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Abstract
Dividend imputation is a way to eliminate the double taxation of dividends. In Australia, imputation
credits allow Australian companies to distribute taxes paid on corporate profits by the company back to
shareholders with dividend payments. Resident shareholders can use these credits to reduce personal
tax liabilities or to receive a tax rebate, while non-resident shareholders cannot use these credits. The
value of imputation credits is different for different investors, which makes estimating the equilibrium
market value of imputation credits difficult.
My thesis provides a theoretical model to compare the market equilibrium before and after
introducing imputation credits. It shows that the introduction of dividend imputation changes the
nature of the equilibrium, including the risk-free rate, the market risk premium, the beta of each asset,
and investors’ portfolio choices. Specifically, dividend imputation creates an incentive for investors to
tilt their portfolios towards domestic assets that distribute imputation credits and away from foreign
assets and domestic assets that do not distribute credits. This results in domestic investors receiving
higher payoffs from their investment, but holding more concentrated portfolios and bearing more
risk. I show that imputation causes a discontinuity in returns for some investors who are ineligible to
redeem credits (because they are not resident investors) but who are required to pay back the entire
face amount of any credit when taking a short position. This results in some investors holding no
position in some assets. Such a corner solution means that the standard CAPM equilibrium does not
hold.
I first demonstrate these effects in a stylized model and then calibrate the model using data from
the Australian and US equities markets.
I also use the model to analyse a number of alternatives to dividend imputation, including reducing
the company tax rate, reducing the tax rate on dividend income, and abolishing the redemption of
excess imputation credits for low-taxed investors.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Dividend imputation was introduced in Australia in 1987 to eliminate double taxation. Imputation
credits are credits that attached to dividends paid to shareholders, reflecting company tax already paid,
and can be used by resident shareholders to offset personal tax liabilities. Dividend imputation ensures
that dividends are taxed only once at the marginal rate of the ultimate owner.
As imputation credits increase shareholders’ pre-personal-tax cash flow, investors might bid up the
stock price, and thus affects the cost of capital for the company. This potential effect of imputation
credits on the cost of capital is important to infrastructure regulation. An economic regulator has to
determine the maximum allowed revenue each year for the regulated business, based on the estimation
of the cost of capital, and regulators tend to consider the value of imputation credits in the estimation.
Overestimate the value of imputation credits, investors of the regulated business will be uncompensated,
and vice verse. Therefore, an accurate estimation of the effect of imputation credits on the cost of
capital is important.
However, only resident shareholders are eligible to use imputation credits, while non-resident
investors cannot use imputation credits. As both group of investors have non negligible effects on
stock prices, it is difficult to estimate the value of imputation credits when these two groups value
imputation credits differently.
There is currently no settled approach to estimate the cost of capital under imputation. One debate
lies on the interpretation of the value of distributed credits when using empirical data to estimate the
value of imputation credits. If a market value interpretation is taken, we should estimate the value
of imputation credits using market value of credits from the market prices of traded securities. If a
redemption proportion interpretation is adopted, we should estimate the value of imputation credits by
estimating the proportion of credits that are redeemed. However, these two approached have resulted in
materially different estimation of the value of imputation credits. Another debate lies on the definition
of market when using market clearing conditions to theoretically analyze the value of imputation
credits. If the market is defined as a perfectly segmented domestic market with only domestic investors,
the value of distributed credits should be 1. If the market is defined as an integrated global market,
where the domestic market makes up a small part of the global market, the value of distributed credits
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should be 0. However, reality is somewhere in between these two extreme and there is no theoretical
model can handle the situation.
This thesis develops a theoretical framework that can accommodate the reality that the Australian
market is not well-described by either perfect segmentation or perfect integration. The framework
calculate market equilibrium under different scenarios and numerically analyze the effects of imputation
on the cost of capital, government bond yields, CAPM parameter estimates, and investor portfolio
choice.
In Chapter 2, the mechanics of dividend imputation in Australia is described in detail. I use a
numerical example to illustrate how the estimation of the value of imputation credits is applied in the
important setting of infrastructure regulation. I also consider the theoretical basis for the valuation of
imputation credits and I discuss a number of difficulties in relation to estimating the value of imputation
credits that have been identified in the current literature.
Chapter 3 develops a stylized single market model to derive the market equilibrium. By comparing
the market equilibrium before and after introducing imputation credits, the effect of imputation can
be quantified. I convert the equilibrium solving problem to a root finding problem (that is solving
g(P) = 0) and I apply numerical methods to find the equilibrium prices. Details of the calculation
method are provided. The results show that the nature of equilibrium is changed by imputation,
including the equilibrium prices of risky assets, the risk-free rate, investors’ portfolio choices, and
CAPM parameters such as the betas of risky assets, the market risk premium and the risk-free rate of
return. The equilibrium prices of assets that provide imputation credits only increase slightly because
the risk-free rate increases and partially offsets the upward pressure on risky asset prices caused by the
availability of imputation credits. The CAPM with imputation credits developed by Lally and van Zijl
(2003) sets out the relationship between required returns and the value of imputation credits under
imputation. This relationship can be numerically verified by the numerical results of my single market
model. However, the CAPM with imputation credits only describes the relationship between returns
after the new equilibrium has reached, but tells us nothing about the change in the equilibrium caused
by the introduction of imputation. Thus, the development of my numerical approach fills an important
gap in the existing literature.
Chapter 4 extends the single market model to a two-market model, which includes a small market
and a large market. The two-market model shows that the effect of introducing imputation into one
market is influenced by the dividend tax policy adopted by the other market, because the two markets
work as whole and should not be analyzed separately. Investors have an incentive to tilt their portfolios
towards domestic assets that distribute imputation credits and away from foreign assets and domestic
assets that do not distribute credits. This creates a home bias. Imputation also causes a discontinuity in
returns for some investors who are ineligible to redeem credits (because they are not resident investors)
but who are required to pay back the entire face amount of any credit when taking a short position.
This results in some investors holding no position in some assets. Such a corner solution means that
the standard CAPM equilibrium does not hold. However, the modelling framework developed in this
thesis enables us to numerically derive the equilibrium outcome and to analyse changes in asset prices
3and the cost of capital and to obtain other useful information under a broad range of scenarios.
Chapter 5 calibrates the two-market model to real market data. The calibrated model includes more
risky assets, and shows that the findings in the previous chapter continue to hold in this more complex
and realistic setting. The calibrated model also enables us to study the estimation error that results
from using a segregated market portfolio instead of the world market portfolio when implementing
the standard CAPM. This is an important analysis because it is common in practice to implement the
CAPM relative to a domestic market portfolio. The results show that this approach produces estimation
errors in relation to asset beta, market risk premium, and expected returns. The estimation errors are
larger for the small market than for the large market.
Chapter 6 adds personal taxes into the calibrated model, and numerically compares the effects of a
number of alternative policies to imputation. The policies compared include reducing the company tax
rate, reducing the tax rate on dividend income, and abolishing the redemption of excess imputation
credits for low-tax investors. The results show that the influence of policy changes has two components:
a direct effect relating to the policy itself and indirect effect resulting from the consequential changes
in the equilibrium outcome. The indirect effect caused by the equilibrium movements is commonly
ignored in the literature, but is crucial to a complete understanding of the effects of different dividend
taxation policies.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.

Chapter 2
Overview of dividend imputation
2.1 Dividend imputation
Rationale for dividend imputation
Prior to 1987, Australia operated a classical tax system in which profits are taxed at the corporate level
and then again at the personal level when distributed to shareholders as a dividend. For example, a
company that earned a profit of $100 would pay $30 of corporate tax at a 30% corporate tax rate. The
net profit after tax of $70 could then be distributed as a dividend to shareholders, who would then be
taxed at their personal level. For a shareholder with a marginal personal tax rate of 50%, this would
amount to $35 of personal tax. That is, of the original $100 profit, the total tax collected is $65, leaving
only $35 for the investor that has had their capital at risk.
This level of taxation was viewed as excessive, creating a disincentive for investment. In 1987,
a dividend imputation system was introduced in Australia in order to remove the double taxation of
dividends. The objective of such a system is to ensure that the source profit (the $100 in the example
above) is taxed only once, at the marginal rate of the ultimate owner (the 50% personal tax rate of the
shareholder in the above example).
The mechanics of dividend imputation in Australia
I use a numerical example to explain how the dividend imputation tax system works in Australia,
following the discussion in Cannavan and Gray (2017).
In Australia, every dollar of dividends that is paid out of profits that have been taxed at the corporate
level in Australia will have T/(1−T ) dollars of imputation credits attached, where T is the corporate
tax rate. For example, at the current 30% corporate tax rate, every dollar of cash dividends paid out of
domestic profits will have a 43 cent imputation credit attached.1 A company that earned a pre-tax profit
of $1.43 pays 43 cents of corporate tax (30%) which creates 43 cents of imputation credits available
1Dividends paid out of profits earned and taxed offshore do not carry imputation credits. Consequently, the maximum
credit that can be attached to a $1 dividend is 43 cents, occurring when that dividend is paid entirely out of profits that have
been taxed in Australia.
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for distribution. This leaves the firm with $1.00 of after-tax profits available for distribution. If the
entire after-tax profit of $1.00 is distributed as a dividend, a 43 cent imputation credit will be attached
to it, reflecting the 43 cents of corporate tax that has already been paid in relation to those profits. If the
firm elected to pay a dividend of only 70 cents (representing a standard dividend payout rate of 70% of
the after-tax profit), the amount of credits that could be attached to it would be 0.43×0.70 = 0.30,
leaving credits with a face amount of 13 cents undistributed.2
A resident shareholder who receives a $1.00 fully-franked3 dividend must then declare income
of $1.43, even though they received only $1.00 of cash dividends. If the resident shareholder has a
marginal rate of personal taxation of 50%, for example, the receipt of the dividend will produce a tax
liability of 71.5 cents.4 The imputation credit can then be used to offset 43 cents of this obligation,
leaving the shareholder to pay the remaining 28.5 cents of personal tax. Thus, the net effect is that the
shareholder receives $1.00 of cash, makes a tax payment of 28.5 cents and retains the remaining 71.5
cents. Note that this is exactly equivalent to the shareholder receiving the entire initial source profit of
$1.43 and paying tax at their marginal rate of 50%. That is, the imputation system has the effect of
making the intervening company structure irrelevant for the tax consequences of resident shareholders.
Resident shareholders whose marginal personal tax rate is lower than the corporate tax rate can
redeem excess franking credits against other income, or if personal tax payable is reduced to zero,
excess credits can be redeemed for cash.5
By contrast, non-resident shareholders, who have no Australian personal tax obligations, receive
no benefit from imputation credits — they can neither use them to lower personal tax obligations nor
redeem them for cash.6
The operation of the dividend imputation system for resident and non-resident shareholders is
summarized in the example set out in Table 2.1. In this example, a company that earns a profit of
$816.3 pays $244.9 corporate tax at a 30% corporate tax rate, which leaves an after-tax profit of $571.4.
Then 70% of the after-tax profit ($400) is distributed as a dividend to shareholders. Suppose there
are four investors equally holding the shares of this company, so that each investor receives a cash
dividend of $100. The mechanics of imputation is shown in the table, with algebraic notation in the
column on the right hand side.
The example in Table 2.1 also shows two other important features of imputation credits. First, for
every dollar of fully-franked dividends, resident shareholders receive an additional (1− tp)T/(1−T )
net benefit from imputation credits compared to non-resident shareholders in the same personal tax
bracket. Second, imputation credits can also be viewed as a tax rebate in relation to personal tax on
2These undistributed credits are available to be attached to future dividends.
3Dividends that have been paid out of Australian profits and therefore have imputation credits attached to them are
known as franked dividends. A fully franked dividend is one that is paid exclusively out of profits that have been taxed in
Australia.
450% of the sum of the cash dividend of $1.00 and the attached credit of 43 cents.
5I note that, at the time of writing, the policy of the federal opposition is to materially restrict the extent to which
excess credits can be redeemed for cash.
6Although non-resident investors are exempt from Australian withholding taxes on franked dividends received,
generally this is of no material benefit since double tax agreements already provide non-residents a credit in their country
of residence for any withholding taxes on unfranked dividends.
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Table 2.1: The mechanics of dividend imputation in Australia
Item Amount
Company profit 816.3
Company tax (tax rate T = 30%) 244.9
After-tax profit 571.4
Dividend paid (70% payout rate) 400.0
Non-resident shareholders Resident shareholders
Personal tax rate (tp) 50% 15% 50% 15%
Dividend Paid 100.0 100.0 1−T 100.0 100.0 1−T
Credit Attached 43.0 43.0 T 43.0 43.0 T
Grossed-up dividend 100.0 100.0 1−T 143.0 143.0 1
Personal tax obligation -50.0 -15.0 −tp(1−T ) -71.5 -21.5 −tp
Offset from credits 0.0 0.0 0 43.0 43.0 T
Net personal tax effect -50.0 -15.0 −tp(1−T ) -28.5 +21.5 −tp+T
Net benefit 50.0 85.0 (1− tp)(1−T ) 71.5 121.5 1− tp
Proportion of corporate profit 35% 59.5% 50% 85%
retained by shareholder
T denotes the company tax rate and tp denotes the personal tax rate.
dividends distributed. In this example, $172 (70% distribution rate times $244.9) of total tax paid by
the company is distributed to shareholders as imputation credits, $86 of which can be redeemed by
shareholders to offset personal tax liabilities (the 50% of the distributed credits that are received by
resident shareholders). This can be equivalently viewed as the company receiving an $86 tax rebate in
relation to its dividend distribution such that it only pays corporate tax of $158.9 (i.e., $244.9−$86).
The after-tax profits are then distributed as dividends, effectively with a greater benefit flowing to
resident shareholders than non-resident shareholders. The $86 in this case is actually the personal tax
of resident shareholders collected at the company level. Under this view, imputation credits have a
potential effect on the cost of equity capital as the benefits that resident shareholders receive from
imputation credits potentially reduces the amount the firm must return to those shareholders. This is
discussed further in section 2.2.
Over time, various methods of transferring imputation credits from non-resident to resident
investors have existed. One example is dividend stripping whereby a foreign (or tax-exempt) investor
sells their shares to a resident investor immediately prior to the ex-dividend date and immediately
repurchases them afterwards (usually at the same fixed price). The resident tax payer then receives
the dividend and the attached credit from the company. The resident then compensates the foreign
investor for the dividend and an agreed portion of the credit. The most significant legislative response
to such methods was the introduction of the 45-day holding period rule in 1997. This rule requires
investors to hold a substantially unhedged position in the shares for a minimum of 45 days around the
ex-date should they wish to redeem the credits, and Cannavan et al. (2004) conclude that this has been
successful in preventing the effective transference of imputation credits among shareholder groups.
Because there is now no simple mechanism for transferring credits among investors, the current
situation is that there are two distinct groups of investors – residents who value credits and non-
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residents who do not. And since there is no market for the transfer of credits, there is no observable
market price for them.
2.2 Effect of dividend imputation on the cost of capital
As the example in Table 2.1 shows, there are two (equivalent) ways to see the potential effects of
imputation credits on the cost of capital:
• From the company’s perspective, it will cost the firm less to provide equity investors with the
return that they require. Dividend imputation tax credits form a part of the return that equity
holders receive, and that component of the return is paid by government via the tax system. In
other words, for a given total required return on equity, the cost to the firm will be reduced by
the extent to which investors value imputation credits. Suppose, for example, that investors
have a 10 per cent required return on equity for a particular firm. In a classical tax system, the
firm would be solely responsible for generating that return for shareholders. In an imputation
system, however, the government provides equity holders with imputation credits. If investors
(in aggregate) receive a yield of say 1 per cent from those credits, the firm will need to pay only
9 per cent to its shareholders.
• From the investor’s perspective, imputation credits increase the pre-personal-tax cash flow that is
available to investors. To the extent that equity investors (in aggregate) value imputation credits,
they will bid up the stock price to reflect the present value of those credits. Consequently, a firm
will be able to raise more equity from a given stream of dividends.
2.3 Application to infrastructure regulation
The idea that equity holders receive a portion of their required return on equity from imputation
credits is particularly important in the context of infrastructure regulation. Infrastructure assets such
as electricity and gas distribution and transmission networks, water businesses, and some telecom-
munications, rail and port assets are natural monopolies. For example, there will only be a single
electricity distribution network in any city. To ensure that prices do not reflect monopoly rents and that
the efficient amount of investment occurs, an economic regulator will determine the maximum allowed
revenue each year for the regulated business. For example, the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) is
responsible for regulating gas and electricity transmission and distribution businesses in all states other
than Western Australia. The total value of the assets of these companies is in the hundreds of billions.
The way the AER goes about setting the maximum allowed revenue for each business is to use
what is known as a ’building block’ approach. This involves setting the allowed revenue such that the
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regulated firm is able to cover efficient operating costs, corporate taxes and regulatory depreciation,7
and generate sufficient profits to provide a fair return on capital. The return on capital is the product of
what the regulator considers to be a fair return for investors (or WACC) and the value of the assets that
are being regulated (known as the regulated asset base, or RAB). For example, if a firm has assets with
a value (RAB) of $7 billion and the regulator has determined that a fair return (WACC) is 10 per cent,
the firm would be allowed to charge prices so that its profit (after covering efficient operating costs
etc.) was $700 million. This profit would then be paid to investors as a return on the capital that they
have provided to the firm. The regulator will separately determine what it considers to be a fair return
on debt and equity capital (in light of the different nature and risk of those two forms of investment)
and combine them by taking a weighted-average to form an estimate of the WACC.
It is the return on equity capital that is relevant to the discussion about the benefits of the dividend
imputation tax system. As discussed in the previous section, a firm receives a type of subsidy from
imputation credits for the (after corporate tax) return required by its equity holders. This is analogous
to the tax subsidy received for the interest payments it makes to debt holders. In the case of debt, the
subsidy is via the tax deductibility of interest payments, and in the case of equity the subsidy is via
the distribution of imputation credits. Therefore, just as a firm’s weighted-average cost of capital is
adjusted for the tax-deductibility of interest payments on debt, so it must be adjusted for the impact of
imputation credits.
The AER estimates the effect of imputation credits on the cost of equity capital using a framework
known as the Officer model. Officer (1994) shows that the value of imputation credits enters the cost
of capital equation via a parameter referred to as “gamma” or γ . This parameter represents the value of
an imputation credit at the time it is created by the firm’s payment of a dollar of Australian corporate
tax. The standard approach for estimating the value of imputation tax credits, γ , is as the product of
two components: the proportion of created credits that are distributed to shareholders (the distribution
rate, F) and the market value of those credits that are distributed to shareholders measured as the extent
to which they are capitalized into the stock price (θ ), so that γ = F×θ .
Let re be the total required return on equity. Under the assumptions of Officer, imputation credits
reduce the firm’s cost of equity capital as follows:
re
[
1−T
1−T (1− γ)
]
where T is the relevant corporate tax rate and γ is the equilibrium value of franking credits to the
representative shareholder (i.e., the value of credits that is capitalized into the stock price).
To see why this is the case, consider the illustrative example in Table 2.2.
In this example, the firm earns a profit of $100, pays $30 of corporate tax (creating credits with
a face value of $30), leaving an after-tax profit of $70. From this, the firm pays a $49 dividend
7Australia operates an ’incentive based’ regulatory framework whereby the regulator makes an assessment of the
operating costs, corporate taxes, and depreciation that would be incurred by an efficient business, rather than allowing the
business to recover whatever its actual costs might have been. If the business is able to beat the efficient benchmark, it
keeps some of the efficiency gains. If businesses consistently beat the regulatory allowance, the regulator will redefine
what it considers to be efficient and the process begins again.
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Table 2.2: Stylized derivation of Officer (1994) formula
Parameter Numerical example Algebraic notation
Profit 100 1
Less Corporate tax 30 T
After-tax profit 70 1−T
Dividend paid 49 (1−T )F
(70% payout rate)
Retained profit/capital gain 21 (1−T )(1−F)
(= 70−49)
Imputation credit distributed 21.07 (1−T )F× T1−T = FT
(43% of dividend paid)
Value of imputation credit 7.37 θFT = γT
(setting the value of distributed
credits to 35% of the face amount)
Total return to shareholder 77.37 (1−T )F
(= 49+21+7.37) +(1−T )(1−F)
+γT = (1−T )+ γT
Return provided by the firm 70 (1−T )
(= 49+21)
Proportion of total return 90.5% 1−T
1−T+γT =
1−T
1−T (1−γ)provided by the firm (= 70/77.37)
(representing a 70% payout rate) and the remaining $21 that is reinvested back into the firm is assumed
to earn a fair return such it has a net present value of $21. The $49 dividend will have $21.07 of credits
attached to it (43% of the amount of the dividend). That distributed credit is assumed, in this example,
to have a market value of 35% of the face amount.
Thus the total return to shareholders (dividend plus capital gain plus imputation credit) is $77.37,
of which the firm is responsible for providing the dividend and capital gain ($70), such that the firm is
required to generate 90.5% of the total required return on equity. Note that gamma is the product of
the distribution rate and the value of distributed credits, which in this example is:
γ = F×θ = 0.7×0.35 = 0.25.
Other things being equal, a higher gamma means that the regulator has assessed that credits are
worth more to investors such that the firm’s cost of equity is reduced. The regulator then reduces the
profit that the regulated firm is allowed to earn by the estimated value of credits to investors.
This means that it is very important for the regulator to accurately estimate the value of imputation
credits to investors. If the regulator overestimates the value of imputation credits, investors in the firm
will be undercompensated, and vice versa, as shown in the numerical example below.
Numerical example
Consider a regulated firm with $10 billion of assets in place. The regulator estimates that the required
return on equity is 8%, the required return on debt is 5%, the proportion of debt financing is 60%, and
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the corporate tax rate is 30%. The regulator estimates the vanilla WACC8 and then sets allowed cash
flows accordingly. Suppose the regulator sets gamma to 0.4, but the true value of imputation credits is
only 25% of the face amount. In this case, the equity holders will be undercompensated because the
regulator has assumed that investors receive more value from the imputation credits than they actually
do.
The vanilla WACC in this case is:
WACC = rLe
E
V
+ rd
D
V
= 8%×0.4+5%×0.6 = 6.2%.
The total allowed return is:
6.2%×10 billion = 620 million.
Within the regulatory model, the cash flow that corresponds to the vanilla WACC is given by:
C− (C− rdD)T (1− γ) = 620
so
C− (C−5%×6 billion)×0.3× (1−0.25) = 620 million
in which case C = 712.90. Thus, to properly compensate the equity holders, the firm would have to
charge its customers prices so that it generates a pre-tax profit of $712.90 million. This would then be
distributed as set out in Table 2.3 below.
Table 2.3: Distribution of cash flows in Australian regulatory framework
A Pre-tax profit 712.90
B Interest 300.00
C = A−B Taxable income 412.90
D = 0.3×C Tax paid 123.87
E = A−B−D Dividend paid 289.03
F = 0.25×D Value of credits 30.97
G = E +F Total return to equity 320.00
The equity holders would then have a return of 320/4,000 = 8%, as required.
But suppose the regulator sets gamma to 0.4 even though investors truly value those credits at
only 0.25. That is, the regulator has over-estimated the true value of the credits. In that case, the total
allowed pre-tax profit would be set so that:
C− (C−5%×6 billion)×0.3× (1−0.4) = 620 million
in which case C = 690.24. Thus, the allowance would be as set out in Table 2.4.
8That is, a simple weighted average of the required return on debt and the required return on equity.
12 CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW OF DIVIDEND IMPUTATION
Table 2.4: Distribution of cash flows in Australian regulatory framework: Incorrect regulatory estimate
A Pre-tax profit 690.24
B Interest 300.00
C = A−B Taxable income 390.24
D = 0.3×C Tax paid 117.07
E = A−B−D Dividend paid 273.17
F = 0.25×D Value of credits 29.27
G = E +F Total return to equity 302.44
The equity holders would be under-compensated by 320−302.44 = 17.56. The return to equity
holders would be 302.44/4,000 = 7.56%.
This example shows that the accurate estimation of gamma is very important when setting allowed
returns on regulated infrastructure assets.
2.4 Theoretical basis for the value of imputation credits
Recall that the value of imputation credits, gamma, or γ , is the product of the distribution rate F and
the value of the distributed credits θ :
γ = F×θ .
Generally, firms do not distribute 100% of their domestic profits every year, preferring to reinvest to
finance future growth. According to data from Australian Taxation Office, the cumulative imputation
credit distribution ratio, F , has been very stable for many years at around 70%. By contrast, the value
of distributed credits, θ , has proven to be more controversial in practice.
Market value or redemption rate?
Two different interpretations of the value of distributed credits, θ , have been proposed in practice:
• A market value interpretation: the extent to which the value of credits is capitalized into stock
prices; and
• A redemption proportion interpretation: the proportion of distributed credits that are redeemed
by investors.
These two interpretations lead to different estimation approaches:
• If the market value interpretation is adopted, we should use estimation methods that are designed
to estimate the market value of credits from the market prices of traded securities. For example,
dividend drop-off analysis (which infers the value of credits by comparing stock prices before
and after the ex-dividend date), comparative pricing studies (which infer the value of credits from
comparable securities, one of which entitles the owner to receive credits and one of which does
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not), and returns studies (which infer the value of credits by examining stock returns over periods
with and without the payment of credits). These market value studies have been summarized by
Ainsworth et al. (2016).
• If the redemption proportion interpretation is adopted, we should use estimation methods that
are designed to estimate the proportion of credits that are (or are likely to be) redeemed. This
redemption proportion can be measured directly using aggregate tax statistics published by the
Australian Taxation Office, or indirectly using data on the proportion of Australian equity owned
by resident investors.
These two approaches have resulted in materially different estimates of gamma. If gamma is defined
to be the market value of credits, the market value studies support a gamma between 0 and 25% of
the face amount of credits created. By contrast, if gamma is defined to be the redemption rate, the
redemption rate studies support a gamma between 30% and 60% of the face amount of credits created.
Theoretical basis
The theoretical basis for the value of distributed imputation credits (theta) is set out in Monkhouse
(1993) and Lally and van Zijl (2003). These studies develop a standard asset-pricing equilibrium
framework, analogous to the CAPM, but where investors receive imputation credits attached to
dividends. Within this framework, the value of distributed credits is derived using a standard market-
clearing condition. This leads to a standard representative agent equilibrium. The result is that the
equilibrium market value of distributed credits, or theta, is a weighted-average of the utilization rates
of investors in the market, where the weights depend on the wealth and risk-aversion of investors. The
utilization rate is assumed to be 1 for domestic investors who can redeem imputation credits, and 0 for
non-resident investors who cannot. It is important to note that the market-wide utilization rate is not
the proportion of total credits that are redeemed.
Since this equilibrium result is derived from a market clearing condition (in which all of the wealth
of investors is used to purchase all of the assets in the market), the definition of “the market” is very
important.
At one extreme, the market can be defined to be a perfectly segmented domestic market with only
domestic investors, all of whom can redeem imputation credits. In this case, the weighted-average
utilization rate is 1, by definition. This is the approach of Lally and van Zijl (2003).
At the other extreme, the market can be defined to be an integrated global market, where the
domestic market in question makes up a small part of the global market. In this case, the weighted-
average utilization rate will be close to zero as the vast majority of investors will be unable to redeem
credits issued by the (small) domestic country.
The reality is somewhere in between the perfect segmentation and perfect integration cases. There is
substantial foreign investment in Australian equities and substantial investment by Australian residents
into foreign equities. However, there is also a material home bias, whereby Australian investors tend
to hold more Australian equities than would be implied by an optimally diversified portfolio. See, for
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example, Black and Kirkwood (2010), who estimate that approximately 60% of Australian equities are
held by domestic investors.
These results are problematic for the standard approaches to estimating the cost of capital for
domestic firms under imputation credits. The CAPM (or some variant of it) is commonly used to
estimate the total required return on equity. This total return must then be disaggregated into the
component provided by the government (imputation credits) and the component provided by the firm
(dividends and capital gains).
It is most common in practice to estimate CAPM parameters from the perspective of the domestic
market. For example, the risk-free rate is estimated from the yield on domestic government bonds, the
market risk premium is estimated using data from the domestic stock market, and beta is estimated
relative to the domestic stock market. Lally and van Zijl (2003) conclude that this implies that theta
should be estimated on the basis of a domestic market, in which case it would be set to 1. But that fails
to recognize the reality that there is a material amount of foreign investment into Australia, and that
foreign investment affects Australian government bond yields and stock returns. Thus, if a segregated
domestic market assumption is to be used, then all parameters would have to be re-estimated in terms
of what they would have been in the absence of foreign investment, which is an impossible task. It
would also produce an irrelevant result as the cost of equity in the market does reflect the impact of
foreign investment.
However, the assumption of an integrated world market (which implies a theta of approximately
0) is also problematic for two reasons. First, that framework does not recognize the material home
bias that is evident among Australian investors. Second, standard practice is to use domestic data to
estimate cost of capital parameters because that approach better explains returns than a world CAPM.
The result is that there is no settled approach for estimating the cost of capital in an imputation
setting where one group of investors (residents) benefit from imputation credits and another group
of investors (non-residents) does not. Whereas it is standard to estimate the risk-free rate, market
risk premium and beta using domestic market data (that reflects the trading in the domestic market
by non-resident investors), there are a range of approaches for recognizing the effects of dividend
imputation. Independent expert valuation reports and corporate practitioners tend to make no adjust-
ment for imputation credits when estimating the cost of capital. By contrast, economic regulators
tend to make an adjustment in relation to the proportion of credits that are redeemed. None of these
approaches are entirely consistent with any known equilibrium model, because the existing models
cannot accommodate anything other than perfect segmentation or perfect integration.
This thesis develops a theoretical framework that can accommodate the reality that the Australian
market is not well-described by either perfect segmentation or perfect integration. The framework
enables numerical analysis of the effects of imputation on the cost of capital, government bond yields,
CAPM parameter estimates, and investor portfolio choice.
Chapter 3
Equilibrium in a single domestic market
This chapter derives an equilibrium and analyses the effects of imputation credits in a single domestic
market. The purpose of the chapter is to illustrate how to numerically compute the market equilibrium
in a single stylized market, and to use that framework to compare the equilibrium outcomes before and
after introducing imputation credits. This makes it possible to analyze the effect that imputation credits
have on asset prices, investors’ portfolio choices, CAPM parameters, and so on. In the following
sections, I first introduce the method to compute the market equilibrium, then I present the equilibrium
results and study the properties of the equilibrium, and lastly I analyze the effects of imputation credits.
I find that:
• The equilibrium risk-free rate increases after introducing imputation. As imputation credits
increase the expected return of risky assets, investors decrease their investment in the risk-free
asset, so the risk-free asset has a lower equilibrium price and thus has a higher return.
• The equilibrium prices of risky assets do not change materially after the introduction of impu-
tation. Since the risk-free rate increases, the relativity of returns between all assets does not
change materially. The investors’ initial endowments are unchanged and its allocation between
assets remains largely unchanged.
• The equilibrium cost of capital for each firm does not change materially, since the price of each
risky asset does not change materially. That is, the benefits from the introduction of imputation
flow materially to investors (via higher expected returns) rather than to firms (via a reduced cost
of capital).
• A negligible proportion of the face amount of credits is capitalised into asset prices. The increase
in the equilibrium risk-free rate offsets the upward pressure on risky asset prices caused by the
availability of imputation credits.
• The introduction of imputation credits changes the nature of the equilibrium – all components of
the equilibrium change with the introduction of imputation. This effect has not been identified
in the previous literature. The introduction of imputation results in a change in the equilibrium
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risk-free rate, the market risk premium, and the beta of each asset. Investors’ portfolio choices
are also changed.
• If we assume that government changes the supply of the risk-free asset to maintain the same risk-
free rate of interest when imputation is introduced, the nature of the equilibrium changes again.
In this scenario, the benefits of imputation credits largely move from investors to companies.
The equilibrium prices of risky assets increase, such that the expected return to investors is
unchanged, and the firms’ cost of capital is reduced.
• The CAPM with imputation credits developed by Lally and van Zijl (2003) sets out the relation-
ship between required returns and the value of imputation credits after the new equilibrium has
been reached, but does not consider the movement between the equilibrium in a no-imputation
world to the new equilibrium in a with-imputation world.
• The CAPM with imputation credits is consistent with the Classic CAPM relation (i.e., the
standard textbook formula) where all returns include the value of imputation tax credits – not
just dividends and capital gains.
• In practice, it is common to implement the CAPM by measuring returns to include dividends
and capital gains only. This leads to estimation error such that the expected return is over-stated
for high-beta stocks and under-stated for low-beta stocks.
3.1 Method of calculating the market equilibrium
Financial market equilibrium is defined to occur when investors’ aggregate demand equals aggregate
supply for every asset in the market. Aggregate demand for an asset can be represented by the total
investors’ funds invested in it, and aggregate supply can be represented by the asset’s price.1
In a standard CAPM equilibrium, investors agree about the distribution of payoffs for each asset.
For a given set of asset prices, the expected return of each asset is determined from the expected payoff
and the asset price. The set of expected returns then implies the optimal portfolio for each investor.
Each investor chooses a portfolio that is mean-variance efficient and has maximum expected utility.
The set of investors’ optimal portfolios generates the aggregate monetary allocation for assets, which
is the aggregate demand. Since the mean-variance efficient portfolios that investors form are fully
determined by the assets’ expected returns and covariances, which in turn are determined by the assets’
current prices and expected payoffs, equilibrium occurs when the expected returns implied by asset
prices result in the investors’ aggregate monetary allocation in each asset equalling the respective asset
prices.
The equilibrium condition is summarized in Table 3.1, taking a market with two investors, three
risky assets and a risk-free asset as an example. In this table, ω ji is the optimal proportion of their initial
1Here I ignore the fact that an asset may be divided up into a finite number of ’shares,’ effectively assuming infinite
divisibility of assets.
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wealth that investor j invests in asset i, W j0 is the initial wealth of investor j, and Pi is the equilibrium
price of asset i. For each row, the amount invested in each asset adds to equal the initial wealth of
the investor. For each column, the total dollar investment from all investors in each asset equals the
asset price. That is, in equilibrium, all of the investors in the market have invested all of their wealth
into assets in the market, and the total amount invested is equal to the total value of the assets. This
represents the standard market-clearing equilibrium condition.
Table 3.1: Equilibrium condition
Asset 1 2 3 Risk-free Total
Investor A ωA1 ·W A0 ωA2 ·W A0 ωA3 ·W A0 (1−ωA ·1) ·W A0 W A0
Investor B ωB1 ·W B0 ωB2 ·W B0 ωB3 ·W B0 (1−ωB ·1) ·W B0 W B0
Total P1 P2 P3 Pr f W A0 +W
B
0
This table shows the equilibrium condition for a market with two investors, three
risky assets and one risk-free asset. For each row, the amount invested in each
asset adds to equal the initial wealth of the investor. For each column, the total
dollar investment from all investors in each asset equals the asset price.
I then construct an algorithm to calculate the market equilibrium, as summarised in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Calculating the market equilibrium
1: Set up predetermined parameter values including expected payoff, standard deviation and corre-
lation matrix of risky assets, payoff of risk-free asset, investors’ initial wealth and risk aversion
rate.
2: Choose an initial guess of asset prices.
3: Calculate the expected return of assets and corresponding covariance matrix of risky assets implied
by the guess of asset prices.
4: Calculate the optimal portfolio for each investor – the mean-variance efficient portfolio that
maximizes expected utility.
5: Calculate aggregate investment in each asset.
6: Calculate the difference between aggregate investment and the price of each asset.
7: If difference > tolerance, improve the guess of asset prices and return to Step 3.
8: Otherwise conclude that the market is in equilibrium.
The algorithm requires the calculation of the optimal portfolio for each investor and an optimisation
routine to improve the guess of asset prices until the market equilibrium is reached. Details of these
steps of the algorithm are provided in the remainder of this section and Appendix A.
3.1.1 Investor portfolio optimisation
Investors are assumed to be risk averse expected utility maximisers with mean-variance preferences,
consistent with the CAPM. Thus, all investors will adopt the portfolio that has maximum expected
utility (given their degree of risk aversion) among all mean-variance efficient portfolios.
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In this thesis, investors are assumed to have power utility functions and make a single-period
portfolio choice. The expected utility function for every investor to maximize is:
E
[
U(W˜ )
]
=
[
W0(1+µp)
]1−ε
1− ε −
1
2
W 20 σp
2 ε[
W0(1+µp])
]1+ε , (3.1)
where W˜ is the investor’s normally distributed end-of-period wealth, W0 is the investor’s start-of-period
wealth, µp and σp2 are the mean and variance of the portfolio return, and ε is the investor’s relative
risk aversion rate. The derivation of Equation 3.1 is given in Appendix A.1.
Let µ =
[
E[r1],E[r2], ...,E[rn]
]T
be an n×1 vector of n risky assets’ expected returns. Let Σ be an
n×n covariance matrix of the returns on the n assets. Since Σ is a covariance matrix, it is symmetric
and positive definite. 1 is a n×1 vector of ones. Assume there is a risk-free asset with risk-free return
rate r f . Given a target portfolio return µˆp, the weights of the mean-variance efficient portfolio is:
ωˆT =
(µˆp− r f )Σ−1(µ− r f ·1)
(µ− r f ·1)TΣ−1(µ− r f ·1) , (3.2)
where ωˆ is the portfolio proportions in risky assets, and (·−1) is the inverse of a matrix. Moreover, the
variance of the mean-variance efficient portfolio σp2 satifies:
σp2 =
(µˆp− r f )2
(µ− r f ·1)TΣ−1(µ− r f ·1) . (3.3)
The derivation of Equation 3.2 and Equation 3.3 is given in Appendix A.2.
Substituting Equation 3.3 into Equation 3.1 produces the optimization problem that involves finding
the expected return of the portfolio, µ∗p, that maximizes the investor’s expected utility:
µ∗p = argmax
µˆp
{
E
[
U(µˆp)
]}
,
where:
E
[
U(µˆp)
]
=
[
W0(1+ µˆp)
]1−ε
1− ε −
1
2
W 20
(µˆp− r f )2
(µ− r f ·1)TΣ−1(µ− r f ·1)
ε[
W0(1+ µˆp])
]1+ε .
The closed-form solution to the above optimisation problem is:
µp∗ =
−r f −W0K
W0K−1 , (3.4)
where:
K =
B−
√
B2−4AW0
2A
,
B =
εW 20
C
,
A =
ε(1+ ε)W 30
2C
,
C = (µ− r f ·1)TΣ−1(µ− r f ·1).
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Having obtained the expected return of the optimal portfolio, µ∗p, the corresponding portfolio
weights and portfolio variance can then be calculated by substituting µ∗p into µˆp in Equation 3.2 and
Equation 3.3.
Thus, we have the optimal portfolio weights, expected return and variance for each investor
according to their risk aversion.
Next, note that the Classic CAPM Equation 3.5 is implied by mean-variance portfolio theory:
(E[ri]− r f ) = βi(E[rm]− r f ), for i = 1,2, ...n, (3.5)
where ri is the return of the ith asset, rm is the return of the market portfolio, σm2 is the variance of the
market portfolio and βi is defined as:
βi =
Cov(ri,rm)
σm2
.
Derivation of the Classic CAPM is given in Appendix A.2. In this thesis, I call Equation 3.5 the Classic
CAPM in order to distinguish it from a version of the CAPM with imputation credits considered
later. The derivation has not restricted the sign of market portfolio weights, since assets must have
non-negative supply, equilibrium market clearing implies that assets’ returns must adjust to make the
aggregate portfolio demands for individual assets to be non-negative.
3.1.2 Calculating the market clearing equilibrium
The optimal portfolios imply the aggregate monetary allocation in each asset, which equals the asset
price in equilibrium. That is, market clearing occurs when a set of asset prices results in the total
demand for each asset equalling the total supply of that asset.
If the assumed price of an asset is greater than the aggregate demand for that asset, the market is
not in equilibrium and the price of that asset must be reduced. And vice versa if the assumed price is
below the aggregate demand. Thus, an optimisation algorithm is required to determine how prices
should be changed to converge to equilibrium.
I convert the optimisation problem to a fixed point finding or root finding problem. Let P denote
the price vector of all assets, i.e., P = [P1,P2,P3,Pr f ] in the three risky assets and one risk-free asset
example. Let A (a 1×4 vector in this example) denote the aggregate money allocation in the assets. The
aggregate dollar allocation in assets is a function of price, denoted as A = f (P). Then the equilibrium
calculation can be interpreted as a fixed point finding problem which satisfies A = f (P) = P, or
equivalently a root finding problem solving g(P) = A−P = f (P)−P = 0. A trust-region dogleg
approach is applied to solve this problem. See Nocedal and Wright (2006) for details of the method.
3.2 Equilibrium and equilibrium sensitivity in a standard CAPM
setting
In this section, a simple set up is used to study the properties and sensitivity of the single-market
model equilibrium. I consider a stylized market in which there are three risky assets and two investors.
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The objective of this section is to demonstrate that the numerical optimization approach set out above
derives the standard CAPM equilibrium that is known to hold in such a setting.
3.2.1 A single market setting
In this single-market model, there are three risky assets, one risk-free asset, and two investors. The
payoffs from risky assets are assumed to be jointly normally distributed. These random payoffs can
be considered as the total of an end-of-period stock price plus a dividend. Let C˜ denote the random
payoffs from the three risky assets, having the following properties:
• Expectation:
E[C˜] = [$100,$100,$100],
• Standard deviation:
Std[C˜] = [11,18,13],
• Correlation:
Corr[C˜] =

1 0.4 0.2
0.4 1 0.3
0.2 0.3 1
 .
The risk-free asset is assumed to have a payoff of $10 and earn a risk-free rate given by r f .
Let r be the vector of returns on the risky assets. For a given vector of asset prices, x =
[P1,P2,P3,Pr f ], the asset returns are also normally distributed with:
• Expectation:
µ = E[r] =
[(100
P1
−1
)
,
(100
P2
−1
)
,
(100
P3
−1
)]T
,
• Standard deviation:
Std[r] =
[11
P1
,
18
P2
,
13
P3
]T
,
• Correlation:
Corr[r] = Corr[C˜],
• Covariance:
Σ=

11
P1
0 0
0 18P2 0
0 0 13P3
Corr[r]

11
P1
0 0
0 18P2 0
0 0 13P3
 .
The risk-free rate is given by:
r f =
10
Pr f
−1.
For the convenience of analysing market equilibrium sensitivity, the two investors, Investor A and
Investor B, are assumed to have equal wealth and relative risk aversion rate for now:
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• Investor A initial wealth and risk aversion rate W A0 = 135, εA = 5,
• Investor B initial wealth and risk aversion rate W B0 = 135, εB = 5.
3.2.2 The standard CAPM equilibrium outcome
With the data set out above, the equilibrium outcome is shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Equilibrium result for A(135,5), B(135,5)
Asset 1 2 3 Risk-free
Payoff 100 100 100 10
Price 88.17 85.05 87.67 9.11
Return 13.42% 17.58% 14.06% 9.78%
Allocation A 44.08 42.52 43.84 4.55
(135,5) Return: 14.81%, Std dev: 11.54%
Allocation B 44.08 42.52 43.84 4.55
(135,5) Return: 14.81%, Std dev: 11.54%
Market 33.80% 32.60% 33.60% –
portfolio Return: 14.99%, Std dev: 11.94%
The table shows the equilibrium result for both Investor A
and B have initial wealth $135 and risk aversion rate 5. In this
case, Investor As and B choose the same portfolio and each
holds 50% of every asset. The equilibrium is characterized
as the sum of the investment into each asset being equal to
the price of the relevant asset.
In this case, Investors A and B have the same initial wealth and risk aversion. Due to this symmetry,
they choose the same optimal portfolio and each of them holds exactly 50% of every asset. The
equilibrium is characterized as the sum of the investment into each asset being equal to the price of the
relevant asset.
The mean-variance efficient portfolios and the optimal portfolio chosen by investors are shown in
Figure 3.1.
In equilibrium, both investors have a long position in the risk-free asset, as shown in Figure 3.1 –
the portfolios held by both investors plot below the tangency portfolio.
The expected utility for different levels of portfolio returns is shown in Figure 3.2. The optimal
portfolio for every investor always consists of a combination of the risk-free asset and the tangency
portfolio. Thus, the portfolio return varies only according to the relative proportions invested in each
component. Higher portfolio returns involve a relatively higher weighting in the tangency portfolio
and consequently higher portfolio variance. The equilibrium portfolio is shown to be the portfolio that
maximises the expected utility of the investors.
It is important to show that the numerically derived equilibrium is consistent with the Classic
CAPM equilibrium that holds in this setting. The beta for each asset can be derived using Equation A.10
and the expected returns for each asset derived from the CAPM are consistent with the numerically
derived expected returns set out above, as shown in Table 3.3.
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Figure 3.1: Efficient portfolios and investors’ portfolio choice
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Figure 3.2: Expected utility by portfolio return
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Table 3.3: Classic CAPM parameter values in equilibrium
MRP E[rm]− r f 5.21% = 14.99%−9.78%
Asset Beta Asset expected return
1 0.70 13.42% = 9.78%+0.70×5.21%
2 1.50 17.58% = 9.78%+1.50×5.21%
3 0.82 14.06% = 9.78%+0.82×5.21%
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A more direct way to display the Classic CAPM is by the Security Market Line, which displays
the expected rate of return of an individual security as a function of asset beta and the excess expected
return on the market portfolio (or market risk premium), as shown in Figure 3.3. Note that the expected
returns of Asset 1, 2 and 3 all lie on the Security Market Line, consistent with the Classic CAPM.
Figure 3.3: Security Market Line
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3.2.3 Sensitivity of equilibrium to initial wealth
With other parameters (including the distribution of asset payoffs) fixed, an increase in the initial
wealth of investors changes asset prices but does not change the portfolio weights – investors simply
pay more for each asset, which increases asset prices and decreases expected returns. Therefore, the
market portfolio weights and the betas of risky assets all remain unchanged. Panel (a) of Figure 3.4
shows that, as the initial wealth of investors increases from $95 to $145, the expected return on each
asset decreases. The curves in this figure are parallel because investors do not change their portfolio
weights. Panel (b) of Figure 3.4 shows the efficient frontier, CML and market portfolio for the case
where the initial wealth of Investor A and Investor B is $105 and $135 respectively. The shape of
the efficient frontier and the slope of the CML stay unchanged, but shift downward as initial wealth
increases. When investor wealth increases, the return on the market portfolio and the risk-free rate of
return both decrease as investors pay more for the same asset payoffs.
3.2.4 Sensitivity of equilibrium to investor risk aversion
As investor risk aversion increases, the optimal portfolio changes to place less weight on risky assets
and more weight on the risk-free asset. Holding the distribution of asset payoffs constant, a higher
demand for the risk-free asset results in a lower risk-free rate of return. Within the set of risky assets
in this illustrative economy, Asset 2 has the highest risk, having materially higher standard deviation
relative to the other risky assets and having a relatively high correlation with Asset 1. Consequently, as
investor risk aversion increases, the weight assigned to Asset 2 decreases relative to the other risky
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Figure 3.4: Sensitivity to initial wealth
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assets. The market portfolio thus tilts toward Asset 1 and Asset 3, as shown in Panel (a) of Figure 3.5.
Consequently, the equilibrium prices of Asset 1 and Asset 3 increase (due to the relatively higher
demand), while the equilibrium price of Asset 2 falls (due to relatively lower demand). Equivalently,
the expected returns of Asset 1 and Asset 3 fall, while the expected return rate of Asset 2 rises, as
shown in Panel (b) in Figure 3.5. Higher risk aversion also results in the risk-free asset receiving more
weight in the investors’ optimal portfolio, so the price of the risk-free asset rises and the risk-free rate
of return falls. Moreover, Panel (c) of Figure 3.5 shows the efficient frontier, CML and market portfolio
for risk aversion rate for the two investors equal to 3 and 6, respectively. As risk aversion rises, the
risk-free rate falls and the expected return on the market portfolio rises, resulting in a materially higher
market risk premium, as expected. The shape of the efficient frontier also changes – as risk aversion
increases the returns available on low-risk portfolios fall (as the price of relatively low-risk assets rises)
and the returns available on high-risk portfolios rises (as the price of relatively high-risk assets falls).
That is, low-risk assets become relatively more attractive to investors and high-risk assets become
relatively less attractive.
3.2.5 Sensitivity of equilibrium to the wealth proportion of the more risk averse
investor
Asymmetry in the risk aversion of investors
When the two investors in the economy have the same risk aversion rate, changing the wealth proportion
between them has no effect on the equilibrium outcome as all market investment is made by investors
with the same preferences. The only change will be in the proportion of assets held by each investor.
Consequently, I now consider the case where the two investors have different risk aversion rates. It is
still assumed that both investors have initial wealth of $135, however I now assume that Investor A has
a risk aversion rate of 4, and that Investor B has a risk aversion rate of 6. The equilibrium results are
shown in Table 3.4.
3.2. EQUILIBRIUM AND EQUILIBRIUM SENSITIVITY IN A STANDARD CAPM SETTING 25
Figure 3.5: Sensitivity to risk aversion rate
(a)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Risk aversion rate
0.32
0.325
0.33
0.335
0.34
M
ar
ke
t p
or
tfo
lio
 w
ei
gh
t 
Asset 1
Asset 2
Asset 3
(b)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Risk aversion rate
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
As
se
t r
et
ur
ns
 
Asset 1
Asset 2
Asset 3
Risk-free asset
(c)
0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16
Portfolio standard deviation
0.125
0.13
0.135
0.14
0.145
0.15
0.155
0.16
Po
rtf
ol
io
 re
tu
rn Efficient frontier 3CML 3
Market portfolio 3
Efficient frontier 6
CML 6
Market portfolio 6
Table 3.4: Equilibrium result for A(135,4), B(135,6)
Asset 1 2 3 Risk-free
Payoff 100 100 100 10
Price 88.13 85.12 87.65 9.10
Return 13.47% 17.48% 14.09% 9.95%
Allocation A 53.50 51.67 53.21 -23.37
(135,4) Return: 15.86%, Std dev: 14.00%
Allocation B 34.63 33.45 34.45 32.47
(135,6) Return: 13.77%,Std dev: 9.07%
Market 33.78% 32.62% 33.60% –
portfolio Return: 14.98%, Std dev:11.94%
The table shows the equilibrium result where Investor A has
risk aversion rate 4 and Investor B has risk aversion rate of 6,
and both investors have initial wealth $135. Being less risk
averse, Investor A chooses a portfolio with higher expected
return and higher risk compared to Investor B.
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Comparing the new equilibrium result with Table 3.2, we see a fall in the prices of Asset 1, Asset
3 and the risk-free asset, and an increase in the price of Asset 2, which is consistent with an overall
decrease in risk aversion. The portfolio choices of Investors A and B are now different. Investor A is
relatively less risk averse and borrows at the risk-free asset to invest in risky assets (A’s allocation to
the risk-free asset is negative). By contrast, Investor B is now relatively more risk averse and invests a
larger allocation in the risk-free asset. As Investor A takes a higher proportion of investment in the
market than his initial wealth, the overall risk aversion rate is reduced, thereby causing the change
in the respective prices of the assets. The portfolio choices of A and B, and the CML, are shown in
Figure 3.6. We see that the optimal portfolio for A is above the market portfolio, while B adopts a
portfolio below the market portfolio. Thus, Investor A holds a portfolio with higher expected return
and higher risk compared to Investor B, as expected.
Figure 3.6: Efficient frontier and CML: A(135,4), B(135,6)
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Sensitivity of equilibrium to the wealth proportion of the more risk averse investor
As the relative proportion of total investor wealth moves more towards the more risk averse investor,
B, the market portfolio moves away from the most risky asset (2). Asset prices and expected returns
also move in the corresponding direction, as shown in Figure 3.7. As we increase the proportion of
wealth owned by the more risk averse investor, the changes in the equilibrium are similar to the case
above where we increase the risk-aversion rate of all investors – because in both cases the market
in aggregate is becoming more risk averse. Specifically, the market portfolio changes towards the
relatively less risky Assets 1 and 3 and away from the relatively more risky Asset 2, as shown in Panel
(a) of Figure 3.7. As a result, the expected returns of Assets 1 and 3 fall, while the expected return on
Asset 2 rises as its price falls due to the lower demand for it. The risk-free rate also falls as a result of
the increased demand for that asset as the relative wealth of the risk averse investor increases. Also, the
shape of the efficient frontier changes, in the same way as when aggregate risk aversion was increased
above. This is shown in Panel (c) of Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: Sensitivity of equilibrium to wealth proportion of B
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3.2.6 Summary of equilibrium sensitivities
Table 3.5 summarizes the sensitivity of equilibrium outcomes to increases in various parameters. An
increase in investor wealth decreases average returns as investors pay more for the same payoffs. An
increase in average risk aversion shifts the equilibrium away from the relatively risky asset (2) towards
the other assets (1) and (3).
Table 3.5: Summary of sensitivity of equilibrium to the increase of parameters
Asset return Market portfolio weight Efficient frontier
1 2 3 r f 1 2 3
Initial wealth ↑ ↓ Unchanged Shifts downwards
Risk aversion ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ Change in shape
Wealth proportion of Investor B ↑
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3.3 The effect of imputation credits on the market equilibrium
This section analyses the effect of imputation credits by comparing the equilibrium results before and
after introducing a dividend imputation system. In this section, Investor A is assumed to have initial
wealth of $90 and risk-aversion of 4, and Investor B is assumed to have initial wealth of $180 and
risk-aversion of 6. This is the same case as proportion of wealth owned by Investor B at 0.66 shown in
Figure 3.7.
I analyze the effects of imputation credits in three typical cases. Case One involves a perfectly
segmented domestic market, where all risky assets provide imputation credits and all investors can
redeem the credits. In Case Two, one of the investors is ineligible to redeem the credits, but every
risky asset provides credits. In Case Three, one of the risky assets does not provide imputation credits,
but all investors are eligible to redeem the credits. The analysis shows that imputation credits have a
material influence on all aspects of the market equilibrium, including the portfolio choices of investors,
asset prices, risk-free rate, CAPM parameter values, and so on.
The insight that the introduction of imputation affects all aspects of the equilibrium is an important
contribution of this analysis, as previous analyses have implicitly assumed that the introduction of
imputation has no effect on the risk-free rate, the total return on equity required by investors, the
composition of the market portfolio, asset betas or the total market risk premium.
3.3.1 Equilibrium before imputation is introduced
I begin by documenting the properties of the equilibrium prior to the introduction of imputation in
Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Equilibrium result for A(90,4), B(180,6)
Asset 1 2 3 Risk-free
Payoff 100 100 100 10
Price 88.19 85.01 87.68 9.12
Expected return 13.39% 17.64% 14.05% 9.69%
Allocation A 38.53 37.14 38.31 -23.98
(90,4) Return: 16.41%, Std dev: 15.12%
Allocation B 49.66 47.87 49.37 33.10
(180,6) Return: 14.02%, Std dev: 9.74%
Market 33.80% 32.58% 33.61% –
portfolio Return: 14.99%, Std dev: 11.94%
This table shows the equilibrium result for Investor A has initial
wealth of $90 and risk aversion rate 4, and Investor B has initial
wealth of $180 and risk aversion rate 6. As Investor A borrows
from the risk-free assets, his holding proportion in the risky
assets are larger than his proportion of initial wealth.
In this case, Investor A has 90/(90+180) = 33.33% of the initial wealth in the market and Investor
B has 66.67%. However, since Investor A is less risk averse and borrows money by shorting the
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risk-free asset, the percentage of Investor A’s holding in each risky asset is more than his percentage of
initial wealth in the market, being 38.53/88.19 = 43.69%.
The Classic CAPM parameter values for the no-imputation case are summarised in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Classic CAPM parameter values no-imputation
MRP E[rm]− r f 5.31% = 14.99%−9.69%
Asset Beta Asset expected return
1 0.70 13.39% = 9.69%+0.70×5.31%
2 1.50 17.64% = 9.69%+1.50×5.31%
3 0.82 14.05% = 9.69%+0.82×5.31%
3.3.2 The CAPM with imputation credits
To validate the equilibrium results of this one-market model after introducing imputation credits, I use
the framework developed by Lally and van Zijl (2003). I begin by deriving the CAPM equilibrium in a
single market with imputation credits. Prices and returns are expressed on an after corporate tax but
before personal tax basis.
The traditional definition for the rate of return r j on asset j is the sum of the capital gain (or loss)
and the cash dividend paid during the relevant period:
r j =
Pj1−Pj0
Pj0
+
D j
Pj0
, (3.6)
where Pjt is the price of asset j at time t and D j is the cash dividend paid on asset j.
After introducing imputation credits, the rate of return on asset j is defined to include imputation
credits (to the extent that they can be used by investors in aggregate), denoted as rˆ j:
rˆ j = r j +U
IC j
Pj0
, (3.7)
where IC j is the face amount of imputation credits attached to the cash dividend and U is the market
wide utilization rate for imputation credits, which ranges from 0 to 1. This utilization rate represents
the extent to which imputation credits are capitalized into the stock price, as explained further below.
I follow Lally and van Zijl (2003) in assuming the dividend and its associated imputation credits to
be non-stochastic. Thus taking the expectation of Equation 3.7 gives:
E[rˆ j] = E[r j]+U
IC j
Pj0
. (3.8)
For each investor, the utilization rate of imputation credits is an individual-specific characteristic
– some investors are eligible to redeem credits and others are not, depending on their individual tax
status. The utilization rate for Investor i is denoted by Ui. I follow Lally and van Zijl (2003), in setting
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Ui to 1 for investors who can redeem credits and 0 for investors who cannot redeem credits. As a result,
the expected return of asset j is also investor-specific, denoted as E[rˆi j], where:
E[rˆi j] = E[r j]+Ui
IC j
Pj0
. (3.9)
As noted in the previous chapter, each investor chooses to invest in an efficient portfolio consisting
of the risk-free asset and the tangency portfolio. As the expected return with imputation credits is
individual specific, the tangency portfolio is different from investor to investor. Let Ki denote the
tangency portfolio of Investor i. With unrestricted short selling, the expected return, with imputation
credits, on Asset j for Investor i satisfies:
E[rˆi j] = r f +(E[rˆKi]− r f )Cov(rˆi j, rˆKi)V[rˆKi] , (3.10)
where r f denotes the risk-free rate, Cov(·) represents the covariance function, and V[·] represents
the variance function.
Since the dividend and imputation credits are non-stochastic, we have:
Cov(rˆi j, rˆKi)
V[rˆKi]
=
Cov(r j,rKi)
V[rKi]
. (3.11)
Substituting Equation 3.9 and Equation 3.11 into Equation 3.10 yields:
E[r j]+Ui
IC j
Pj0
= r f +λiCov(r j,rKi), (3.12)
where:
λi =
E[rˆKi]− r f
V[rˆKi]
.
Defining pii to be the fraction of aggregate risky assets held by investor i, multiplying the previous
equation by pii and dividing by λi yields:
pii
λi
(
E[r j]+Ui
IC j
Pj0
)
=
pii
λi
(
r f +λiCov(r j,rKi)
)
.
Summing across all investors produces an expression for aggregate demand:(
∑ piiλi
)
E[r j]+
(
∑ piiλiUi
)IC j
Pj0
=
(
∑ piiλi
)
r f +Cov
(
r j,
(
∑piirKi
))
.
Note that the market portfolio can be defined as rm = ∑piirKi. Dividing the previous equation by
∑ piiλi produces:
E[r j]+U
IC j
Pj0
= r f +
Cov(r j,rm)
∑ piiλi
,
= r f +
Cov(r j,rm)
∑ piiV[rˆKi]E[rˆKi]−r f
,
(3.13)
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where:
U =∑xiUi,
xi =
pii
λi
÷∑ piiλi .
Moreover, for the market portfolio, we have:
E[rˆm] = r f +
V[rˆm]
∑ piiλi
. (3.14)
Equation 3.13 is the CAPM in a market with imputation credits, as derived by Lally and van Zijl
(2003). In the Classic CAPM, the expected return on a particular asset is the same for every investor,
so it is also the market wide expected return. However under imputation, the expected return on a
particular asset differs across investors depending on whether or not they are eligible to redeem the
imputation credits. In this case, the equilibrium expected return is a weighted average of expected
returns across investors. It is useful to note that, Equation 3.13 provides a method to calculate the
market-wide expected return with imputation credits for risky assets and also for the market portfolio,
and the relation between these expected returns satisfies the Classic CAPM formula. This is easy to
prove because the Classic CAPM relation is:
E[rˆ j] = r f +
Cov(r j,rm)
V[rˆm]
(
E[rˆm]− r f
)
,
and substituting Equation 3.14 into the Classic CAPM relation yields:
E[r j]+U
IC j
Pj0
= r f +
Cov(r j,rm)
∑ piiλi
,
which is Equation 3.13.
Equation 3.13 gives the market wide total required rate of return for risky assets. The first term,
E[r j], is the part of the required return provided by the company and the second term, U
IC j
Pj0
, is the part
provided by imputation credits. The aggregate value of distributed imputation credits, U , is a weighted
average utilization rate across investors with the weights reflecting both the investment in risky assets
and the degree of risk aversion for each investor.
Importantly, this CAPM formula sets out the relationship between required returns and the value
of imputation credits after the new equilibrium has reached. That is, given the new equilibrium
outcome, it shows how imputation credits make up part of the expected return on each asset. It does not
consider the movement between the equilibrium in a no-imputation world to the new equilibrium in a
with-imputation world. That is, there are two steps to consider. Suppose we start with a no-imputation
equilibrium and then imputation credits are introduced into the economy. This will induce investors to
alter their investment portfolios. This change moves investors away from what would otherwise be
their optimal investment portfolio, and therefore has the effect of lowering utility. However that loss
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in utility is more than offset by the gain from imputation credits. The CAPM formula set out above
considers only the new equilibrium, and the value of imputation credits in that equilibrium. It does
not consider the loss in utility that arises from investors moving their portfolio allocations away from
what would otherwise be optimal. Therefore, the CAPM formula does not address the question of
the degree to which investors benefit from the introduction of imputation, relative to a no-imputation
economy. Also, it provides no insights into how the introduction of imputation affects the equilibrium
outcome – rather, it starts with the new equilibrium and simply allocates expected returns between
credits on one hand and dividends and capital gains on the other.
3.3.3 Case One: All assets provide imputation credits to all investors
I begin by considering the case of a fully segmented single market where all risky assets provide
imputation credits and all investors are eligible to redeem those credits. I assume there is a $1
imputation credit attached to the payoff on each risky asset. The expected payoff of risky assets
including capital gain, cash dividend and the imputation credit is now E[C˜] = [101,101,101]. As noted
above, dividends and imputation credits are non-stochastic, so the standard deviation and correlation
of the payoffs to the risky assets are not affected.
Equilibrium outcome
The equilibrium result for this case is compared with the previous no-imputation equilibrium in
Table 3.8.
Table 3.8 shows that the introduction of imputation credits results in a small increase in the price of
risky assets and a decrease in the price of the risk-free asset. This is because the risky assets become
relatively more attractive to all investors, who reduce their allocations to the risk-free asset in favour of
increased investment in the three risky assets. The prices of the risky assets increase only slightly, such
that the benefit of imputation flows predominantly to investors (rather than to the firm via higher share
prices and a lower after-tax cost of capital). The allocations between the assets also change slightly for
both investors – relatively more for the investor with higher risk aversion.
Since the expected return for the three risky assets have increased after introducing imputation,
the total portfolio return increases as well. The efficient frontier, CML, market portfolio and portfolio
choice of Investors A and B, before and after introducing imputation credits are shown in Figure 3.8.
Numerical verification of the CAPM with imputation credits
In this case, both investors are eligible to redeem the imputation credits, so the utilization rate for both
investors is 1: UA =UB =U = 1. Moreover, Investors A and B face the same expected return from
each risky asset, so the tangency portfolios for A and B are the same, and rˆKA = rˆKB = rˆm. Therefore,
the CAPM with imputation credits in Equation 3.13 is equivalent to the Classic CAPM, as:
E[rˆ j] = E[r j]+
IC j
Pj0
= r f +
Cov(r j,rm)
1
λ
, (3.15)
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Table 3.8: Equilibrium result with imputation (Case One)
Asset 1 2 3 Risk-free
(Difference relative to no-imputation equilibrium)
Payoff 101 101 101 10
Price 88.20 85.07 87.70 9.02
(+0.01) (+0.07) (+0.02) (-0.09)
Return 14.51% 18.72% 15.16% 10.83%
(+1.12%) (+1.09%) (+1.12%) (+1.15%)
Allocation A 38.52 37.16 38.30 -23.98
(90,4) (-0.01) (+0.01) (-0.01) (+0.00)
Return: 17.51%(+1.10%), Std dev:15.11%(-0.01%)
Allocation B 49.68 47.92 49.40 33.00
(180,6) (+0.02) (+0.05) (+0.03) (-0.10)
Return: 15.14%(+1.12%), Std dev: 9.75%(+0.00%)
Market 33.80% 32.60% 33.61% –
portfolio (-0.01%) (+0.01%) (-0.00%) –
Return: 16.10%(+1.11%), Std dev: 11.93%(-0.00%)
Case One assumes a fully segmented single market where all risky
assets provide imputation credits and all investors are eligible to
redeem those credits. For $1 imputation credits, the equilibrium
prices increase $0.01, $0.07 and $0.02 respectively for Asset 1,
2 and 3, which is relatively small. The risk-free rate increases
1.15%. Monetary allocation into the various assets remains almost
unchanged for both investors.
Figure 3.8: Efficient frontier and CML in the no-imputation and with-imputation cases
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Portfolio standard deviation
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Po
rtf
ol
io
 re
tu
rn Efficient frontier no IC
CML no IC
Market portfolio no IC
A no IC
B no IC
Efficient frontier with IC
CML with IC
Market portfolio with IC
A with IC
B with IC
34 CHAPTER 3. EQUILIBRIUM IN A SINGLE DOMESTIC MARKET
where
λ =
E[rˆm]− r f
V[rˆm]
.
Moreover, for the market portfolio:
E[rˆm] = r f +
V[rˆm]
1
λ
, (3.16)
and
E[rˆm] =∑ωmj E[rˆ j], (3.17)
where ωmj is the weight of asset j in the market portfolio and is in proportion to its market value.
The numerical value of each term in Equation 3.15 is shown in Table 3.9. Recall that r f = 10.83%
from Table 3.8 and U = 1.
Table 3.9: Verification of the CAPM with imputation credits (Case One)
(1) (2) (3) (4) Equation 3.15 LHS Equation 3.15 RHS
Asset E[r·] IC·P·1 Cov(r·,rm)
1
λ (1)+U(2)
(3)
(4) + r f
1 13.38% 1.13% 0.99%
27.03%
14.51% 14.51%
2 17.55% 1.18% 2.13% 18.72% 18.72%
3 14.02% 1.14% 1.17% 15.16% 15.16%
Also for the market portfolio:
E[rˆm] =∑ωmj E[rˆ j] = 16.10%, (3.18)
where ωm = [33.80%, 32.60%, 33.61%]. Or as in Equation 3.16:
16.10% = 10.83%+
1.42%
27.03%
. (3.19)
In summary, my numerically derived equilibrium outcome for this case is entirely consistent with
the algebraically derived outcome in Lally and van Zijl (2003). This provides some confidence that
the numerical approach is able to recover the equilibrium outcome. This will be important when
examining more complex cases where no algebraic derivation is available.
Classic CAPM parameter values including imputation credits
The expected return with imputation credits derived in the previous subsection satisfies the Classic
CAPM formula. Using the weights, expected return and the variance of the market portfolio from the
previous subsection, which is ωm = [33.80%, 32.60%, 33.61%], E[rˆm] = 16.10% and V[rˆm] = 1.42%,
we have the Classic CAPM parameter values in Table 3.10. The changes in the parameter values
relative to the no-imputation case are shown in parentheses. The risk-free rate increases 1.15% as
investors allocate relatively less to the risk-free asset due to the increased payoff available on risky
assets. Asset betas remain almost unchanged. The Market Risk Premium (MRP) decreases 0.04%,
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because the increase in the return on the market portfolio is smaller than the increase in the risk-free
rate. Asset 2, with the highest beta, has the smallest growth in expected return.
Note also that the return on the market portfolio and risky assets in the Classic CAPM in Table 3.10
includes imputation credits. In other words, as explained in subsection 3.3.2, the Classic CAPM and
the CAPM with imputation credits are effectively the same in this case.
Table 3.10: Changes in Classic CAPM parameter values (Case One with
credits)
Asset Expected return Asset beta Risk-free rate MRP
1 14.51% (+1.12%) 0.70 (+0.00)
10.83% 5.27%
2 18.72% (+1.09%) 1.50 (-0.00)
3 15.16% (+1.12%) 0.82 (+0.00) (+1.15%) (-0.04%)
The expected return with imputation credits satisfies the Classic CAPM
relation. The risk-free rate increases 1.15%. Asset betas remain almost
unchanged. MRP decreases slightly, which results in Asset 2 (with the
highest beta) having the lowest growth in expected return.
However, if the returns on the market portfolio and risky assets are calculated on the basis of capital
gains and dividends only (i.e., not including imputation credits) which is the convention in practice, the
standard CAPM relation does not hold and results in estimation error. The difference between actual
returns of risky assets and the returns implied by the standard CAPM excluding imputation credits is
shown in Table 3.11. In Table 3.11, the actual return of a risky asset excluding imputation credits is
computed as the expected payoff of this asset ($100 in this model) divided by the equilibrium price of
the asset and minus one, which is [13.38%, 17.55%, 14.02%] respectively for Assets 1, 2 and 3. The
market portfolio return is the weighted average of these actual returns, with each asset weighted in
proportion to its total presence in the market. The weights of each asset in the market portfolio are
ωm = [33.80%, 32.60%, 33.61%], and thus the market portfolio return is 14.95%. With the risk-free
rate and asset beta, we have the return of risky assets implied by the standard CAPM. Compare to the
no-imputation value, the risk-free rate increases 1.15%, and MRP declines 1.19%. The large decline in
MRP and the material increase in the risk-free rate results in the standard CAPM implying a much
lower return for risky assets with beta greater than 1 and a much higher return for risky assets with beta
smaller than 1. As the equilibrium price of risky assets only increases slightly under imputation, the
return excluding imputation credits only decreases slightly. Therefore, the standard CAPM omitting
imputation credits (as usually implemented in practice) overestimates the expected return excluding
imputation credits for risky assets that have a beta smaller than 1 (which is Asset 1 and Asset 3 in this
model) and underestimates that for risky assets have a beta greater than 1 (which is Asset 2 in this
model). Table 3.11 quantifies the estimation error for each risky asset.
The cost of capital and total required return
Of the total expected payoff for each risky asset of $101, $100 is provided by the company through
capital gains and dividends, and $1 is from imputation credits. Therefore, the firm’s cost of capital
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Table 3.11: Estimation error of implementing standard CAPM for returns omitting credits (Case
One)
Asset Actual return Implied by CAPM Error Asset beta Risk-free rate MRP
1 13.38% 13.71% +0.33% 0.70
10.83% 4.12%
2 17.55% 17.00% -0.55% 1.50
3 14.02% 14.22% +0.20% 0.82 (+1.15%) (-1.19%)
Expected returns excluding imputation credits do not satisfy the Classic CAPM relation. As
the MRP decreases and the risk-free rate increases materially, the Classic CAPM (as usually
implemented in practice) implies materially higher returns for assets that have a beta less than
1 and materially lower returns for assets that have a beta larger than 1.
can be calculated as
(100
Pi
− 1). The comparison of the cost of capital before and after introducing
imputation credits is in Table 3.12. In Case One, the cost of capital is reduced slightly by imputation,
and this is equivalent to a small increase in the asset prices. Importantly, asset prices do not increase
by the full amount of the imputation credit as investors are only prepared to pay slightly more when
the risky assets include an imputation credit.
Table 3.12: Cost of capital comparison (Case One)
Asset 1 2 3
No imputation 13.39% 17.64% 14.05%
With imputation 13.38% 17.55% 14.02%
Difference -0.01% -0.09% -0.02%
We can also compare the total return received by investors before and after imputation, as in
Table 3.13. The total required return increases in this case, in contrast to the common assumption in the
literature that there is no change to the total required return on assets resulting from the introduction of
imputation. That is, in this case the benefit of imputation, in equilibrium, flows largely to investors
rather than the firm – investors effectively pay only a small amount (via an increase in the stock price)
to obtain each credit.
Table 3.13: Total return comparison (Case One)
Asset 1 2 3
No imputation 13.39% 17.64% 14.05%
With imputation 14.51% 18.72% 15.16%
Difference +1.12% +1.09% +1.12%
The value of imputation to each investor
In Case One, each risky asset provides $1 of imputation credits to investors and this $1 is distributed
between Investors A and B according to the proportion of the asset that they hold. Table 3.8 shows
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that A holds 43.67% in each asset and B holds 56.33%. The proportions held by Investors A and B
is the same for each risky asset because both investors have the same tangency portfolio in this case.
Investor A receives approximately $0.44 of the imputation credits from each risky asset and B receives
$0.56. That is, A receives a total of $1.31 of imputation credits and B receives a total of $1.69.
Table 3.14: Redemption of imputation credits (Case One)
Asset 1 2 3 Total
A’s asset holding 43.67% 43.67% 43.67%
Value of credits $0.44 $0.44 $0.44 $1.31
B’s asset holding 56.33% 56.33% 56.33%
Value of credits $0.56 $0.56 $0.56 $1.69
However, since the equilibrium has changed after introducing imputation credits, we cannot simply
conclude that Investors A and B are $1.31 and $1.69 respectively better off due to the introduction
of imputation. Instead, we need to factor in the effect of the change in their equilibrium holdings in
each asset. Therefore, I calculate the actual value of imputation credits to investors by comparing the
expected utility level before and after introducing imputation. More specifically, I first convert the
expected utility into its equivalent dollar value, and then compare those equivalent dollar values. The
conversion formula is:
W =
(
E[U ](1− ε)) 11−ε ,
which is derived from:
U(W ) =
W 1−ε
1− ε = E[U ].
The results are as shown in Table 3.15. The table shows that, including the impact of changes
in the equilibrium, Investor A is $1.02 and Investor B is $2.05 better off due to the introduction of
imputation. For Investor A, the total value of imputation is less than the face value of credits redeemed,
specifically 0.78 of the face value. For Investor B however, the actual value of imputation is 1.21 times
of the face value of credits. The reason for this difference comes from the increase in the risk-free rate.
Investor A is less risk averse and borrows money via the risk-free asset, so suffers from the increase
of the risk-free rate, while Investor B invests in the risk-free asset and enjoys the benefit of a higher
risk-free rate.
In summary, when analysing dividend imputation it is very important to consider how the intro-
duction of imputation may have changed the nature of the equilibrium asset holdings of investors.
This is not something that has been properly considered in the previous literature. In particular, the
introduction of imputation makes risky assets relatively more attractive than the risk-free asset. This
has the effect of reducing the price of the risk-free asset and increasing the risk-free rate of return.
This in turn benefits investors who are more averse to risk and penalises investors who are more risk
tolerant.
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Table 3.15: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case
One)
Investor Before After Difference Credits redeemed Percentage
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 101.45 102.47 1.02 1.31 0.78
B 201.01 203.06 2.05 1.69 1.21
Both investors benefit from imputation credits in that they enjoy a higher
level of expected utility. Investor A benefits less than the face value of credits
redeemed, because he is less risk averse and borrows via the risk-free asset,
and suffers from the increase of the risk-free rate. On the contrary, Investor
B who is more risk averse benefits more than the face amount of credits
redeemed, because his investment in the risk-free asset provides a higher
return.
An equilibrium with a fixed risk-free rate
From the above analysis we note that the increase in the risk-free rate has a material influence on the
equilibrium outcome after introducing imputation credits. In the previous analysis, I have assumed
that the government fixes its demand for risk-free borrowing and the risk-free rate changes to clear the
market. An alternative assumption is that the government fixes the risk-free rate, in which case the
amount it borrows will vary so as to clear the market. This alternative case of a fixed risk-free rate is
considered in this subsection.
The equilibrium result with a fixed risk-free rate is shown in Table 3.16. Because the risky assets
provide an additional return through imputation credits while the risk-free rate stays unchanged,
investors tilt their portfolios toward the risky assets. As a result, the price of the risky assets increase
and the total demand for the risk-free asset decreases. The final return including the imputation credits
received by investors is approximately the same before and after imputation.
Since the equilibrium price of risky assets increases in this case, the cost of capital for companies
is lower after imputation. As shown in Table 3.17, the cost of capital decreases for all risky assets.
Thus, where the risk-free rate is maintained, risky asset prices increase and the corporate cost of capital
decreases as a result of the introduction of imputation.
It is not a surprise that the increase in risky assets’ price largely depletes the benefit of imputation
credits to investors. As shown in Table 3.18, the equivalent dollar value of expected utility of investors
almost stays unchanged after the introduction of imputation.
Moreover, in this case, the CAPM with imputation credits can be converted to the Classic CAPM,
and parameter values are shown in Table 3.19. The expected returns of risky assets including imputation
credits are lower than when there is no imputation, because the equilibrium price of risky assets
increases materially when risk-free rate is fixed.
Again, if we use returns not including imputation credits (as is common practice) the standard
CAPM leads to estimation error. The difference between the true returns and the CAPM implied
returns are shown in Table 3.20. In this case, the equilibrium prices of risky assets increase materially,
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Table 3.16: Equilibrium result with imputation (Case One r f fixed)
Asset 1 2 3 Risk-free
Payoff 101 101 101 7
Price 89.10 85.92 88.60 6.38
(+0.91) (+0.91) (+0.91) (-2.74)
Return 13.35% 17.55% 14.00% 9.69%
(-0.04%) (-0.08%) (-0.04%) (0.00%)
Allocation A 38.93 37.54 38.71 -25.18
(90,4) (+0.40) (+0.40) (+0.40) (-1.19)
Return: 16.41%(+0.00%), Std dev:15.12%(+0.00%)
Allocation B 50.17 48.38 49.89 31.56
(180,6) (+0.51) (+0.51) (+0.51) (-1.54)
Return: 14.02%(-0.00%), Std dev: 9.74%(-0.00%)
Market 33.80% 32.59% 33.61% –
portfolio (-0.00%) (+0.01%) (-0.00%) –
Return: 14.94%(-0.06%), Std dev: 11.81%(-0.12%)
When the risk-free rate is fixed, total investment in the risk-free asset
decreases. The equilibrium price of risky assets increases materially
under imputation, and the final return including the imputation
credits received by investors is approximately the same before and
after imputation.
Table 3.17: Cost of capital comparison (Case One r f fixed)
Asset 1 2 3
No imputation 13.39% 17.64% 14.05%
With imputation 12.23% 16.39% 12.87%
Difference -1.16% -1.25% -1.17%
Table 3.18: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case
One r f fixed)
Investor Before After Difference Credits redeemed Percentage
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 101.45 101.45 +0.00 1.31 0
B 201.01 201.01 +0.00 1.69 0
The increase in the equilibrium prices of risky assets depletes the benefits of
imputation credits to investors when the risk-free rate is held unchanged.
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Table 3.19: Changes in the Classic CAPM parameter values (Case One r f
fixed)
Asset Expected return Asset Beta Risk-free rate MRP
1 13.35% (-0.04%) 0.70 (+0.00)
9.69% 5.25%
2 17.55% (-0.08%) 1.50 (-0.00)
3 14.00% (-0.04%) 0.82 (+0.00) (–) (-0.06%)
The CAPM with imputation credits can be converted to the Classic
CAPM. Expected returns for risky assets including imputation credits is
lower than the return before introduce imputation credits, because the
equilibrium price of risky assets increase materially.
thus the returns of risky assets not including imputation credits decrease [-1.16%, -1.25%, -1.17%]
respectively for Asset 1, 2 and 3. Therefore, with market portfolio weights [33.80%,32.59%,33.61%],
the MRP decreases by 1.19%. When the risk-free rate stays the same, the CAPM implied returns
decrease according to asset beta. The CAPM overestimates the return excluding imputation credits
for risky assets that have a beta smaller than 1 (which is Asset 1 and Asset 3 in this model) and
underestimate returns for assets that have beta larger than 1 (which is Asset 2 in this model). The
estimation error is quantified in Table 3.20.
Table 3.20: Estimation error of implementing standard CAPM for returns omitting credits (Case
One r f fixed)
Asset Actual return Implied by CAPM Error Asset Beta Risk-free rate MRP
1 12.23% 12.56% +0.33% 0.70
9.69% 4.11%
2 16.39% 15.85% -0.54% 1.50
3 12.87% 13.07% +0.19% 0.82 (–) (-1.19%)
The CAPM leads to estimation error when returns omitting imputation credits. It overestimates
the return for risky assets have beta greater than 1 and underestimates the return for assets have
beta smaller than 1.
Summary
The numerical results in Case One, where we assume a fully segmented market where all risky assets
provide imputation credits and every investor in the market is eligible to redeem credits, demonstrate
that:
• The risk-free rate increases after introducing imputation credits. As risky assets provide a
higher return under imputation, demand for the risk-free asset decreases, which leads to a lower
equilibrium price for the risk-free asset and a higher return rate.
• The equilibrium price of risky assets does not change materially after the introduction of
imputation. Because the risk-free rate increases, total investment in the risk-free and risky assets
does not change materially.
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• The benefits of imputation credits flow primarily to investors. As risky asset prices do not change
materially, the cost of capital for companies also does not change materially and investors simply
receive a higher total return under imputation.
• Investors that are more risk averse benefit more from imputation as their investment in the
risk-free asset provides a higher return.
• The CAPM with imputation credits only provides a description of expected returns after the
new equilibrium has reached, but provides no information about how returns change due to the
movement of assets’ equilibrium prices.
• The CAPM with imputation credits can be converted to the Classic CAPM while returns in this
Classic CAPM includes imputation credits.
• If returns are measured without including imputation credits (i.e., using only capital gains and
dividends) the standard CAPM overestimates the return for low-beta assets and underestimates
the return for high-beta assets.
• If the risk-free rate is fixed before and after imputation, the equilibrium prices of risky assets
increase materially. The total return received by investors including imputation credits are lower
than the returns before imputation is introduced. The benefits of imputation in this case flow
mainly to companies through a lower cost of capital, while investors obtain no net benefit from
imputation and end up with the same level of expected utility.
3.3.4 Case Two: Only one investor is eligible to redeem credits
Case Two considers a single market, where all risky assets still provide imputation credits, but only
one investor, either Investor A (low risk aversion) or Investor B (high risk aversion), is eligible to
redeem the credits. There is again a $1 imputation credit attached to the dividends of each risky asset.
I start with that case where only Investor A can redeem the credits, then consider the case where only
Investor B can redeem the credits. The analysis procedure is the same as in Case One above.
Only Investor A (low risk aversion) is eligible to redeem credits (Case Two A)
The equilibrium outcome for this case is provided in Table 3.21. It shows that the risk-free rate
increases 0.57%, and the equilibrium prices of risky assets increase slightly. Investor A’s expected
return includes imputation credits and is higher than Investor B’s expected return on each asset, so
the investors each have different tangency portfolios. After introducing imputation, Investor A tilts
more towards risky assets and away from the risk-free asset to capture more benefits from imputation
credits, while Investor B does the opposite to benefit from the higher risk-free rate. Compared with
Case One, the asset price changes are smaller in this case, since the portfolio changes of Investor A
and Investor B largely offset each other, even though the portfolio changes for both investors are larger
than for the previous case.
42 CHAPTER 3. EQUILIBRIUM IN A SINGLE DOMESTIC MARKET
Table 3.21: Equilibrium result with imputation (Case Two A)
Asset 1 2 3 Risk-free
(Difference relative to no-imputation equilibrium)
Payoff 101 101 101 10
Price 88.19 85.06 87.69 9.07
(-0.00) (+0.05) (+0.00) (-0.05)
Return A
14.53% 18.75% 15.18% 10.26%
(+1.14%) (+1.11%) (+1.14%) (+0.57%)
Return B
13.40% 17.57% 14.04% 10.26%
(+0.01%) (-0.07)% (-0.01%) (+0.57%)
Allocation A 51.73 40.13 47.82 -49.68
(90,4) (+13.20) (+2.99) (+9.51) (-25.70)
Return: 19.11%(+2.70%), Std dev:17.99%(+2.87%)
Allocation B 36.46 44.93 39.87 58.75
(180,6) (-13.20) (-2.94) (-9.51) (+25.65)
Return: 13.56%(-0.46%), Std dev: 8.33%(-1.41%)
Tangency 37.03% 28.73% 34.24% –
portfolio A (+3.23%) (-3.86%) (+0.63%) –
Return: 15.96%(+0.97%), Std dev: 11.59%(-0.34%)
Tangency 30.07% 37.05% 32.88% –
portfolio B (-3.74%) (+4.47%) (-0.73%) –
Return: 15.15%(+0.16%), Std dev: 12.37%(+0.43%)
In Case Two A, all risky assets provide imputation credits, but only
Investor A (low risk aversion) is eligible to redeem credits. The
equilibrium price for risky assets increases slightly and the risk-
free rate increases by 0.57%. Compared with Case One, the asset
price changes are smaller in this case. Investors A and B have
different tangency portfolios – Investor A’s expected return includes
imputation credits and is higher than Investor B’s expected return on
each asset.
Numerical Verification of the CAPM with Imputation Credits (Case Two A)
The CAPM with imputation credits, Equation 3.13, is again verified numerically in this case. In this
case only Investor A receives imputation credits, thus the utilization rate for Investor A is one, UA = 1,
while for Investor B it is zero, UB = 0. The risk-free rate can be read from Table 3.21 as r f = 10.26%.
The numerical value for each term in Equation 3.13 is shown in Table 3.22.
Equation 3.13 provides a market wide expected return with imputation credits of each risky asset,
which is a weighted average of the expected return with imputation credits for Investor A and Investor
B, with weights xA = 0.4647 and xB = 0.5353.
Notice that in this case the equilibrium value of the redeemed credits, U in Table 3.22, is 0.4647.
It is not the simple proportion of imputation credits that are redeemed by investors, as shown in
Table 3.26, which is $1.60/$3.00 = 0.5333.
The weight of each risky asset in the market portfolio is again in proportion to its total presence in
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Table 3.22: Verification of the CAPM with imputation credits (Case Two A)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)= (2)(3)(4) ∑(1)(5)
investor Ui pii 1λi ∑
pii
λi
xi U
A 1 0.5353 0.2357
0.2715
0.4647
0.4647
B 0 0.4647 0.3127 0.5353
(6) (7) (8) left right
asset E[r·] IC·P·1 Cov(r·,rm) (6)+U(7)
(8)
(4) + r f
1 13.40% 1.13% 0.99% 13.92% 13.92%
2 17.57% 1.18% 2.13% 18.12% 18.12%
3 14.04% 1.14% 1.17% 14.57% 14.57%
the market, which is ωmj = [33.80%, 32.60%, 33.61%]. For the return of the market portfolio, we have:
E[rˆm] =∑ωmj E[rˆ j] = 15.51%
where E[rˆ j] = [13.92%, 18.12%, 14.57%] is the market wide expected return with imputation credits
of risky assets in Table 3.22.
Moreover, the numerical value of the right side of Equation 3.14 for the market portfolio is:
15.51% =
V[rˆm]
∑ piiλi
+ r f =
1.42%
27.15%
+10.26%.
Again, the numerically derived equilibrium outcome for this case is consistent with the algebraically
derived outcome in Lally and van Zijl (2003).
Classic CAPM parameter values including imputation credits (Case Two A)
We can also verify numerically that the CAPM with imputation credits can be converted to the Classic
CAPM where returns in the Classic CAPM include imputation credits, as shown in Table 3.23. The
return on market portfolio is 15.51%. The risk-free rate can be read from Table 3.21. That table
also shows that the introduction of imputation has a negligible effect on asset betas, the risk-free rate
increases by 0.57%, and the MRP decreases by 0.06%. Market wide expected returns with imputation
increase, and Asset 2 (with the highest beta) increases the least. Again, the broad nature of the
equilibrium changes when imputation is introduced.
Table 3.23: Changes of the Classic CAPM parameter values (Case Two A)
Asset Expected return Asset Beta Risk-free rate MRP
1 13.92% (+0.53%) 0.70 (+0.00)
10.26% 5.25%
2 18.12% (+0.48%) 1.50 (-0.00)
3 14.57% (+0.52%) 0.82 (+0.00) (+0.57%) (-0.06%)
Again, using the standard CAPM relation to estimate returns omitting imputation credits, as usually
implemented in practice, leads to estimation error. The difference between the true returns and the
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returns obtained from implementing the standard CAPM by measuring returns to include dividends
and capital gains only is shown in Table 3.24. The result is similar to Case One. MRP decreases by
0.59%, mainly due to the increase in the risk-free rate. The standard CAPM overestimates returns for
low-beta stocks and underestimates returns for high-beta stocks. The estimation error is smaller in this
case than in Case One, because only Investor A can redeem credits in this case.
Table 3.24: Estimation error of implementing standard CAPM for returns omitting credits (Case
Two A)
Asset Actual return Implied by CAPM Error Asset Beta Risk-free rate MRP
1 13.40% 13.55% +0.16% 0.70
10.26% 4.11%
2 17.57% 17.32% -0.32% 1.50
3 14.04% 14.13% +0.09% 0.82 (+0.57%) (-0.59%)
The cost of capital and total required return (Case Two A)
The effect that the introduction of imputation has on the cost of capital is shown in Table 3.25. Similar
to Case One above, as the asset prices only change slightly, the cost of capital does not change
materially. Therefore, investors who can redeem credits enjoy a higher than market return from risky
assets.
Table 3.25: Cost of capital comparison (Case Two A)
Asset 1 2 3
No imputation 13.39% 17.64% 14.05%
With imputation 13.40% 17.57% 14.04%
Difference +0.01% -0.07% -0.01%
The value of imputation to each investor (Case Two A)
The $1 imputation credit from each risky asset is distributed to investors according to their holding
percentage in the assets, which is listed in Table 3.26. Investor A holds 58.66%, 47.18% and 54.54%
in Asset 1, Asset 2 and Asset 3 respectively, so the imputation credits received by Investor A total
$1.60, and these credits can be redeemed. On the other hand, Investor B cannot redeem the credits, so
there will be $1.40 credits that are not redeemed.
To consider the total value of imputation to investors, the change in the equilibrium outcome must
be considered. The equivalent dollar value of expected utility of investors before and after imputation is
shown in Table 3.27. As the cost of capital does not change materially, Investor A obtains the majority
of the benefit from imputation credits. However, as the risk-free rate increases, and Investor A borrows
at the risk-free rate, the change in the equilibrium creates a disadvantage. The net result is that Investor
A obtains a benefit equal to 78% of the face amount of credits that redeemed. However, Investor B
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Table 3.26: Redemption of imputation credits (Case Two A)
Asset 1 2 3 Total
A’s asset holding 58.66% 47.18% 54.54%
Credits redeemed $0.59 $0.47 $0.55 $1.60
B’s asset holding 41.34% 52.82% 45.46%
Credits redeemed $0 $0 $0 $0
who invests in the risk-free asset, actually benefits $0.24 from the introduction of imputation even
though he is unable to redeem any credits.
Table 3.27: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case Two A)
Investor Before After Difference Credits redeemed Proportion
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 101.45 102.71 1.26 1.60 0.78
B 201.01 201.25 0.24 0 –
Only Investor B (high risk-aversion) is eligible to redeem credits (Case Two B)
The equilibrium result for the case when only the highly risk-averse investors able to redeem credits is
provided in Table 3.28. When only Investor B is eligible to redeem imputation credits, the risk-free
asset price drops and the risk-free rate increases. This change is larger than that in Case Two A,
because Investor B holds a larger proportion of total wealth in the market and therefore has a larger
influence. But still, the increase in the risk-free rate is smaller compared to Case One. The changes of
portfolio choice for investors is opposite to Case Two A, as Investor B tilts towards risky assets for the
imputation credits and Investor A invests more in the risk-free asset for the higher risk-free rate.
The changes in the cost of capital are shown in Table 3.29. Even though the risk-free rate increases
more when the more wealthy investor is eligible to redeem the credits, there are immaterial changes in
the prices of risky assets and the cost of capital.
As shown in Table 3.30, in Case Two B, Investor B holds a greater proportion of risky assets, and
consequently more credits are redeemed than in Case Two A above.
The CAPM with imputation credits still holds in Case Two B, and the numerical verification is
shown in Appendix B.1. Again, the value of the distributed credit, U , in this case is 0.5888, which is
smaller than the redemption rate of the credits, which is $1.97/$3.00 = 0.6567.
The value of imputation credits to investors, including the changes in the market equilibrium, is
shown in Table 3.31. Investor A redeems no credits and suffers a loss dues to the increase in the
risk-free rate. By contrast, Investor B takes a long position in the risk-free asset but invests less in it
after imputation is introduced, so the increase in the risk-free rate is of muted benefit. Investor B’s
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Table 3.28: Equilibrium result with imputation (Case Two B)
Asset 1 2 3 Risk-free
(Difference relative to no-imputation equilibrium)
Payoff 101 101 101 10
Price 88.20 85.05 87.69 9.06
(+0.01) (+0.04) (+0.01) (-0.06)
Return A
13.38 17.58 14.03 10.36%
(-0.01%) (-0.05%) (-0.01%) (+0.68%)
Return B
14.52% 18.76% 15.17% 10.36%
(+1.13%) (+1.12%) (+1.13%) (+0.68%)
Allocation A 25.87 34.39 29.22 0.52
(90,4) (-12.66) (-2.75) (-9.09) (+24.50)
Return: 15.18%(-1.23%), Std dev:12.44%(-2.67%)
Allocation B 62.33 50.66 58.48 8.54
(180,6) (+12.67) (+2.79) (+9.10) (-24.56)
Return: 15.73%(+1.71%), Std dev: 11.11%(+1.37%)
Tangency 28.91% 38.43% 32.65% –
portfolio A (-4.89%) (+5.85%) (-0.96%) –
Return: 15.21%(+0.21%), Std dev: 12.52%(+0.58%)
Tangency 36.35% 29.55% 34.10% –
portfolio B (+2.55%) (-3.04%) (+0.49%) –
Return: 15.99%(+0.10%), Std dev: 11.66%(-0.27%)
Case Two B where all risky assets provide imputation credits but
only Investor B is eligible to redeem credits. The equilibrium price
changes are larger than Case Two A, as Investor B holds more wealth
in the market, but the changes are smaller than Case One where both
investors are able to redeem credits.
Table 3.29: Cost of capital comparison (Case Two B)
Asset 1 2 3
No imputation 13.39% 17.64% 14.05%
With imputation 13.38% 17.58% 14.03%
Difference -0.01% -0.05% -0.01%
Table 3.30: Redemption of imputation credits (Case Two B)
Asset 1 2 3 Total
A’s asset holding 29.33% 40.43% 33.32%
Redemption of credits $0 $0 $0 $0
B’s asset holding 70.67% 59.57% 66.68%
Redemption of credits $0.71 $0.60 $0.67 $1.97
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benefit therefore comes from the redemption of credits, and approximately equals the face amount of
credits that are redeemed.
Table 3.31: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case Two B)
Investor Before After Difference Credits redeemed Proportion
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 101.45 101.35 -0.10 0 –
B 201.01 202.98 1.97 1.97 1.00
Equilibrium with a fixed risk-free rate
As for Case one above, I also consider an equilibrium where the risk-free rate is fixed before and after
introducing imputation credits. I only study the case for Case Two A, since the results are similar in
Case Two B.
The equilibrium outcome is shown in Table 3.32. Compared with Case One, where both investors
can redeem the credits and the risk-free rate fixed, the price increases for risky assets are smaller in
this case because only one investor is eligible to redeem the imputation credits.
Table 3.33 shows that the cost of capital decreases for the risky assets, but less than in Case One.
The effect is smaller because only one investor is eligible to redeem credits in this case.
The dollar value of imputation credits to investors, taking into account the change in equilibrium,
is shown in Table 3.34. Because the fairly large increase in risky asset prices, the value of imputation
credits to Investor A is less than half of the face amount of credits that are redeemed. Investor B
receives no imputation credits and suffers a loss due to the increase in risky asset prices. Again, when
the risk-free rate is held constant, companies benefit from a lower cost of capital arising from the
increase in risky asset prices, while investors has less benefit.
The CAPM with imputation credits can still be converted to the Classic CAPM relation. Parameter
values for the Classic CAPM where returns include imputation credits are shown in Table 3.35.
When the risk-free rate is fixed, betas almost stay unchanged, the MRP decreases, and the market
wide expected return of risky assets with imputation credits is lower than the expected return before
imputation is introduced.
Using the standard CAPM relation to estimate returns omitting imputation credits, as often
implemented in practice, again leads to estimation error, as shown in Table 3.36. Estimation error is
similar to Case Two A where the risk-free rate increases.
Summary
In this single-market equilibrium where only one investor can redeem the credits, the key conclusions
are:
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Table 3.32: Equilibrium result (Case Two A with r f fixed)
Asset 1 2 3 Risk-free
(Difference relative to no-imputation equilibrium)
Payoff 101 101 101 8.50
Price 88.64 85.48 88.13 7.75
(+0.45) (+0.47) (+0.45) (-1.37)
Return A
13.95% 18.16% 14.60% 9.69%
(+0.56%) (+0.52%) (+0.55%) (0%)
Return B
12.82% 16.99% 13.46% 9.69%
(-0.57%) (-0.65%) (-0.58%) (0%)
Allocation A 51.98 40.35 48.07 -50.40
(90,4) (+13.45) (+3.21) (+9.76) (-26.42)
Return: 18.57%(+2.16%), Std dev:18.00%(+2.88%)
Allocation B 36.65 45.13 40.07 58.15
(180,6) (-13.01) (-2.74) (-9.31) (+25.05)
Return: 13.00%(-1.02%), Std dev: 8.33%(-1.41%)
Tangency 37.02 28.74 34.24% –
portfolio A (+3.22%) (-3.85%) (+0.63%) –
Return: 15.38%(+0.39%), Std dev: 11.54%(-0.40%)
Tangency 30.08% 37.04% 32.88% –
portfolio B (-3.72%) (+4.45%) (-0.73%) –
Return: 14.58%(-0.42%), Std dev: 12.31%(+0.37%)
When the risk-free rate is fixed in this case only Investor A is eligible
to redeem credits, providing a $1 imputation credits increase the
equilibrium price of risky assets around $0.45, which is smaller than
the increase in Case One because only one investor is eligible to
redeem credits here.
Table 3.33: Cost of capital comparison (Case Two A with r f fixed)
Asset 1 2 3
No imputation 13.39% 17.64% 14.05%
With imputation 12.82% 16.99% 13.46%
Difference -0.57% -0.65% -0.58%
Table 3.34: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case Two A with r f fixed)
Investor Before After Difference Credits redeemed Proportion
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 101.45 102.20 0.75 1.60 0.47
B 201.01 200.23 -0.78 0 –
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Table 3.35: Changes in Classic CAPM parameter values (Case Two A with r f fixed)
Asset Expected return Asset beta Risk-free rate MRP
1 13.34% (-0.05%) 0.70 (+0.00)
9.69% 5.24%
2 17.53% (-0.10%) 1.50 (-0.00)
3 13.99% (-0.06%) 0.82 (+0.00) (–) (-0.07%)
Table 3.36: Estimation error of implementing standard CAPM for returns omitting credits (Case Two
A with r f fixed)
Asset Actual return Implied by CAPM Error Asset Beta Risk-free rate MRP
1 12.82% 12.97% +0.15% 0.70
9.69% 4.71%
2 16.99% 16.74% -0.25% 1.50
3 13.46% 13.55% +0.09% 0.82 (-) (-0.60%)
• The introduction of imputation causes the risk-free rate to increase as investors who are eligible
to redeem credits reduce their demand for the risk-free asset in favour of risky assets that
distribute imputation credits.
• The change in the risk-free rate is smaller than in Case 1 because in this case only one of the
investors is eligible to redeem credits.
• Asset prices and the cost of capital remain relatively unchanged. The benefit of imputation flows
to the investor who is eligible to redeem credits rather than the firm.
• The CAPM with imputation can be numerically verified in this case. The value of the distributed
credits, U , is different from the redemption proportion of imputation credits.
• Using the standard CAPM to estimate returns ignoring imputation credits, as often implemented
in practice, leads to estimation error.
• The investor who is not eligible to redeem credits may be made better or worse off by the
introduction of imputation, depending on their risk preferences. Investors who are relatively
more risk averse than average are made better off due to their relatively larger investment in the
risk-free asset, the return of which increases.
• In the case where the risk-free rate is held constant, asset prices increase and the cost of capital
fall. The effect is smaller than in Case 1 where both investors are eligible to redeem credits.
In this case, benefit of imputation flows largely to firms rather than the investor who is able to
redeem credits.
3.3.5 Case Three: One asset does not provide imputation credits
Finally, I consider the case where two risky assets provide imputation credits, and one risky asset does
not, but where all investors are eligible to redeem the credits. We start with the case where Asset 3
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does not provide imputation credits, then compare it with the case where Asset 2 does not provide
imputation credits.
Asset 3 does not provide imputation credits (Case Three 1)
The equilibrium outcome is set out in Table 3.37. As Asset 3 does not provide imputation credits,
investors tilt their portfolios towards Asset 1 and Asset 2. The price of Asset 3 decreases, while the
prices of Asset 1 and Asset 2 both increase. There is also a reduction in demand for the risk-free
asset, such that its price decreases and the risk-free rate increases. The increase in the risk-free rate is
approximately two-thirds of that in Case One – there being no increase in the demand for Asset 3 in
this case.
Table 3.37: Equilibrium result with imputation (Case Three 1)
Asset 1 2 3 Risk-free
(Difference relative to no-imputation equilibrium)
Payoff 101 101 100 10
Price 88.50 85.35 87.09 9.05
(+0.31) (+0.35) (-0.59) (-0.06)
Return 14.12% 18.33% 14.82% 10.45%
(+0.73%) (+0.70%) (+0.77%) (+0.76%)
Allocation A 38.66 37.28 38.04 -23.98
(90,4) (+0.13) (+0.14) (-0.27) (+0.00)
Return: 17.14%(+0.73%), Std dev:15.12%(-0.00%)
Allocation B 49.84 48.07 49.05 33.04
(180,6) (+0.18) (+0.20) (-0.32) (-0.06)
Return: 14.76%(+0.75%), Std dev: 9.74%(+0.00%)
Market 33.91% 32.71% 33.38% –
portfolio (+0.11%) (+0.12%) (-0.23%) –
Return: 15.73%(+0.74%), Std dev: 11.94%(-0.00%)
In Case Three 1, Asset 3 does not provide imputation credits, but
both investors are eligible to redeem credits. The equilibrium prices
for Asset 1 and Asset 2 increase, but decrease for Asset 3 and the
risk-free asset. Both investors invest in the same tangency portfolio,
and the portfolio return increases due to imputation credits.
The numerical verification of the CAPM with imputation credits is presented in Appendix B.2.
Similar to Case One, since both investors have the same expected return with imputation credits, the
market wide utilization rate is one, U = 1. Again, The CAPM with imputation credits can be converted
to the Classic CAPM relation, and the parameter values are shown in Table 3.38. After introducing
imputation, the beta of Asset 2 slightly decreases, while the beta of Asset 3 slightly increases due to
the changes in risky asset prices and the changes in the market portfolio weights. The MRP decreases
by 0.03%, where that change is smaller than in Case One.
Again, omitting imputation credits and use the standard CAPM to estimate assets return leads to
estimation error, as shown in Table 3.39. The standard CAPM tends to overestimate the returns of
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Table 3.38: Changes in Classic CAPM parameter values (Case Three 1)
Asset Expected return Asset Beta Risk-free rate MRP
1 14.12% (+0.73%) 0.70 (-0.00)
10.45% 5.28%
2 18.33% (+0.70%) 1.49 (-0.01)
3 14.82% (+0.77%) 0.83 (+0.01) (+0.76%) (-0.03%)
assets providing imputation credits (Assets 1 and 2 in this case) and underestimate the returns of assets
that do not provide imputation credits (Asset 3).
Table 3.39: Estimation error of implementing standard CAPM for returns omitting credits (Case
Three 1)
Asset Actual return Implied by CAPM Error Asset Beta Risk-free rate MRP
1 12.99% 13.59% +0.60% 0.70
10.45% 4.51%
2 17.16% 17.19% +0.03% 1.49
3 14.82% 14.19% -0.63% 0.83 (+0.76%) (-0.79%)
The cost of capital changes are shown in Table 3.40. Asset 3, which does not provide imputation
credits, has an increase in the cost of capital whereas Asset 1 and Asset 2 have a lower cost of capital.
This is in accordance with the price increase of Asset 1 and Asset 2 and the price decrease of Asset 3.
Table 3.40: Cost of capital comparison (Case Three 1)
Asset 1 2 3
No imputation 13.39% 17.64% 14.05%
With imputation 12.99% 17.16% 14.82%
Difference -0.40% -0.48% +0.77%
In this case, Asset 1 and Asset 2 provide a $1 imputation credit to investors, and this $1 is shared
by Investor A and Investor B according to their holdings in that asset, as shown in Table 3.41. The
percentage holding by Investor A is 43.68% in each risky asset and 56.32% by Investor B, and these
figures are similar to those in Case One. Therefore, Investor A receives $0.87 imputation credits in
total and B receives $1.13.
Table 3.41: Redemption of imputation credits (Case Three 1)
Asset 1 2 3 Total
A’s asset holding 43.68% 43.68% 43.68%
Redemption of credits $0.44 $0.44 $0 $0.87
B’s asset holding 56.32% 56.32% 56.32%
Redemption of credits $0.56 $0.56 $0 $1.13
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As for the previous cases, I consider the effect of the introduction of imputation on the market
equilibrium. The equivalent dollar value of expected utility of investors before and after imputation is
shown in Table 3.42. Investor A is made better off by the introduction of imputation by 0.78 of the
face amount of credits that redeemed. For Investor B however, the value of imputation credits is 1.12
times the face amount of the credits that are redeemed. The reason for this is the same in Case One –
Investor B holds a long position in the risk-free asset, so benefits from the increase of the risk-free rate.
The opposite applies to Investor A.
Table 3.42: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case Three 1)
Investor Before After Difference Credits redeemed Proportion
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 101.45 102.13 0.68 0.87 0.78
B 201.01 202.37 1.36 1.13 1.21
Asset 2 does not provide imputation credits (Case Three 2)
I now consider the case where Asset 2 does not provide imputation credits, while Asset 1 and Asset 3
do provide imputation credits. The results are similar to Case Three 1. The increase in the risk-free
rate is the same, but now Asset 2 has a decrease in its equilibrium price, a higher cost of capital, and a
slightly higher beta. Details of the results are presented in Appendix B.3.
Equilibrium with a fixed risk-free rate
As for the previous cases, I also consider the case where the risk-free rate is fixed before and after
introducing imputation credits. I only consider the case where Asset 3 does not provide imputation
credits, since the results are similar for the cases where Asset 2 or Asset 1 do not provide imputation
credits. The equilibrium outcome is set out in Table 3.43. When the risk-free rate stays unchanged, the
prices of Asset 1 and Asset 2 both increase by $0.91, which is the same as the corresponding scenario
in Case One. The price of Asset 3 remains the same before and after introducing imputation. There is
an increase in investment in Asset 1 and Asset 2 by each investor, and the increase amount is the same
as in Case One. However, in this case, the investment in Asset 3 stays the same. Therefore, the total
decrease in investment in the risk-free asset is two-thirds of that observed in Case One.
It is easy to infer that the cost of capital for Asset 1 and Asset 2 decrease, while the cost of capital
remains the same for Asset 3, as shown in Table 3.44.
Parameter values from converting the CAPM with imputation credits to the Classic CAPM are set
out in Table 3.45. The beta change is the same as in the case where the risk-free rate increases, and the
market risk premium decreases slightly more.
Again, estimating returns omitting imputation credit by the standard CAPM relation leads to
estimation error as shown in Table 3.46. The estimation error is similar to Case Three 1 when the risk
free rate increase.
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Table 3.43: Equilibrium result with imputation (Case Three 1 r f fixed)
Asset 1 2 3 Risk-free
(Difference relative to no-imputation equilibrium)
Payoff 101 101 101 8.00
Price 89.10 85.92 87.68 7.29
(+0.91) (+0.91) (+0.00) (-1.82)
Return 13.35% 17.55% 14.05% 9.69%
(-0.04%) (-0.08%) (+0.00%) (0.00%)
Allocation A 38.93 37.54 38.31 -24.78
(90,4) (+0.40) (+0.40) (+0.00) (-0.80)
Return: 16.41%(-0.00%), Std dev:15.12%( -0.00%)
Allocation B 50.17 48.38 49.37 32.07
(180,6) (+0.51) (+0.51) (+0.00) (-1.03)
Return: 14.02%(-0.00%), Std dev: 9.74%(-0.00%)
Market 33.92% 32.71% 33.38% –
portfolio (+0.11%) (+0.12%) (-0.23%) –
Return: 14.96%(-0.04%), Std dev: 11.86%(-0.08%)
In Case Three 1 if the risk-free rate is held unchanged, Asset 3
changes immaterially in equilibrium price, but Asset 1 and Asset 2
increase materially in equilibrium price. Total portfolio returns to
investors do not change matrially.
Table 3.44: Cost of capital comparison (Case Three 1 with r f fixed)
Asset 1 2 3
No imputation 13.39% 17.64% 14.05%
With imputation 12.23% 16.39% 14.05%
Difference -1.16% -1.25% +0.00%
Table 3.45: Changes in Classic CAPM parameter values (Case Three 1 with r f fixed)
Asset Expected return Asset Beta Risk-free rate MRP
1 13.35% (-0.04%) 0.70 (-0.00)
9.69% 5.27%
2 17.55% (-0.08%) 1.49 (-0.01)
3 14.05% (-0.00%) 0.83 (+0.01) (–) (-0.04%)
Table 3.46: Estimation error of implementing standard CAPM for returns omitting credits (Case Three
1 with r f fixed)
Asset Actual return Implied by CAPM Error Asset Beta Risk-free rate MRP
1 12.23% 12.82% +0.59% 0.70
9.69% 4.51%
2 16.39% 16.42% +0.03% 1.49
3 14.05% 13.42% -0.63% 0.83 (-) (-0.80%)
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The introduction of imputation is of no benefit to Investors A and B as the increase in asset prices
offsets the benefits of imputation credits. This is the same as in Case One when the risk-free rate is
fixed.
Table 3.47: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case Three 1 rf fixed)
Investor before after difference credits redeemed percentage
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 101.45 101.45 +0.00 0.87 0
B 201.01 201.01 -0.00 1.13 0
Summary
In this single-market equilibrium where one risky asset does not provide imputation credits, the key
conclusions are:
• The introduction of imputation still causes an increase in the risk-free rate as there is more
demand for risky assets that provide imputation credits and less demand for the risk-free asset.
• The increase of the risk-free rate is around two-thirds of that in Case 1 since two out of three
risky assets distribute imputation credits in this case.
• The price of the risky asset that does not provide imputation credits decreases as investors
reduce their demand for that asset in favour of risky assets that distribute imputation credits.
Equivalently, the cost of capital increases for this risky asset.
• Asset prices for the risky assets that distribute imputation credits increase, in accordance with
the decrease of the cost of capital.
• After introducing imputation credits, the CAPM with imputation credits can be numerically
verified, and it is equivalent to the Classic CAPM when expected returns in the Classic CAPM
include imputation.
• Estimating returns omitting imputation credits, as often implemented in practice, leads to
estimation error.
• In the case where the risk-free rate is held constant, the asset price and the cost of capital for
the risky asset that does not provide imputation credits is almost unchanged, but asset prices
increase and the cost of capital decreases for the risky assets that distribute imputation credits. In
this case, the benefit of imputation credits largely flows to firms that provide imputation credits
rather than to investors.
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3.3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I set up a single market equilibrium to numerically estimate the effects of imputation
credits on the cost of capital, CAPM parameter values, and investors’ expected utility level under
different cases.
The main finding is that the introduction of imputation credits change the nature of the equilibrium.
When analyzing the effects of imputation credits, it is important to consider the change of market
equilibrium – in particular the extent to which imputation induces investors to depart from portfolio
holdings that would otherwise be optimal. Failure to consider this change in equilibrium can result in
over-estimation of the benefits of imputation.
The CAPM with imputation credits, developed by Lally and van Zijl (2003), only describes the
return under the new equilibrium, but does not provide information about the change of the equilibrium.
Consequently, that framework provides no guidance about the net benefits of imputation relative to a
non-imputation economy.
The effects of imputation credits including the movement of market equilibrium on cost of capital
and investors’ expected utility level in the single market model are summarized below.
The CAPM with imputation credits
The derived equilibrium outcomes in the single-market model for all cases are consistent with the
CAPM with imputation credits derived in Lally and van Zijl (2003). Even though this CAPM with
imputation credits does not provide any information about the change of equilibrium before and after
introducing imputation credits, it does provide a method to calculate the market average expected return
with imputation credits, conditional on the new (with-imputation) equilibrium having been reached.
This CAPM with imputation credits can be converted to the Classic CAPM, where the expected returns
in this Classic CAPM include imputation credits (i.e., where returns include dividends, capital gains
and imputation credits). Using the standard CAPM to estimate returns omitting imputation credits, as
usually implemented in practice, leads to estimation error.
The cost of capital
The change of cost of capital is in accordance with the change of equilibrium asset prices, which in
turn is closely related to the change in the risk-free rate, as shown in Table 3.48.
• When the risk-free rate is fixed, the cost of capital for risky assets is lower compared to the case
where the risk-free rate increases. As an increase in the risk-free rate attracts more investment
into the risk-free asset, less investment flows to risky assets in which case the equilibrium price
of risky assets is lower and the cost of capital is higher.
• In Case One and Two, when all risky assets provide imputation credits, the cost of capital
changes immaterially with the introduction of imputation. This is because the increase in the
payoffs of risky assets is essentially matched by an increase in the risk-free rate in which case
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Table 3.48: Cost of capital change by imputation
Situation r f increase r f fix
Asset 1 2 3 Risk-free 1 2 3
Case One -0.01% -0.09% -0.02% +1.15% -1.16% -1.25% -1.17%
Case Two A +0.01% -0.07% -0.01% +0.57% -0.57% -0.65% -0.58%
(A redeem credits)
Case Three 1 -0.40% -0.48% +0.77% +0.76% -1.16% -1.25% +0.00%
(1, 2 distribute credits)
the relative demand for assets (and hence their prices) does not change materially. However,
when the risk-free rate is held fixed in these two cases, the cost of capital decreases materially.
• In Case Three, when only some risky assets provide imputation credits, the cost of capital for
assets that provide imputation credits decreases materially, while the cost of capital for assets do
not provide imputation credits increases materially. This effect is exacerbated when the risk-free
rate is fixed.
• Other things being equal, the change in the cost of capital resulting from the introduction of
imputation is positively related to asset Beta.
The value of imputation to each investor
The actual value of imputation credits to each investor considering the equilibrium changes are
summarized in Table 3.49.
Table 3.49: Dollar value of expected utility change by imputation
Case One Case Two A Case Two B Case Three 1
(A redeem credits) (B redeem credits) (1, 2 distribute credits)
A B A B A B A B
r f +1.02 +2.05 +1.26 +0.24 -0.10 +1.97 +0.68 +1.36
increase
% to
78% 121% 78% – – 100% 78% 121%
face value
r f +0.00 +0.00 +0.75 -0.78 -0.71 +0.76 +0.00 -0.00
fix
% to
0% 0% 47% – – 39% 0% 0%
face value
• The value of imputation credits to investors is not the face value that they redeem, but is
influenced by the equilibrium movement.
• Investors that are relatively more risk averse are made better off by imputation credits due to
their relatively larger investment in the risk-free asset, the return of which increases.
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• The benefits of imputation credits flow mainly to investors when the risk-free rate increases, but
flow mainly to companies by a lower cost of capital when the risk-free rate is held fixed.

Chapter 4
Equilibrium with two markets
This chapter extends the single market model to a two-market model, which includes one small market
and one large market. The size of the large market is ten times as big as the small market. Comparable
to the actual market size, the small market represents the Australian market, and the large market
represents the US market.
Under this two-market model, the effects of imputation credits on portfolio choice, home-bias, the
CAPM with imputation credits are studied in detail.
In the following sections, I first introduce the method to compute market equilibrium with imputa-
tion in the two market model, then I analyze the effects of imputation credits in three different cases:
Case One, all risky assets provide imputation credits to their domestic investors; Case Two, only assets
in the small market provide imputation credits to their domestic investors; Case Three, only some
assets in the small market provides imputation credits to their domestic investors.
I find that:
• The equilibrium risk-free rate increases after introducing imputation. As imputation credits
increase the expected return of risky assets, investors decrease their investment in the risk-free
asset, so the risk-free asset has a lower equilibrium price and thus has a higher return.
• When analyzing the effect of imputation credits, it is important to consider the combined effects
from dividend tax policies of both markets. Because the dividend tax policy in one market
influences the equilibrium price of risky assets in both markets. Specifically, increasing the
amount of imputation credits provided in one market increases the equilibrium price for assets
in that market and decreases the equilibrium price for assets in the other market. The combined
effects from both markets can result in a decrease in equilibrium price in one market even though
it starts providing imputation credits.
• The effects of introducing imputation credits in one market depends on the dividend policy in the
other market. For example, the effects of introducing $1 imputation credits in the small market
have different influence on equilibrium prices when the large market provides $10 imputation
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credits than when the large market does not provide imputation credits. This inter-relationship
has not been identified in the previous literature.
• Investors hold none of the relatively low return foreign assets that provide imputation. As
imputation increases an asset’s price, the lower return drives investors to short the asset. However,
when short selling an asset investors are required to pay back the face amount of imputation
credits, thus driving investors to have a zero position in such assets.
• Investors tend to short sell domestic assets that do no provide imputation credits, to provide
additional funds to invest in imputation-paying domestic assets. Foreign assets are then used to
provide diversification benefits.
• The CAPM with imputation credits do not hold after introducing imputation credits. Because
investors do not hold every asset in the market, the assumptions of investors holding every asset
in the market are violated.
• Implementing the standard CAPM using returns that do not include imputation credits (an
approach that is common in practice) leads to estimation error.
• The benefits of imputation credits mainly flow to investors as the equilibrium prices of risky assets
do not increase materially after introducing imputation. However, if we assume that governments
change the supply of the risk-free asset to maintain the same risk-free rate after introducing
imputation, the benefits of imputation credits largely move from investors to companies, through
a material increase of equilibrium prices and thus a lower cost of capital.
• A home bias phenomena appears after introducing imputation credits. Investors tilt towards
domestic assets under imputation.
• Short sale restrictions influence the equilibrium prices of assets, and investors are generally
made worse off by such restrictions.
4.1 Method of calculating equilibrium with two markets
The two-market setting creates some challenges for the derivation of equilibrium outcomes. The main
challenge is, after introducing imputation credits, short sales occurs in investors’ optimal portfolios.
When investors short sell an asset providing imputation credits, they have to pay back the face amount
of the imputation credits when closing their positions. Therefore, the expected return under a long
position is different from a short position for a foreign asset. This means, the closed-form solution
for the optimal portfolio in the single-market model is no longer suitable for the two-market model.
Instead, numerical methods have to be applied to account for this feature.
To calculate the optimal portfolio for each investor under the two-market model after introducing
imputation credits, there are two steps involved. First, for a given portfolio return, I calculate the mean-
variance efficient portfolio that provides the minimum variance, where the return on foreign assets
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depends on the investor’s long or short position in the asset. This is a convex quadratic programming
problem with linear equality and inequality constraints. I use the interior-point method in this step.
Details of the method can be found in Nocedal and Wright (2006). Second, among all mean-variance
efficient portfolios, I calculate the one that provides the maximum expected utility for the investor in
question. Since there is no closed-form relation between return and variance of the efficient portfolios,
the golden section search and parabolic interpolation method is used to find the solution in this step.
See Brent (1973) for details of that method.
With the preceding methods to calculate the optimal portfolio for each investor, I calculate the
market equilibrium under imputation credits, which is similar to the method used in the single market
model. Again, I convert the equilibrium finding problem to a fixed point finding problem and use the
trust-region dogleg approach to solve. See Nocedal and Wright (2006) for details of the method.
4.2 The two-market setting
In the two-market model, the small market has the same set up as in the single market model. I assume
the large market is ten times as big as the small market, and the correlation between two markets is 0.8.
Parameter values are provided below.
The small market has three risky assets, Asset 1, Asset 2 and Asset 3, where each asset has expected
payoff of $100. Accordingly, the large market has three risky assets Asset 1’, Asset 2’ and Asset 3’,
and the expected payoff is $1000 for each asset.
I continue to use C˜ to denote the random payoffs from the risky assets. The payoffs of the six risky
assets have the following properties:
• Expectation:
E[C˜] = [$100,$100,$100,$1000,$1000,$1000],
• Standard deviation:
Std[C˜] = [11,18,13,110,180,130],
• Correlation
Corr[C˜] =

1.00 0.40 0.20 0.80 0.32 0.16
0.40 1.00 0.30 0.32 0.80 0.24
0.20 0.30 1.00 0.16 0.24 0.80
0.80 0.32 0.16 1.00 0.40 0.20
0.32 0.80 0.24 0.40 1.00 0.30
0.16 0.24 0.80 0.20 0.30 1.00

.
The correlation matrix of the three risky assets within each market is the same, and the correlation
between the two markets is 0.8.
Moreover, the two markets share one common risk-free asset, which has a payoff of $100 and
generates a risk-free rate of r f .
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There are two investors in each market, A and B for the small market and C and D for the large
market. Investors in the large market have ten times the initial wealth, but the same risk aversion rate,
as investors in the small market:
• In the small market: Investor A and Investor B,
whose initial wealth and risk aversion rate are: W A0 = 90, ε
A = 4; W B0 = 180, ε
B = 6.
• In the large market: Investor C and Investor D,
whose initial wealth and risk aversion rate are: WC0 = 900, ε
C = 4; W D0 = 1800, ε
D = 6.
Note that for Investor A and Investor B, Asset 1, Asset 2 and Asset 3 are their ”domestic” assets,
while for Investor C and Investor D, Asset 1’, Asset 2’ and Asset 3’ are their ”domestic” market. All
four investors compose their optimal portfolio using the six risky assets and the one risk-free asset.
4.3 Equilibrium before imputation is introduced
The closed-form solution for maximum expected utility in Section 3.1 can be used in calculating the
equilibrium before introducing imputation credits. Equilibrium details are set out below.
4.3.1 Equilibrium outcome
The equilibrium results are presented in Table 4.1. Assets in the large market provide relatively higher
returns compared to their counterparts in the small market. This is because the small market has
smaller capacity for capital. If the returns provided by the small market are the same as the large
market under the symmetric set up, half of all investment would seek to flow to the small market,
which is beyond the total requirement for capital in that market. Therefore, relatively lower returns
are provided by the small market’s risky assets to attract less investment, so that equilibrium can be
reached.
Another way of thinking about this issue is that each investor has a demand for investment in the
foreign market for diversification purposes. Since there is more wealth in the large market, there is
more ’diversification’ demand for assets in the small market. Hence those assets have a relatively
higher price and lower expected returns, in equilibrium.
In this no imputation situation, all investors face the same expected returns and thus choose the
same tangency portfolio, which is therefore the market portfolio. Investor A and Investor C, both have
a risk aversion rate 4 and choose the same optimal portfolio which involves short selling the risk-free
asset. Investor B and Investor D on the other hand, have a higher risk aversion rate, choose a less risky
portfolio and have a positive position in the risk-free asset. The portfolio choice of investors on the
Capital Market Line is shown in Figure 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Equilibrium results before introducing imputation
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’ Risk-free
Payoff 100 100 100 1000 1000 1000 100
Price 88.88 86.25 88.46 883.87 852.35 878.85 91.34
Return 12.51% 15.94% 13.05% 13.14% 17.32% 13.79% 9.49%
Allocation A 3.53 3.42 3.51 35.09 33.84 34.89 -24.28
(90,4) Return: 16.03%, Std dev: 14.86%
Allocation B 4.55 4.42 4.53 45.26 43.65 45.01 32.58
(180,6) Return: 13.70%, Std dev: 9.58%
Allocation C 35.28 34.24 35.12 350.88 338.36 348.88 -242.76
(900,4) Return: 16.03%, Std dev: 14.86%
Allocation D 45.52 44.17 45.30 452.64 436.51 450.07 325.79
(1800,6) Return: 13.70%, Std dev: 9.58%
Market 3.09% 3.00% 3.07% 30.70% 29.61% 30.53% –
portfolio Return: 14.64%, Std dev: 11.70%
Under the equilibrium, the returns provided by the small market are relatively lower,
due to the additional demand for diversification purposes from investors in the large
market. All investors have the same tangency portfolio. Investors have the same risk
aversion rate and choose the same optimal portfolio.
Figure 4.1: Efficient frontier and investors’ portfolio choice
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4.3.2 Classic CAPM parameter values
The Classic CAPM holds in this two-market equilibrium with no imputation. The beta values for risky
assets are shown in Table 4.2, and the Security Market Line is shown in Figure 4.2.
Table 4.2: Classic CAPM parameter value
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’ r f Market
Beta 0.59 1.25 0.69 0.71 1.52 0.83 0 1
Return 12.51% 15.94% 13.05% 13.14% 17.32% 13.79% 9.49% 14.64%
Figure 4.2: Security Market Line
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4.4 The effects of imputation credits on the market equilibrium
In this section, I introduce imputation credits to the two-market model. I study the effects of imputation
credits in three cases. Case One, all risky assets provide imputation credits to their domestic investors;
Case Two, only assets in the small market provide imputation credits to their domestic investors; Case
Three, only some assets in the small market provides imputation credits to their domestic investors.
4.4.1 Case One: All assets provide imputation credits to all investors
In this case, I assume the two markets have the same imputation policy, and all risky assets provide
imputation credits to their domestic investors. The imputation credits attached to assets in the small
market, Asset 1, Asset 2 and Asset 3, are $1, which is the same as in the single market model.
Accordingly, the imputation credits attached to assets in the large market, Asset 1’, Asset 2’ and Asset
3’, are $10. Investor A and Investor B are eligible to redeem credits provided by Asset 1, Asset 2 and
Asset 3, and Investor C and Investor D are eligible to redeem credits from Asset 1’, Asset 2’ and Asset
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3’. If a short sale occurs, investors are required to pay back the face amount of imputation credits
when closing their position.
Equilibrium outcome
The equilibrium outcome is set out in Table 4.3. Numbers in parenthesis indicate differences compared
with the two-market equilibrium before imputation, shown in Table 4.1. After introducing imputation
credits, the main changes to the market equilibrium are:
• The risk-free rate increases by 1.02%. Again, this is because risky assets with imputation credits
become relatively more attractive to investors, resulting in less investment in the risk-free asset.
• The prices of assets 1, 2 and 3 decrease [0.37, 0.67, 0.47] respectively, while the prices of
Asset 1’, 2’ and 3’ increase [0.70, 0.94, 0.71] respectively. The decrease in the equilibrium
prices of risky assets in the small market is the combined effect of both markets’ introduction of
imputation. The imputation credits provided by the large market induces the wealthy investors (C
and D) to withdraw capital from the small market to their domestic market, while the imputation
credits in the small market induces Investors A and B to increase their investment in Assets 1, 2
and 3. As Investors A and B have smaller amount of wealth, the total investment in these three
assets reduces. The opposite occurs for Assets 1’, 2’ and 3’. This is discussed further below.
• All investors increase their investment in their domestic market and decrease their investment in
the foreign market. As a result, Assets 1 and 3 are held entirely by small market investors and
Assets 1’ and 3’ are held entirely by large market investors. That is, the home bias phenomena
appears. Assets 2 and 2’ are held partially by foreign investors for their diversification benefits –
those assets being relatively less correlated with other assets.
• Investors A and B have a smaller increase in portfolio return than Investors C and D. This is
because there is a decrease in foreign asset returns for A and B but an increase for C and D. For
the same reason, Investors A and B increase the investment in the risk-free asset, while C and D
decrease their investment in it. Therefore, A and B have a lower portfolio standard deviation.
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Table 4.3: Equilibrium under imputation (Case One)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’ Risk-free
(Difference relative to no-imputation equilibrium)
Payoff AB 101 101 101 1000 1000 1000 100
Payoff CD 100 100 100 1010 1010 1010 100
Price 88.51 85.59 87.99 884.58 853.30 879.55 90.49
(-0.37) (-0.67) (-0.47) (+0.70) (+0.94) (+0.71) (-0.85)
Return 14.12% 18.01% 14.78% 13.05% 17.19% 13.69% 10.51%
AB (+1.60%) (+2.07%) (+1.74%) (-0.09%) (-0.13%) (-0.09%) (+1.02%)
Return 12.99% 16.84% 13.65% 14.18% 18.36% 14.83% 10.51%
CD (+0.47%) (+0.90%) (+0.60%) (+1.04%) (+1.04%) (+1.05%) (+1.02%)
Allocation A 38.62 24.24 38.39 0.00 12.60 0.00 - 23.84
(90,4) (+35.09) (+20.81) (+34.88) (-35.09) (-21.24) (-34.89) (+0.43)
Return: 16.84% (+0.81%), Std dev:14.62% (-0.24%)
Allocation B 49.89 31.31 49.60 0.00 16.28 0.00 32.92
(180,6) (+45.34) (+26.90) (+45.07) (-45.26) (-27.37) (-45.01) (+0.34)
Return: 14.60% (+0.89%), Std dev: 9.44% (-0.14%)
Allocation C 0.00 13.12 0.00 386.34 360.06 384.14 -243.66
(900,4) (-35.28) (-21.12) (-35.12) (+35.46) (+21.70) (+35.26) (-0.90)
Return: 17.16% (+1.14%), Std dev: 15.07% (+0.21%)
Allocation D 0.00 16.92 0.00 498.24 464.35 495.41 325.08
(1800,6) (-45.52) (-27.25) (-45.30) (+45.60) (+27.85) (+45.34) (-0.72)
Return: 14.80% (+1.10%), Std dev: 9.72% (+0.13%)
Tangency 33.92% 21.29% 33.72% 0.00% 11.07% 0.00% –
portfolio (+30.83%) (+18.29%) (+30.65%) (-30.70%) (-18.54%) (-30.53%) –
AB Return: 15.51% (+0.87%), Std dev: 11.56% (-0.14%)
Tangency 0.00% 1.15% 0.00% 33.78% 31.48% 33.59% –
portfolio (-3.09%) (-1.85%) (-3.07%) (+3.08%) (+1.87%) (+3.06%) –
CD Return: 15.75% (+1.11%), Std dev: 11.86% (+0.16%)
In Case One, all risky assets provide imputation credits, and investors are eligible to redeem credits
provided by their domestic assets. Under imputation, the risk-free rate increases, prices for risky assets in
the small market decrease and prices for risky assets in the large market increase. Home bias appears.
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I note that the decrease in the equilibrium prices for risky assets in the small market is caused
by the introduction of imputation in the large market. Other things being equal, the introduction of
imputation to one market increases the equilibrium price of risky assets in that market and decreases
the equilibrium price of risky assets in the other market. The introduction of imputation credits in the
small market has the effect of increasing the price of risky assets in that market, as investors in the
small market have an incentive to invest more in those assets. However, the introduction of imputation
credits in the large market has the effect of decreasing the price of risky assets in the small market, as
investors in the large market have an inventive to invest less into the small market. The net effect is
that the equilibrium prices of risky assets in the small market decrease when imputation credits are
introduced into the two markets at the same time, as in Case One.
Moreover, if we just introduce imputation credits in one market, the influence of imputation credits
on equilibrium price depends on the approach that is adopted in the other market. In Figure 4.3, I
consider the effect of the introduction of $1 imputation into the small market. This effect depends on
whether or not the large market provides imputation credits, the quantum of those imputation credits.
When the large market does not provide imputation credits, the introduction of $1 imputation in the
small market increases the equilibrium price of assets in the small market by [$0.23, $0.08, $0.07]
respectively, and decreases the equilibrium price of assets in the large market by [$0.14, $0.07, $0.14].
However, when the large market provides $10 imputation credits, the introduction of $1 imputation
credits in the small market increase the equilibrium prices of risky assets in the small market by [$0.39,
$0.05, $0.28] respectively and decreases the equilibrium prices of risky assets in the large market by
[$0.20, $0.34, $0.14]. Therefore, to analyze the influence of imputation credits on equilibrium prices,
we need to consider the entire market equilibrium.
Figure 4.3: Effect of introducing $1 imputation credits in the small market on equilibrium prices under
different imputation policies in the large market
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Violation of the CAPM with imputation credits
The numerical value of each term in the CAPM with imputation credits as in Equation 3.13 is shown
in Table 4.4. The market portfolio weight is in proportion to each asset’s price, being [3.07%, 2.97%,
3.06%, 30.72%, 29.63%, 30.55%]. We can see the CAPM with imputation credits in Equation 3.13
only holds for Asset 2 and Asset 2’, but does not hold for Asset 1, Asset 3, Asset 1’ and Asset 3’.
Table 4.4: Value of the CAPM with imputation credits (Case One)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)= (2)(3)(4)
Investor Ui· ωi 1λi ∑
ωi
λi
xi
A [1,1,1,0,0,0] 3.95%
0.2671
0.2685
0.0393
B [1,1,1,0,0,0] 5.11% 0.0508
C [0,0,0,1,1,1] 39.72%
0.2687
0.3974
D [0,0,0,1,1,1] 51.22% 0.5125
∑(1)(5) (6) (7) (8) Left Right Difference
Asset U E[r·] IC·P·1 Cov(r·,rm) (6)+U(7)
(8)
(4) + r f Left-Right
1
0.0901
12.99% 1.13% 0.81% 13.09% 13.52% -0.43%
2 16.84% 1.17% 1.73% 16.95% 16.95% 0.00%
3 13.65% 1.14% 0.95% 13.75% 14.05% -0.30%
1’
0.9099
13.05% 1.13% 0.97% 14.08% 14.12% -0.04%
2’ 17.19% 1.17% 2.08% 18.26% 18.26% 0.00%
3’ 13.69% 1.14% 1.14% 14.73% 14.76% -0.03%
The CAPM with imputation credits does not hold for Assets 1, 3, 1’ and 3’ because these are what
I define to be ’zero-holding’ assets, meaning that at least one investor holds zero percent of that asset in
their portfolio. Investor A and Investor B hold zero percent of Asset 1’ and Asset 3’ in their portfolio,
and Investor C and Investor D hold zero percent of Asset 1 and Asset 3 in theirs.
The Classic CAPM relation only holds between investors’ tangency portfolio and the risky assets
included in the tangency portfolio, but does not hold between the tangency portfolio and the zero-
holding assets. For example, Investor A and B’s tangency portfolio only includes Asset 1, 2, 3 and 2’,
and these four assets and the tangency portfolio satisfy the Classic CAPM relation, but Asset 1’ and
Asset 3’ which are not included in the tangency portfolio do not satisfy the Classic CAPM relation, as
shown in Table 4.5. In the table, the actual return is the return including imputation credits received
by Investor A and Investor B, and the tangency portfolio return is a weighted average of these actual
returns. The Classic CAPM implies a higher return than the actual return received by Investors A and
B for their zero-holding assets. The situation is similar for the tangency portfolio of Investors C and D,
which is shown in Table 4.6.
Estimation error from the standard CAPM using returns that exclude imputation credits
As discussed in the previous chapter, in practice, the returns on the market portfolio and risky assets
are often calculated on the basis of capital gains and dividends only (i.e., not including imputation
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Table 4.5: Classic CAPM parameter value for Investor A and B’s tangency portfolio (Case One)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’
Weight 33.92% 21.29% 33.72% 0.00% 11.07% 0.00%
Beta 0.72 1.50 0.85 0.61 1.34 0.71
CAPM return 14.12% 18.01% 14.78% 13.55% 17.19% 14.07%
Actual return 14.12% 18.01% 14.78% 13.05% 17.19% 13.69%
Estimation error 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% +0.50% 0.00% +0.38%
r f = 10.51%, Tangency portfolio return = 15.51%
Table 4.6: Classic CAPM parameter value for Investor C and D’s tangency portfolio (Case One)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’
Weight 0.00% 1.15% 0.00% 33.78% 31.48% 33.59%
Beta 0.56 1.21 0.66 0.70 1.50 0.83
CAPM return 13.46% 16.84% 13.98% 14.18% 18.36% 14.83%
Actual return 12.99% 16.84% 13.65% 14.18% 18.36% 14.83%
Estimation error +0.47% 0.00% +0.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
r f = 10.51%, Tangency portfolio return = 15.75%
credits). Table 4.7 quantifies the estimation error produced by that approach. In the table, the market
portfolio return is a weighted average of the actual returns excluding imputation credits, with each
asset weighted in proportion to its total presence in the market. The standard CAPM can overestimate
or underestimate the return excluding imputation credits for risky assets.
Table 4.7: Estimation error for returns excluding imputation credits by the standard CAPM(Case One)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’
Weight 3.07% 2.97% 3.06% 30.72% 29.63% 30.55%
Beta 0.59 1.26 0.69 0.71 1.52 0.83
CAPM return 12.93% 15.68% 13.35% 13.41% 16.73% 13.92%
Actual return 12.99% 16.84% 13.65% 13.05% 17.19% 13.69%
Estimation error -0.06% -1.16% -0.29% +0.36% -0.46% +0.23%
r f = 10.51%, MRP = 4.09%
The cost of capital
The change in the cost of capital after introducing imputation credits is set out in Table 4.8. For Asset
1’, 2’ and 3’, the cost of capital decreases after introducing imputation credits, and the cost of capital
increases for Assets 1, 2 and 3. This is in accordance with the movement of equilibrium prices.
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Table 4.8: Cost of capital comparison (Case One)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’
No imputation 12.51% 15.94% 13.05% 13.14% 17.32% 13.97%
With imputation 12.99% 16.84% 13.65% 13.05% 17.19% 13.69%
Difference +0.47% +0.90% +0.60% -0.09% -0.13% -0.09%
Home bias
Home-bias is the phenomenon that investors tend to invest relatively more into their domestic market
and less into foreign markets compared to the world market portfolio. The Classic CAPM model
predicts that investors should hold the world market portfolio whose weight is in proportion to risky
assets’ prices. A common measure of Equity Home Bias (EBS) is defined as:
EHBi = 1− Share of Foreign Equities in Country i Equity HoldingsShare of Foreign Equities in the World Market Portfolio . (4.1)
When the EHB for country i is equal to one, there is a fully home bias; when it is equal to zero, there
is no home bias.
In Table 4.9, we list the proportion of assets holding by investors before and after imputation credits.
We see that, before imputation, investors hold the same percentage in every asset, since all investors’
have the same tangency portfolio. Moreover, the percentage hold by each investor is approximately
in line with their proportion of total wealth in the market. For example, Investor A and Investor B
together hold 9.09% of each asset, because their total wealth takes 9.09% of the total wealth in the
whole market. However, after introducing imputation, assets are predominantly held by the domestic
investors. Investor A and Investor B hold 100% of Asset 1 and Asset 3, and 64.91% of Asset 2, and
Investor C and Investor D hold 100% of Asset 1’ and Asset 3’, and 96.62% of Asset 2’.
Table 4.9: Proportion of assets holding by investors (Case One)
1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’
Before
A 3.97% 3.97% 3.97% 3.97% 3.97% 3.97%
B 5.12% 5.12% 5.12% 5.12% 5.12% 5.12%
A+B 9.09% 9.09% 9.09% 9.09% 9.09% 9.09%
C 39.70% 39.70% 39.70% 39.70% 39.70% 39.70%
D 51.21% 51.21% 51.21% 51.21% 51.21% 51.21%
C+D 90.91% 90.91% 90.91% 90.91% 90.91% 90.91%
After
A 43.63% 28.32% 43.63% 0.00% 1.48% 0.00%
B 56.37% 36.59% 56.37% 0.00% 1.91% 0.00%
A+B 100% 64.91% 100% 0.00% 3.38% 0.00%
C 0.00% 15.33% 0.00% 43.67% 42.20% 43.67%
D 0.00% 19.77% 0.00% 56.33% 54.42% 56.33%
C+D 0.00% 35.09% 0.00% 100% 96.62% 100%
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The EHB for the small market and the large market before and after introducing imputation credits
are shown in Table 4.10. Before imputation credits, there is no home bias – investors all hold the world
market portfolio. However, after introducing imputation credits, the EHB for both market becomes
large and home bias is obvious.
Table 4.10: EHB before and after imputation (Case One)
Before After
Small market 0 0.88
Large market 0 0.87
To conclude, imputation credits is one reason for the home bias phenomena. As the benefit of
imputation credits overrides the benefit of diversification, investors are more inclined to invest relatively
more into domestic assets.
The value of imputation to each investor
Table 4.11 sets out the amount of imputation credits that can be redeemed by each investor according
to their portfolio holdings in each asset.
Table 4.11: Redemption of imputation credits (Case One)
Investor 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’ Total
A $0.44 $0.28 $0.44 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $1.16
B $0.56 $0.37 $0.56 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $1.49
C $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $4.37 $4.22 $4.37 $12.95
D $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $5.63 $5.44 $5.63 $16.71
The actual value of imputation credits to investors requires consideration of how imputation causes
a change in the equilibrium holdings of investors. I again convert the expected utility level to its
equivalent dollar value before and after imputation, as shown in Table 4.12. For the less risk averse
investors (A and C) the value of imputation is less than the face value of the credits that redeemed.
This is because those investors are disadvantaged by the increase in the risk-free rate because they are
net borrowers. The reverse is true for the more risk averse investors.
Table 4.12: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case One)
Investor Before After Difference Credits redeemed Percentage
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 101.21 102.05 0.85 1.16 0.73
B 200.56 202.31 1.75 1.49 1.17
C 1012.07 1021.72 9.65 12.95 0.75
D 2005.64 2024.63 18.99 16.71 1.14
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An equilibrium with a fixed risk-free rate
In the previous analysis, I have assumed that the government fixes its demand for risk-free borrowing
and the risk-free rate changes to clear the market. An alternative assumption is that the government
fixes the risk-free rate, in which case the amount it borrows will vary so as to clear the market. This
alternative case of a fixed risk-free rate is considered in this sub-section.
The equilibrium result is shown in Table 4.13. With a fixed risk-free rate, the equilibrium price
of risky assets increases and the increase is more than 85% of the face amount of credits in the large
market. The increase in the small market is lower relative to the face amount of imputation credits
because of the influence of imputation policy in the large market, as discussed above. All investors
invest less in the risk-free assets and more in the risky assets. The home bias phenomena still appears.
4.4.
T
H
E
E
FFE
C
T
S
O
F
IM
PU
TA
T
IO
N
C
R
E
D
IT
S
O
N
T
H
E
M
A
R
K
E
T
E
Q
U
IL
IB
R
IU
M
73
Table 4.13: Equilibrium under imputation (Case One r f fix)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’ Risk-free
(Difference relative to no-imputation equilibrium)
Payoff AB 101 101 101 1000 1000 1000 70.54
Payoff CD 100 100 100 1010 1010 1010 70.54
Price 89.32 86.35 88.79 892.66 860.89 887.56 64.43
(+0.44) (+0.10) (+0.33) (+8.79) (+8.54) (+8.71) (-26.90)
Return 13.08% 16.96% 13.75% 12.02% 16.16% 12.67% 9.49%
AB (+0.57%) (+1.02%) (+0.70%) (-1.11%) (-1.16%) (-1.12%) (0.00%)
Return 11.96% 15.80% 12.62% 13.15% 17.32% 13.80% 9.49%
CD (-0.55%) (-0.14%) (-0.42%) (+0.01%) (-0.00%) (+0.01%) (0.00%)
Allocation A 38.98 24.22 38.75 0.00 12.94 0.00 -24.89
(90,4) (+35.45) (+20.80) (+35.24) (-35.09) (-20.90) (-34.89) (-0.62)
Return: 15.85% (-0.18%), Std dev:14.62% (-0.24%)
Allocation B 50.34 31.28 50.04 0.00 16.71 0.00 31.63
(180,6) (+45.78) (+26.86) (+45.51) (-45.26) (-26.94) (-45.01) (-0.94)
Return: 13.60 % (-0.11%), Std dev: 9.44% (-0.15%)
Allocation C 0.00 13.48 0.00 390.00 363.16 387.77 -254.41
(900,4) (-35.28) (-20.76) (-35.12) (+39.12) (+24.80) (+38.89) (-11.65)
Return: 16.18% (+0.16%), Std dev: 15.08% (+0.22%)
Allocation D 0.00 17.38 0.00 502.66 468.07 499.79 312.10
(1800,6) (-45.52) (-26.80) (-45.30) (+50.02) (+31.57) (+49.72) (-13.69)
Return: 13.80% (+0.10%), Std dev: 9.72% (+0.13%)
Tangency 33.93% 21.08% 33.73% 0.00% 11.26% 0.00% –
portfolio (+30.84%) (+18.09%) (+30.65%) (-30.70%) (-18.35%) (-30.53%) –
AB Return: 14.47% (-0.17%), Std dev: 11.45% (-0.25%)
Tangency 0.00% 1.17% 0.00% 33.78% 31.48% 33.59% –
portfolio ( -3.09%) (-1.83%) (-3.07%) (+3.08%) (+1.85%) (+3.06%) –
CD Return: 14.71% (+0.07%), Std dev: 11.75% (+0.05%)
When risk-free rate is held unchanged, the equilibrium prices for all risky assets increase. The relative
increase in prices is higher in the large market. Home bias still appears.
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As the equilibrium prices of risky assets increase, the cost of capital for those risky assets decreases,
as shown in Table 4.14.
Table 4.14: Cost of capital comparison (Case One r f fix)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’
No imputation 12.51% 15.94% 13.05% 13.14% 17.32% 13.97%
With imputation 11.96% 15.80% 12.62% 12.02% 16.16% 12.67%
Difference -0.55% -0.14% -0.42% -1.11% -1.16% -1.12%
The home-bias level measured by EHB is shown in Table 4.15, which is as severe as when the
risk-free rate varies.
Table 4.15: EHB before and after imputation (Case One r f fix)
Before After
Small market 0 0.88
Large market 0 0.87
The actual value of imputation credits, incorporating the impact of the change in equilibrium, is
shown in Table 4.16. As the equilibrium price of risky assets increases after imputation, Investors A
and B actually suffer a loss from imputation credits, and the value of imputation to Investors C and D
is only 4% of the face value of imputation credits that are redeemed. This is because the introduction
of imputation results in a maetrial change in portfolio holdings away from what would otherwise have
been optimal for each investor.
Table 4.16: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case one r f fix)
Investor Before After Difference Credits redeemed Percentage
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 101.21 101.14 -0.06 1.15 -0.06
B 200.56 200.48 -0.08 1.49 -0.06
C 1012.07 1012.64 0.58 12.96 0.04
D 2005.64 2006.37 0.74 16.70 0.04
To conclude, if the risk-free rate remains fixed after introducing imputation credits, companies
benefit from a lower cost of capital and investors obtain only a marginal benefit from imputation.
Summary for Case One
In Case One where all risky assets provide imputation credits to their domestic investors, I find that:
• Similar to the single-market model, the introduction of imputation credits increases the risk-free
rate. As the risky assets have higher returns with imputation credits, they attract more investment,
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thus less is invested in the risk-free asset and risk-free asset has a lower equilibrium price and a
higher return.
• When all risky assets in one market provide imputation credits, the equilibrium price of those
risky assets will increase, but the equilibrium price of risky assets in the other market will
decrease. The change in the equilibrium price in one market is influenced by the dividend tax
policy adopted in the other market.
• The benefits of imputation credits override the benefits of diversification. Investors invest more
in their domestic market and less in foreign market, and might hold zero of some foreign assets.
The home bias phenomena appears.
• Since some investors hold zero percent in certain assets, there is a corner solution and the CAPM
with imputation credits does not hold.
• If the risk-free rate is fixed, the benefit of imputation credits predominantly goes to companies
via a reduction in the cost of capital, while investors have close to zero or even negative benefit
from imputation credits.
4.4.2 Case Two: Only the small market provides imputation credits
In this case, imputation credits are only provided by risky assets in the small market, which is Asset 1,
2 and 3, and only Investor A and Investor B are eligible to redeem the credits. For Investor A and B, the
expected payoff with imputation credits is E[C˜] = [101,101,101,1000,1000,1000], and for Investor
C and Investor D is E[C˜] = [100,100,100,1000,1000,1000]. Note that for Investor C and Investor D,
if they short sell Assets 1, 2 or 3, they are required to pay back the full face amount of credits.
The equilibrium result is set out in Table 4.17. Again, figures in parenthesis represent the difference
compared with the two-market equilibrium before imputation. The equilibrium results are that the
risk-free rate increases, but by less than the previous case as it is impacted by imputation in only one
market. The change here is only 0.03%, which is smaller than the increase in Case One of 1.02%.
The equilibrium prices of Assets 1, 2 and 3 increase after introducing imputation, and the increase is
small relative to the face amount of imputation credits. There is a small decrease in the equilibrium
prices for Assets 1’, 2’ and 3’ as the small market investors withdraw from the large market in order to
capture imputation credits in the large market.
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Table 4.17: Equilibrium under imputation (Case Two)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’ Risk-free
(Difference relative to no-imputation equilibrium)
Payoff AB 101 101 101 1000 1000 1000 100
Payoff CD 100 100 100 1000 1000 1000 100
Price 89.11 86.33 88.53 883.73 852.28 878.71 91.31
(+0.23) (+0.08) (+0.07) (-0.15) (-0.07) (-0.14) (-0.02)
Return 13.34% 17.00% 14.08% 13.16% 17.33% 13.80% 9.51%
AB (+0.83%) (+1.06%) (+1.04%) (+0.02%) (+0.01%) (+0.02%) (+0.03%)
Return 12.22% 15.84% 12.95% 13.16 % 17.33% 13.80% 9.51%
CD (-0.29%) (-0.10%) (-0.09%) (+0.02%) (+0.01%) (+0.02%) (+0.03%)
Allocation A 39.07 9.36 36.94 8.37 30.57 9.81 -44.11
(90,4) (+35.54) (+5.94) (+33.43) (-26.72) (-3.27) (-25.08) (-19.84)
Return: 17.29% (+1.26%), Std dev:16.54% ( +1.68%)
Allocation B 50.04 11.99 47.31 10.71 39.15 12.56 8.23
(180,6) (+45.49) (+7.57) (+42.78) (-34.55) (-4.50) (-32.44) (-24.35)
Return: 14.49% (+0.79%), Std dev: 10.59% (+1.00%)
Allocation C 0.00 28.37 1.87 377.50 341.66 373.87 -223.28
(900,4) (-35.28) (-5.87) (-33.24) (+26.63) (+3.30) (+24.99) (+19.48)
Return: 16.00% (-0.03%), Std dev: 14.79% (-0.07%)
Allocation D 0.00 36.61 2.42 487.14 440.89 482.46 350.47
(1800,6) (-45.52) (-7.62) (-42.89) (+34.50) (+4.39) (+32.39) (+24.68)
Return: 13.70% (-0.01%) Std dev: 9.54% (-0.04%)
Tangency 29.13% 6.98% 27.54% 6.24% 22.79% 7.32% –
portfolio (+26.04%) (+3.98%) (+24.47%) (-24.47%) (-6.81%) (-23.21%) –
AB Return: 14.73% (+0.10%), Std dev: 11.10% (-0.60%)
Tangency 0.00% 2.53% 0.17% 33.61% 30.42% 33.28% –
portfolio ( -3.09%) (-0.47%) (-2.91%) (+2.90%) (+0.81%) (+2.75%) –
CD Return: 14.71% (+0.07%), Std dev: 11.85% (+0.15%)
In Case Two, only the small market provides imputation credits. Under imputation, the risk-free rate
increases slightly, assets that provide imputation credits have an increase in price and assets do not
provide imputation credits have a decrease in price. Home bias still appears but less severe than in Case
One.
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Investors again choose to invest more in their domestic assets, but the level of home bias is smaller
in Case Two than in Case One, which is shown by the EHB value in Table 4.18.
The proportion of asset holding by investors are shown in Table 4.19. In Case Two, Investors A
and B only hold a small proportion of foreign assets Asset 1’ and Asset 3’, and Investors C and D
only hold a small proportion of foreign asset Asset 3, and hold zero percent of Asset 1. Again, the
introduction of imputation in the small market creates a home bias.
Table 4.18: EHB before and after imputation (Case Two)
Before After
Small market 0 0.60
Large market 0 0.71
Table 4.19: Two-market proportion of asset holding by investors (Case Two)
1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’
Case One
A 43.63% 28.32% 43.63% 0.00% 1.48% 0.00%
B 56.37% 36.59% 56.37% 0.00% 1.91% 0.00%
A+B 100% 64.91% 100% 0.00% 3.38% 0.00%
C 0.00% 15.33% 0.00% 43.67% 42.20% 43.67%
D 0.00% 19.77% 0.00% 56.33% 54.42% 56.33%
C+D 0.00% 35.09% 0.00% 100% 96.62% 100%
Case Two
A 43.84% 10.87% 41.59% 0.95% 3.58% 1.13%
B 56.15% 13.92% 53.27% 1.21% 4.59% 1.44%
A+B 100% 24.79% 94.86% 2.16% 8.18% 2.57%
C 0.00% 32.88% 2.07% 42.72% 40.09% 42.55%
D 0.00% 42.34% 3.07% 55.12% 51.74% 54.88%
C+D 0.00% 75.21% 5.14% 97.84% 91.82% 97.43%
Because Asset 1 is not held at all by Investors C and D, there is a corner solution and the CAPM
with imputation credits does not hold for Asset 1. The numerical values of each term of the CAPM
with imputation credits in Equation 3.13 is presented in Table 4.20.
The estimation error from implementing the standard CAPM using returns that exclude imputation
credits (as often implemented in practice) is shown in Table 4.21.
As the equilibrium prices of assets that provide imputation credits increase, the cost of capital for
these assets decreases. On the contrary, the cost of capital for assets that do not provide imputation
credits increases. The cost of capital before and after imputation credits for Case Two in the two-market
model are shown in Table 4.22.
Table 4.23 sets out the imputation credits redeemed by each investor. Investors C and D are not
eligible to redeem any credits.
The value of imputation credits to investors, after factoring in the effects of changing the equilib-
rium, is shown in Table 4.24. In this case, even though Investors C and D do not receive imputation
credits directly, they benefit from the decrease in the prices of Assets 1’, 2’ and 3’ that results from
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Table 4.20: Verification of the CAPM with imputation credits (Case Two)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)= (2)(3)(4)
Investor Ui· ωi 1λi ∑
ωi
λi
xi
A [1,1,1,0,0,0] 4.66%
0.2359
0.2665
0.0412
B [1,1,1,0,0,0] 5.97% 0.0528
C [0,0,0,0,0,0] 39.02%
0.2702
0.3955
D [0,0,0,0,0,0] 50.36% 0.5104
∑(1)(5) (6) (7) (8) Left Right Difference
Asset U E[r·] IC·P·1 Cov(r·,rm) (6)+U(7)
(8)
(4) + r f Left-Right
1
0.0941
12.22% 1.12% 0.80% 12.33% 12.52% -0.19%
2 15.84% 1.16% 1.71% 15.95% 15.95% 0.00%
3 12.95% 1.13% 0.95% 13.06% 13.06% 0.00%
1’
0.9059
13.16% 1.13% 0.97% 13.16% 13.16% 0.00%
2’ 17.33% 1.17% 2.08% 17.33% 17.33% 0.00%
3’ 13.80% 1.14% 1.14% 13.80% 13.80% 0.00%
Table 4.21: Estimation error from implementing the standard CAPM using returns that exclude
imputation credits (Case Two)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’
Weight 3.10% 3.00% 3.08% 30.70% 29.61% 30.52%
Beta 0.59 1.25 0.69 0.71 1.52 0.83
CAPM return 12.52% 15.93% 13.05% 13.15% 17.31% 13.79%
Actual return 12.22% 15.84% 12.95% 13.16% 17.33% 13.80%
Estimation error +0.29% +0.09% +0.10% -0.01% -0.02% -0.01%
r f = 9.51%, MRP = 5.12%
Table 4.22: Cost of capital comparison (Case Two)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’
No imputation 12.51% 15.94% 13.05% 13.14% 17.32% 13.79%
With imputation 12.22% 15.84% 12.95% 13.16% 17.33% 13.80%
Difference -0.29% -0.10% -0.09% +0.02% +0.01% +0.02%
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small market investors withdrawing from the large market. Investor C is $0.04 better off and Investor
D is $0.22 better off. The actual value of imputation to Investors A and Investor B are approximately
half of the face amount of credits that are redeemed, because the prices of Assets 1, 2 and 3 increase.
Investor B has a slightly higher actual value percentage than Investor A because he benefits from a
long position in the risk-free asset.
Table 4.23: Redemption of imputation credits (Case Two)
Investor 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’ total
A 0.44 0.11 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.96
B 0.56 0.14 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.23
C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
D 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4.24: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case Two)
Investor Before After Change Credits redeemed Proportion
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 101.21 101.67 0.46 0.96 0.48
B 200.56 201.17 0.61 1.23 0.49
C 1012.07 1012.11 0.04 0.00 –
D 2005.64 2005.86 0.22 0.00 –
Equilibrium with a fixed risk-free rate
I now consider the case where imputation is introduced only to the small market and where the risk-free
rate is held fixed. The equilibrium result is shown in Table 4.25. In this case, the equilibrium price of
all risky assets increases, as the risk-free rate stays unchanged, more money flows to risky assets. The
increase in the prices of Assets 1, 2 and 3 are slightly larger than when the risk-free rate is allowed to
vary, but compared to the face amount of imputation credits, the increase is still small, because the
total wealth of investors that are eligible to redeem credits is small compared to total market wealth.
80
C
H
A
PT
E
R
4.
E
Q
U
IL
IB
R
IU
M
W
IT
H
T
W
O
M
A
R
K
E
T
S
Table 4.25: Equilibrium under imputation (Case Two r f fix)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’ Risk-free
(Difference relative to no-imputation equilibrium)
Payoff AB 101 101 101 1000 1000 1000 99.25
Payoff CD 100 100 100 1000 1000 1000 99.25
Price 89.13 86.35 88.55 883.93 852.47 878.92 90.65
(+0.25) (+0.10) (+0.09) (+0.06) (+0.12) (+0.07) (-0.69)
Return 13.32% 16.97% 14.06% 13.13% 17.31% 13.78% 9.49%
AB (+0.80%) (+1.03%) (+1.01%) (-0.01%) (-0.02%) (-0.01%) (0.00%)
Return 12.20% 15.81% 12.93% 13.13 % 17.31% 13.78% 9.49%
CD (-0.32%) (-0.13%) (-0.12%) (-0.01%) (-0.02%) (-0.01%) (0.00%)
Allocation A 39.08 9.36 36.94 8.37 30.58 9.82 -44.14
(90,4) (+35.55) (+5.94) (+33.43) (-26.72) (-3.26) (-25.07) (-19.87)
Return: 17.27% (+1.24%), Std dev:16.54% ( +1.68%)
Allocation B 50.05 11.99 47.31 10.72 39.16 12.57 8.20
(180,6) (+45.50) (+7.57) (+42.78) (-34.55) (-4.49) (-32.43) (-24.38)
Return: 14.47% (+0.76%), Std dev: 10.59% (+1.00%)
Allocation C 0.00 28.38 1.88 377.59 341.74 373.96 -223.55
(900,4) (-35.28) (-5.86) (-33.24) (+26.72) (+3.38) (+25.08) (+19.21)
Return: 15.97% (-0.05%), Std dev: 14.79% (-0.07%)
Allocation D 0.00 36.62 2.42 487.25 440.99 482.56 350.15
(1800,6) (-45.52) (-7.55) (-42.88) (+34.61) (+4.49) (+32.49) (+24.36)
Return: 13.67% (-0.03%) Std dev: 9.54% (-0.04%)
Tangency 29.13% 6.98% 27.54% 6.24% 22.80% 7.32% –
portfolio (+26.04%) (+3.98%) (+24.46%) (-24.47%) (-6.81%) (-23.21%) –
AB Return: 14.71% (+0.07%), Std dev: 11.10% (-0.61%)
Tangency 0.00% 2.53% 0.17% 33.61% 30.42% 33.28% –
portfolio ( -3.09%) (-0.47%) (-2.91%) (+2.90%) (+0.81%) (+2.75%) –
CD Return: 14.68% (+0.05%), Std dev: 11.85% (+0.14%)
When risk-free rate is held unchanged, the increase in prices for assets that provide imputation credits is
slightly larger, and assets that do not provide imputation credits also have a slight increase in price.
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As the equilibrium price of all risky assets increase, the cost of capital decreases, as shown in
Table 4.26. After introducing imputation credits, the cost of capital for Assets 1, 2 and 3 decreases
more than when the risk-free rate varies, and the cost of capital for Assets 1’, 2’ and 3’ decrease
slightly as well due to the relative increase in demand for risky assets.
Table 4.26: Cost of capital comparison (Case Two r f fix)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’
No imputation 12.51% 15.94% 13.05% 13.14% 17.32% 13.79%
With imputation 12.20% 15.81% 12.93% 13.13% 17.31% 13.78%
Difference -0.32% -0.13% -0.12% -0.01% -0.02% -0.01%
The value of imputation credits to investors, incorporating the effect of changes in the equilibrium,
is shown in Table 4.27. All investors have a lower expected utility level compared to the case where
the risk-free rate is allowed to vary. Similar to Case One, the benefit of imputation credits flow more to
companies through a lower cost of capital and less to investors when the risk-free rate is held fixed.
Table 4.27: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case Two r f fix)
Investor Before After Change Credits redeemed Proportion
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 101.21 101.65 0.44 0.96 0.46
B 200.56 201.13 0.56 1.23 0.46
C 1012.07 1011.88 -0.19 0.00 –
D 2005.64 2005.40 -0.24 0.00 –
Summary for Case Two
In Case Two where only the small market assets (1, 2 and 3) provide imputation credits, I find that:
• The cost of capital for assets that provide imputation credits decreases. By contrast, for the
assets that do not provide imputation credits, the cost of capital increases.
• Investors still choose to invest more in their domestic assets, but the home bias level is less
severe than in Case One where imputation credits are provided on all assets.
• Investors C and D do not hold any of Asset 1, which results in a corner solution such that the
CAPM with imputation credits does not hold.
• The actual value of imputation credits to Investors A and B is around 0.5 of the face amount,
which is lower than that in Case One, because of the smaller increase in the risk-free rate and
the increase in the prices of the domestic risky assets. Investors C and Investor D benefit from
imputation via the increase in the risk-free rate and the decrease of the prices of their domestic
assets, even though they cannot redeem credits.
82 CHAPTER 4. EQUILIBRIUMWITH TWO MARKETS
• When the risk-free rate is held unchanged, companies have a lower cost of capital, but investors
have a lower expected utility level. In this case, the benefit of imputation credits flows to
companies rather than investors.
4.4.3 Case Three: Only some assets in the small economy provide imputation
credits
I now investigate the case where only Assets 1 and 2 provide imputation credits, while Asset 3 and
assets in the large market do not provide imputation credits. Therefore, for Investors A and B, the
expected payoff with imputation credits is E[C˜] = [101,101,100,1000,1000,1000], and for Investors
C and D it is E[C˜] = [100,100,100,1000,1000,1000]. Again, if Investors C or D choose to short sell
Assets 1 or 2 (not Asset 3), they will be required to pay back the face amount of imputation credits.
The equilibrium result is set out in Table 4.28. The risk-free rate decreases less compared to
Case Two, because there is one less asset providing imputation credits. Assets 1 and 2 that provide
imputation credits have an increase in price, but other risky assets that do not provide imputation
credits have a slight decrease in price. Investors A and B tilt their portfolio holdings towards Assets
1, 2, and 3’, while short selling Asset 3. That is, they short-sell Asset 3 to provide funds to invest in
Assets 1 and 2, while holding Asset 3’ to effectively hedge against the short position in Asset 3. On
the contrary, Investors C and Investor D invest less in Assets 1, 2 and 3’, but relatively more in the
other three risky assets, and they hold zero in Asset 1. This is due to the diversification benefits of
Assets 3 and 3’ for foreign investors.
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Table 4.28: Equilibrium under imputation (Case Three)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’ Risk-free
(Difference relative to no-imputation equilibrium)
Payoff AB 101 101 100 1000 1000 1000 100
Payoff CD 100 100 100 1000 1000 1000 100
Price 89.17 86.33 88.45 883.74 852.27 878.73 91.32
(+0.29) (+0.08) (-0.01) (-0.13) (-0.08) (-0.12) (-0.02)
Return 13.27% 17.00% 13.06% 13.15% 17.33% 13.80% 9.51%
AB (+0.76%) (+1.06%) (+0.02%) (+0.02%) (+0.01%) (+0.02%) (+0.02%)
Return 12.15% 15.84% 13.06% 13.15 % 17.33% 13.80% 9.51%
CD (-0.36%) (-0.10%) (+0.02%) (+0.02%) (+0.01%) (+0.02%) (+0.02%)
Allocation A 39.03 18.66 -8.80 7.84 22.67 45.56 -34.96
(90,4) (+35.50) (+15.24) (-12.31) (-27.25) (-11.17) (+10.67) (-10.68)
Return: 16.81% (+0.78%), Std dev:15.90% ( +1.04%)
Allocation B 50.13 23.97 -11.30 10.07 29.11 58.52 19.50
(180,6) (+45.58) (+19.55) (-15.83) (-35.20) (-14.54) (+13.51) (-13.08)
Return: 14.20% (+0.49%), Std dev: 10.21% (+0.62%)
Allocation C 0.00 19.08 47.39 378.05 349.52 338.23 -232.27
(900,4) (-35.28) (-15.16) (+12.28) (+27.17) (+11.15) (-10.65) (+10.49)
Return: 16.01% (-0.01%), Std dev: 14.82% (-0.04%)
Allocation D 0.00 24.62 61.15 487.79 450.98 436.42 339.05
(1800,6) (-45.52) (-19.56) (+15.85) (+35.15) (+14.48) (-13.65) (+13.25)
Return: 13.70% (0.00%) Std dev: 9.56% (-0.03%)
Tangency 31.24% 14.93% -7.04% 6.27% 18.14% 36.46% –
portfolio (+28.15%) (+11.94%) (-10.11%) (-24.43%) (-11.47%) (+5.93%) –
AB Return: 14.77% (+0.13%), Std dev: 11.45% (-0.25%)
Tangency 0.00% 1.68% 4.19% 33.39% 30.87% 29.87% –
portfolio ( -3.09%) (-1.31%) (+1.11%) (+2.68%) (+1.26%) (-0.66%) –
CD Return: 14.68% (+0.04%), Std dev: 11.78% (+0.07%)
In Case Three, only Assets 1 and 2 provide imputation credits. The prices of Assets 1 and 2 increase
and the prices of all other assets decrease. The decrease in the price of the risk-free asset is smaller than
for Case Two. Short selling is involved in this case. Home bias appears, but less severe than in previous
cases.
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The CAPM with imputation parameter values for Equation 3.13 are shown in Table 4.29. Since
Asset 1 is zero-holding asset, it does not satisfy the CAPM with imputation credits. However, for Asset
3, even though it is short sold by Investors A and B, it still satisfies the CAPM with imputation credits.
This is because the CAPM relation (i.e., the expected returns on risky assets being a function of the
expected returns on the tangency portfolio) cannot be derived in the presence of a ’zero-weight’ asset.
Table 4.29: Verification of the CAPM with imputation credits (Case Three)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)= (2)(3)(4)
investor Ui· ωi 1λi ∑
ωi
λi
xi
A [1,1,0,0,0,0] 4.34%
0.2493
0.2663
0.0406
B [1,1,0,0,0,0] 5.58% 0.0522
C [0,0,0,0,0,0] 39.33%
0.2681
0.3961
D [0,0,0,0,0,0] 50.75% 0.5111
∑(1)(5) (6) (7) (8) left right Difference
asset U E[r·] IC·P·1 Cov(r·,rm) (6)+U(7)
(8)
(4) + r f Left-Right
1
0.0928
12.25% 1.12% 0.80% 12.25% 12.52% -0.27%
2 15.95% 1.16% 1.71% 15.95% 15.95% 0.00%
3
0.00
13.06% 1.13% 0.95% 13.06% 13.06% 0.00%
1’ 13.15% 1.13% 0.97% 13.15% 13.15% 0.00%
2’ 17.33% 1.17% 2.08% 17.33% 17.33% 0.00%
3’ 13.80% 1.14% 1.14% 13.80% 13.80% 0.00%
Once again, the estimation of returns that do not consider imputation credits by the standard CAPM
leads to estimation error, as shown in Table 4.30. This continues to be an important result as it is
common in practice to omit the value of imputation credits when measuring returns.
Table 4.30: estimation error from implementing the standard CAPM using returns that exclude
imputation credits (Case Three)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’
Weight 3.10% 3.00% 3.07% 30.70% 29.61% 30.53%
Beta 0.59 1.25 0.69 0.71 1.52 0.83
CAPM return 12.51% 15.93% 13.05% 13.14% 17.31% 13.79%
Actual return 12.15% 15.84% 13.06% 13.15% 17.33% 13.80%
Estimation error +0.36% +0.09% -0.01% -0.01% -0.02% -0.01%
r f = 9.51%, MRP = 5.13%
In this case, the EHB calculated as in Equation 4.1 is shown in Table 4.31. The home bias
phenomena is less severe than Case Two, as expected because there is one fewer asset distributing
imputation credits.
The proportion of assets held by each investor is shown in Table 4.32. In this case, the investment
in Asset 3 all comes from foreign investors, with domestic investors short selling that asset.
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Table 4.31: EHB before and after imputation (Case Three)
Before After
Small market 0 0.33
Large market 0 0.36
Table 4.32: Two-market proportion of asset holding by investors (Case Three)
1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’
Case Two
A 43.84% 10.87% 41.59% 0.95% 3.58% 1.13%
B 56.15% 13.92% 53.27% 1.21% 4.59% 1.44%
A+B 100% 24.79% 94.86% 2.16% 8.18% 2.57%
C 0.00% 32.88% 2.07% 42.72% 40.09% 42.55%
D 0.00% 42.34% 3.07% 55.12% 51.74% 54.88%
C+D 0.00% 75.21% 5.14% 97.84% 91.82% 97.43%
Case Three
A 43.78% 21.62% -9.95% 0.89% 2.66% 5.18%
B 56.22% 27.77% -12.78% 1.14% 3.42% 6.66%
A+B 100% 49.38% -22.73% 2.03% 6.08% 11.84%
C 0.00% 22.10% 53.59% 42.78% 41.01% 38.49%
D 0.00% 28.51% 69.14% 55.20% 52.91% 49.66%
C+D 0.00% 50.62% 122.73% 97.97% 93.92% 88.16%
The change in the cost of capital resulting from the introduction of imputation in Case Three is
shown in Table 4.33. For Asset 1, the cost of capital decreases more in Case Three than in Case Two.
Asset 3 exhibits an increase in the cost of capital as it does not provide imputation credits in Case
Three. For other risky assets, the change in the cost of capital is around the same as in Case Three and
in Case Two.
Table 4.33: Cost of capital changes comparison (Case Three)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’
Change in Case Two -0.29% -0.10% -0.09% +0.02% +0.01% +0.02%
Change in Case Three -0.36% -0.10% +0.02% +0.02% +0.01% +0.02%
The value of imputation credits to investors, including the effects of altering the equilibrium
portfolio holdings, is shown in Table 4.34. Again, even though Investors C and D do not receive
imputation credits directly, they benefit from the decrease in asset prices. For Investors A and B, as the
increase in the price of Asset 1 is more than that in Case Two, the actual value of imputation credits is
less in proportion to the face amount of credits compared to Case Two.
Equilibrium under a short sale restriction
As short sales are involved in Case Three for the two-market model, I now consider the effect of
imposing a short sale restriction.
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Table 4.34: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case Three)
Investor Before After Change Credits redeemed Proportion
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 101.21 101.50 0.29 0.65 0.45
B 200.56 200.95 0.39 0.84 0.46
C 1012.07 1012.13 0.07 0.00 –
D 2005.64 2005.86 0.22 0.00 –
Details of the equilibrium are presented in Table 4.35. The equilibrium price change is slightly
smaller after the short sale restriction is imposed. All investors re-balance their portfolios. Instead of
short selling Asset 3, Investors A and B now hold zero of Asset 3, and invest more in the risk-free asset
and Asset 2. Investors C and D move away from Asset 3 and invest more in Asset 3’, and increase
their investment in the risk-free asset.
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Table 4.35: Equilibrium under imputation (Case Three with short sale restriction)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’ Risk-free
(Difference relative to no-imputation equilibrium)
Payoff AB 101 101 100 1000 1000 1000 100
Payoff CD 100 100 100 1000 1000 1000 100
Price 89.15 86.33 88.46 883.74 852.27 878.72 91.32
(+0.28) (+0.07) (+0.00) (-0.13) (-0.08) (-0.12) (-0.02)
Return 13.29% 17.00% 13.04% 13.16% 17.33% 13.80% 9.51%
AB (+0.77%) (+1.06%) (-0.00%) (+0.02%) (+0.01%) (+0.02%) (+0.02%)
Return 12.16% 15.84% 13.04% 13.16% 17.33% 13.80% 9.51%
CD (-0.35%) (-0.10%) (-0.00%) (+0.02%) (+0.01%) (+0.02%) (+0.02%)
Allocation A 39.03 16.80 0.00 7.83 24.13 38.56 -36.35
(90,4) (+35.50) (+13.37) (-3.51) (-27.26) (-9.70) (+3.67) (-12.07)
Return: 16.80% (+0.77%), Std dev:15.89% ( +1.03%)
Allocation B 50.13 21.57 0.00 10.06 31.00 49.53 17.71
(180,6) (+45.58) (+17.16) (-4.53) (-35.20) (-12.65) (+4.52) (-14.87)
Return: 14.19% (+0.49%), Std dev: 10.20% (+0.62%)
Allocation C 0.00 20.94 38.62 378.05 348.05 345.21 -230.88
(900,4) (-35.28) (-13.30) (+3.51) (+27.18) (+9.69) (-3.67) (+11.88)
Return: 16.01% (-0.01%), Std dev: 14.81% (-0.05%)
Allocation D 0.00 27.02 49.84 487.80 449.09 445.43 340.83
(1800,6) (-45.52) (-17.15) (+4.54) (+35.16) (+12.59) (-4.64) (+15.04)
Return: 13.70% (-0.00%), Std dev: 9.56% (-0.03%)
Tangency 30.89% 13.29% 0.00% 6.20% 19.10% 30.52% –
portfolio (+27.80%) (+10.30%) (-3.07%) (-24.51%) (-10.51%) (-0.01%) –
AB Return: 14.70% (+0.07%), Std dev: 11.32% (-0.39%)
Tangency 0.00% 1.85% 3.42% 33.43% 30.78% 30.53% –
portfolio (-3.09%) (-1.14%) (+0.34%) (+2.73%) (+1.17%) (-0.00%) –
CD Return: 14.68% (+0.05%), Std dev: 11.79% (+0.09%)
When short selling is restricted, Investors A and B hold zero of Asset 3 instead of short selling it. The
change in the of prices of risky assets is generally smaller. All investors re-balance their portfolio
according to the new price.
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Table 4.36 shows the effects of imputation credits on the cost of capital under the short sale
restriction. With the short sale restriction, the cost of capital for Asset 3 stays the same before and
after introducing imputation credits, and it is lower than when short selling is allowed. The change in
the cost of capital for Asset 1 is slightly higher under the short sale restriction. For the other four risky
assets, the cost of capital is immaterially different with and without the short sale restriction.
Table 4.36: Cost of capital changes comparison (Case Three with short sale restriction)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’
No restriction -0.36% -0.10% +0.02% +0.02% +0.01% +0.02%
With restriction -0.35% -0.10% -0.00% +0.02% +0.01% +0.02%
Table 4.37 shows the proportion of assets held by each investor without and with short sale
restriction. With the restriction, Investors A and B hold zero percent of Asset 3. Investors C and D
hold more in Asset 2, 1’ and 3’, but less in Asset 2’ compares to the no restriction case. The home
bias phenomena is more severe with the short sale restriction as EHB is higher in this case as shown
in Table 4.38. This is because Investors A and B hold zero of Asset 3 instead of short selling it.
Consequently, their total investment in domestic assets (1, 2 and 3) are higher than before, which leads
to a slightly higher home-bias level. Thus, the equilibrium price of Asset 3 is higher under the short
sale restriction, which results a lower return. Therefore Investors C and D decrease their investment in
Asset 3 (a foreign asset for them), such that their total investment in foreign assets is lower, which
again leads to slightly higher home bias.
Table 4.37: Two-market proportion of asset holding by investors (with short sale restriction)
1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’
No restriction
A 43.78% 21.62% -9.95% 0.89% 2.66% 5.18%
B 56.22% 27.77% -12.78% 1.14% 3.42% 6.66%
A+B 100% 49.38% -22.73% 2.03% 6.08% 11.84%
C 0.00% 22.10% 53.59% 42.78% 41.01% 38.49%
D 0.00% 28.51% 69.14% 55.20% 52.91% 49.66%
C+D 0.00% 50.62% 122.73% 97.97% 93.92% 88.16%
With restriction
A 43.77% 19.46% 0.00% 0.89% 2.83% 4.39%
B 56.23% 24.99% 0.00% 1.14% 3.64% 5.64%
A+B 100% 44.45% 0.00% 2.02% 6.47% 10.02%
C 0.00% 24.26% 43.66% 42.78% 40.84% 39.29%
D 0.00% 31.30% 56.34% 55.20% 52.69% 50.69%
C+D 0.00% 55.55% 100.00% 97.98% 93.53% 89.98%
As Investors A and B hold a lower proportion of Asset 2 with the short sale restriction, the amount
of credits redeemed by them is lower. Table 4.39 shows the change in investor utility resulting from the
introduction of imputation. All investors are slightly worse off under the short sale restriction, which
comes from the forced re-balancing of their portfolio. As the face amount of the credits redeemed by
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Table 4.38: EHB before and after imputation (Case Three with short sale restriction)
Before After
Small market 0 0.39
Large market 0 0.43
Investors A and B has decreased proportionally more than the reduction in their utility, the value of
credits (relative to the face amount), is higher for Investors A and B.
Table 4.39: Dollar value of expected utility change by imputation under short sale restriction (Case
Three)
No restriction With restriction
A B C D A B C D
change +$0.29 +$0.39 +$0.07 +$0.22 +$0.29 +$0.38 +$0.06 +$0.21
% to face value 45% 46% -% -% 46% 47% -% -%
Equilibrium with a fixed risk-free rate
I now consider the case where the risk-free rate is held fixed and where only Assets 1 and 2 provide
imputation credits. The equilibrium result is shown in Table 4.40. With a fixed risk-free rate, the
increase in the prices of assets that distribute imputation credits (Assets 1 and 2) is slightly greater,
which is similar to the previous cases. The prices of assets that do not provide imputation credits also
increase, and this increase is smaller than that in Case Two as one less asset distributes credits. The
increase in the prices of assets that do not distribute credits occurs because, with a fixed risk-free rate,
more investment flows from the risk-free asset to the risky assets. Compared to the face amount of
imputation credits, the increase in equilibrium price is still small.
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Table 4.40: Equilibrium after imputation (Case Three r f fix)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’ Risk-free
(Difference relative to no-imputation equilibrium)
Payoff AB 101 101 100 1000 1000 1000 99.40
Payoff CD 100 100 100 1000 1000 1000 99.40
Price 89.18 86.34 88.46 883.91 852.43 878.89 90.79
(+0.30) (+0.09) (+0.00) (+0.04) (+0.07) (+0.04) (-0.55)
Return 13.25% 16.98% 13.04% 13.13% 17.31% 13.78% 9.49%
AB (+0.74%) (+1.04%) (-0.00%) (-0.00%) (-0.01%) (-0.01%) (0.00%)
Return 12.13% 15.82% 13.04% 13.13 % 17.31% 13.78% 9.49%
CD (-0.38%) (-0.12%) (-0.00%) (-0.00%) (-0.01%) (-0.01%) (0.00%)
Allocation A 39.04 18.66 -8.80 7.84 22.67 45.57 -34.98
(90,4) (+35.51) (+15.24) (-12.31) (-27.25 (-11.16) (+10.68) (-10.71)
Return: 16.79% (+0.76%), Std dev:15.90% ( +1.04%)
Allocation B 50.14 23.97 -11.30 10.07 29.12 58.53 19.47
(180,6) (+45.59) (+19.55) (-15.83) (-35.20) (-14.53) (+13.52) (-13.11)
Return: 14.18% (+0.47%), Std dev: 10.21% (+0.62%)
Allocation C 0.00 19.09 47.40 378.12 349.58 338.30 -232.49
(900,4) (-35.28) (-15.15) (+12.29) (+27.24) (+11.22) (-10.58) (+10.27)
Return: 15.99% (-0.03%), Std dev: 14.82% (-0.04%)
Allocation D 0.00 24.62 61.16 487.88 451.05 436.50 338.79
(1800,6) (-45.52) (-19.55) (+15.86) (+35.23) (+14.55) (-13.58) (+12.99)
Return: 13.68% (-0.02%), Std dev: 9.56% (-0.03%)
Tangency 31.24% 14.93% -7.04% 6.27% 18.14% 36.46% –
portfolio (+28.15%) (+11.94%) (-10.11%) (-24.43%) (-11.47%) (+5.93%) –
AB Return: 14.74% (+0.11%), Std dev: 11.45% (-0.26%)
Tangency 0.00% 1.69% 4.19% 33.39% 30.87% 29.87% –
portfolio (-3.09%) (-1.31%) (+1.11%) (+2.68%) (+1.26%) (-0.66%) –
CD Return: 14.66% (+0.02%), Std dev: 11.77% (+0.07%)
When risk-free rate is held fixed, the increase in prices for assets that provide imputation credits is
slightly greater, and assets that do not provide imputation credits also have a slight increase in price.
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The changes in the cost of capital are shown in Table 4.41. After introducing imputation credits,
the cost of capital decreases because equilibrium asset prices increase.
Table 4.41: Cost of capital comparison (Case Three r f fix)
Asset 1 2 3 1’ 2’ 3’
No imputation 12.51% 15.94% 13.05% 13.14% 17.32% 13.79%
With imputation 12.13% 15.82% 13.04% 13.13% 17.31% 13.78%
Difference -0.38% -0.12% -0.00% -0.00% -0.01% -0.01%
The value of imputation credits to investors, including the effects of the altered equilibrium, is
shown in Table 4.42. Similar to the previous cases, investors benefit less from imputation credits
when the risk-free rate is held unchanged. The benefit of imputation credits once again flows more to
companies rather than investors when the risk-free rate is held fixed.
Table 4.42: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case Three r f fix)
Investor Before After Change Credits redeemed Proportion
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 101.21 101.48 0.27 0.65 0.42
B 200.56 200.91 0.35 0.84 0.42
C 1012.07 1011.95 -0.12 0.00 –
D 2005.64 2005.49 -0.15 0.00 –
Summary of Case Three
In Case Three, when only Assets 1 and 2 provide imputation credits, I find that:
• The increase in the risk-free rate is smaller than in Case Two, as fewer assets provide imputation
credits.
• The equilibrium prices of Assets 1 and 2 (that provide imputation credits) increase, while the
equilibrium prices of all other risky assets decrease.
• Investors A and B short sell Asset 3 to fund more investment in Assets 1 and 2. They hedge this
by investing more in Asset 3’.
• Investors C and D hold zero of Asset 1, resulting in a corner solution, in which case the CAPM
with imputation credits does not hold.
• Home bias still appears, but is less severe than previous cases as less assets provide imputation
credits.
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• When short sale restrictions are imposed, the equilibrium prices of risky assets that provide
imputation credits are slightly lower than under the no restriction case. This is because less
money is available to invest into other risky assets. The result is that utility falls as investors are
forced to re-balance their portfolios. Moreover, home bias is more severe as investors simply
hold a zero position in some assets, rather than shorting domestic assets and taking a long
position in highly correlated foreign assets as a hedge.
• When the risk-free rate is held unchanged, companies have a lower cost of capital and investors
have lower expected utility. Once again, the benefit of imputation credits flows predominantly to
companies rather than investors.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I set up a two-market model and study the effects of imputation credits in three cases,
as summarized below.
• Similar to the single-market model, the risk-free rate increases after introducing imputation
credits. As imputation credits increase the return of risky assets, less money is invested in the
risk-free asset.
• Generally, assets that provide imputation credits have an increase in their equilibrium prices,
while assets that do not provide imputation credits have a decrease in their equilibrium prices.
The size of the change is influenced by other factors in the market, such as the number of
assets that provide imputation credits, the amount of imputation credits provided by other assets,
whether the risk-free rate changes or not, and whether there is a short sale restriction or not.
• Investors do not hold every risky asset in their portfolio under imputation. Foreign assets
providing imputation credits might have a relatively lower return as the equilibrium price
increases, which overrides the benefits of diversification. This creates an incentive for investors
to short sell these assets. However, when short selling assets investors need to pay back the face
amount of imputation credits, which creates a disincentive to short sell. This results in them
holding zero percent of these assets in their portfolio.
• Short sales might occur for domestic assets that do not provide imputation credits in order to
generate more funds for investment into assets that distribute credits.
• The CAPM with imputation credits does not hold under imputation, since investors do not hold
every assets in the market and the equilibrium exists at a corner solution.
• Implementing the standard CAPM using returns that exclude imputation credits (which is
common in practice) results in estimation error. The numerical approach developed in this thesis
produces accurate estimates of CAPM parameters and the cost of capital.
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• Home bias measured by EHB is more severe when more assets provide imputation credits.
• If the risk-free rate is fixed, the cost of capital for all risky assets is lower compared to the case
where the risk-free rate is free to increase. In this case, the benefits of imputation credits flow to
companies rather than to investors. Generally, a higher risk-free rate results in more investment
in the risk-free asset and less investment in the risky assets.
• The restriction on short sales changes the equilibrium price of assets and investors results in
investors having lower expected utility.

Chapter 5
Two-market model calibrated with market
data
In this chapter, I calibrate the two-market model to real market data. To do this, the model is extended
to have 10 risky assets in each market. The standard deviation and correlation matrix of the expected
payoffs of risky assets are calibrated using market data for the 10 GICS sector portfolios of Australian
and US markets. I then introduce imputation credits into the calibrated model. Similar to the previous
chapter, three cases are studied. In Case One all risky assets in both markets provide imputation credits
to their domestic investors. In Case Two all risky assets in the small market provide imputation credits
to domestic investors in that market. In Case Three only some risky assets in the small market provide
imputation credits to domestic investors.
The results provided by the calibrated two-market model are similar to the previous chapters, in
that:
• The equilibrium risk-free rate increases after introducing imputation. As imputation credits
increase the expected return of risky assets, investors decrease their investment in the risk-free
asset, so the risk-free asset has a lower equilibrium price and thus has a higher return.
• Other things being equal, providing imputation credits increases the equilibrium price of an asset
and decreases the equilibrium price of other assets.
• When analyzing the effects of imputation credits, it is important to consider the change in the
market equilibrium. Again, this has not been identified in the previous literature. For example,
the size of the change in equilibrium prices that is caused by the introduction of imputation is
influenced by several factors in the market, such as the dividend tax policy in other markets,
whether or not the risk-free rate is allowed to change, the wealth and risk-aversion of investors,
and whether or not short selling is allowed.
• Investors hold zero percent of relatively low return foreign assets that provide imputation. As
imputation increases the assets price, there is an incentive for investors to short sell those assets.
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However, investors must pay back the face amount of credits. This results in them holding zero
of such assets.
• Investors short sell domestic assets that do not provide imputation credits, to generate funds to
invest in domestic credit-paying assets.
• The CAPM with imputation credits does not hold after introducing imputation credits, because
investors do not hold every asset in the market and the resulting equilibrium is a corner solution.
• Implementing the standard CAPM using returns that exclude imputation credits (which is
common in practice) results in estimation error. The numerical approach developed in this thesis
produces accurate estimates of CAPM parameters and the cost of capital.
• The home-bias phenomena appears after introducing imputation credits. Investors tilt their
portfolios towards domestic assets under imputation. When more assets provide imputation
credits, the home-bias phenomena is more severe.
Moreover, the calibrated model enables us to study the estimation error that results from using a
segregated market portfolio instead of the world market portfolio in the Classic CAPM 1. The results
show that there are estimation errors in relation to asset Beta, Market Risk Premium (MRP), and
expected return. The estimation errors are larger in the small market than in the large market.
5.1 Calibration of the two-market model
I begin by calibrating the two-market model to real market data. More specifically, the standard
deviation and correlation matrix of the expected payoffs of risky assets are calibrated using real market
data.
5.1.1 Data
I use data for the 10 GICS sector prtfolios for the Australian and US markets. The 10 GICS sectors are:
1) Health care (Hlth), 2) Financial services (Fin), 3) Energy (Enrg), 4) Materials (Mtl), 5) Information
technology (Inf), 6) Utilities (Util), 7) Consumer discretionary (ConD), 8) Telecommunications (Tel),
9) Industrials (Ind) and 10) Consumer staples (ConS). The real-estate sector is not included due to
the comparatively short history of the data. Thus, the two-market model is extended to have ten risky
assets in each market, where each risky asset corresponds to one GICS sector portfolio.
Monthly returns from July 30, 2001 to June 30, 2018 are collected from Bloomberg. I calculate
the standard deviation, correlation matrix and mean of annual returns of these 20 risky assets. The
standard deviation of the monthly returns is multiplied by
√
12 to convert to an annual figure. The
correlation matrix of annual returns of the 20 risky assets can be calculated directly from the monthly
1In the previous chapter, as risky assets in the two markets are set up to be symmetric, there is no estimation error
using the segregated market portfolio in the Classic CAPM.
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data. The expected annual returns can be calculated by multiplying the average monthly returns by 12.
The expectation, standard deviation and correlation matrix of annual returns for the GICS sections are
shown in Table 5.1, Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, respectively.
Table 5.1: Expected annual return calculated from market data
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
(AU) 12.66% 8.59% 10.18% 11.25% 6.71% 11.67% 5.17% 3.71% 7.41% 10.53%
(US) 8.28% 5.34% 9.65% 10.11% 9.96% 7.07% 10.08% 4.86% 8.22% 8.71%
Table 5.2: Standard deviation of annual return calculated from market data
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
(AU) 15.95% 15.25% 20.60% 20.36% 21.07% 12.95% 18.44% 15.68% 16.36% 12.62%
(US) 13.10% 21.57% 20.60% 20.37% 21.48% 15.15% 17.68% 19.66% 17.74% 10.95%
Next, I convert the expectation, standard deviation and correlation matrix of annual returns to those
of risky assets’ payoffs. Use the same notation as in previous chapters, Std[C˜i] is the standard deviation
of the payoff of asset i, Corr[C˜] is the correlation matrix of payoffs, Std[ri] is the standard deviation of
the annual return of asset i, E[ri] is the expectation of the annual return of asset i, and Corr[r] is the
correlation matrix of asset returns. The relation between the standard deviation of the payoff and the
standard deviation of the annual return is:
Std[C˜i] = Std[ri]
C˜i
(1+E[ri])
. (5.1)
C˜i
(1+E[ri]) is an estimation of asset price, where C˜i is $100 for small market (Australian) assets, and
$1000 for large market (American) assets.
The correlation matrix is the same for returns and payoffs, as:
Corr[C˜] = Corr[r].
The standard deviation and correlation of payoffs, calibrated from the market data, are shown in
Table 5.4 and Table 5.5, where Assets 1 to Asset 10 are small market (Australian) assets, and Assets 1’
to Asset 10’ are large market (US) assets, each of them correspond to a GICS sector.
For other parameters, the expected payoff is still $100 for small (Australian) market and $1000
for the large (American) market. Since there are now 20 risky assets in the model, the total wealth of
investors are increased, as:
• Australian investors A and B: W A0 = 300, εA = 4, W B0 = 600, εB = 6;
• American investors C and D: WC0 = 3000, εC = 4, W D0 = 6000, εD = 6
Moreover, the risk-free asset payoff is raised to be $500.
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Table 5.3: Correlation matrix of annual return calculated from market data
AU
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
1 1.00 0.48 0.33 0.32 0.45 0.42 0.52 0.26 0.49 0.47
2 0.48 1.00 0.43 0.44 0.51 0.53 0.66 0.21 0.68 0.56
3 0.33 0.43 1.00 0.74 0.48 0.32 0.44 0.12 0.52 0.38
4 0.32 0.44 0.74 1.00 0.45 0.36 0.48 0.11 0.52 0.33
5 0.45 0.51 0.48 0.45 1.00 0.32 0.64 0.16 0.59 0.40
6 0.42 0.53 0.32 0.36 0.32 1.00 0.42 0.21 0.57 0.45
7 0.52 0.66 0.44 0.48 0.64 0.42 1.00 0.27 0.70 0.55
8 0.26 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.27 1.00 0.20 0.30
9 0.49 0.68 0.52 0.52 0.59 0.57 0.70 0.20 1.00 0.49
10 0.47 0.56 0.38 0.33 0.40 0.45 0.55 0.30 0.49 1.00
US
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
1’ 1.00 0.61 0.43 0.60 0.56 0.42 0.65 0.49 0.65 0.66
2’ 0.61 1.00 0.50 0.74 0.64 0.32 0.80 0.42 0.84 0.57
3’ 0.43 0.50 1.00 0.69 0.47 0.43 0.51 0.41 0.60 0.41
4’ 0.60 0.74 0.69 1.00 0.72 0.35 0.80 0.45 0.86 0.55
5’ 0.56 0.64 0.47 0.72 1.00 0.37 0.80 0.50 0.75 0.47
6’ 0.42 0.32 0.43 0.35 0.37 1.00 0.37 0.45 0.40 0.53
7’ 0.65 0.80 0.51 0.80 0.80 0.37 1.00 0.51 0.87 0.62
8’ 0.49 0.42 0.41 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.51 1.00 0.49 0.50
9’ 0.65 0.84 0.60 0.86 0.75 0.40 0.87 0.49 1.00 0.63
10’ 0.66 0.57 0.41 0.55 0.47 0.53 0.62 0.50 0.63 1.00
(AU,US)
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
1 0.31 0.49 0.28 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.51 0.20 0.51 0.26
2 0.26 0.63 0.34 0.39 0.39 0.33 0.57 0.14 0.62 0.27
3 0.18 0.40 0.63 0.60 0.30 0.24 0.36 0.10 0.40 0.15
4 0.26 0.55 0.55 0.71 0.43 0.38 0.57 0.12 0.58 0.27
5 0.36 0.52 0.40 0.50 0.54 0.32 0.70 0.17 0.52 0.29
6 0.25 0.40 0.28 0.24 0.23 0.38 0.36 0.22 0.41 0.31
7 0.35 0.59 0.40 0.48 0.51 0.37 0.70 0.20 0.63 0.34
8 0.24 0.32 0.24 0.25 0.18 0.34 0.44 0.21 0.29 0.24
9 0.33 0.58 0.41 0.52 0.43 0.37 0.66 0.15 0.64 0.28
10 0.17 0.50 0.26 0.26 0.33 0.36 0.46 0.23 0.46 0.32
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Table 5.4: Calibrated standard deviation of payoffs
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
(AU) 14.16 14.05 18.70 18.30 19.75 11.59 17.54 15.12 15.23 11.42
(US) 120.99 204.76 187.90 185.02 195.30 141.48 160.64 187.46 163.92 100.71
5.1.2 Equilibrium before imputation is introduced
The equilibrium results before introducing imputation credits for the calibrated model are shown in
Table 5.6. Similar to the equilibrium in the previous chapter, when there are no imputation credits,
every investor faces the same expected returns from each risky asset, thus they have the same tangency
portfolio. There is incentive for investors to invest in their domestic markets in order to capture
imputation credits, but also some incentive to invest in foreign assets to capture diversification benefits.
In equilibrium, there is relatively more demand for Australian assets given the smaller size of that
market and the larger demand from foreign investors seeking diversification benefits. The result is
relatively higher prices and lower expected returns for the Australian assets. Investors A and C choose
the same optimal portfolio because they have the same risk-aversion rate, and similarly for Investors
B and D. The portfolio holdings for each investor is approximately equal to the percentage of initial
wealth they have in the market – slightly higher for Investors A and C slightly higher since they borrow
at the risk-free rate and slightly lower for Investors B and D since they invest in the risk-free asset.
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Table 5.5: Calibrated correlation matrix of payoffs
AU
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
1 1.00 0.48 0.33 0.32 0.45 0.42 0.52 0.26 0.49 0.47
2 0.48 1.00 0.43 0.44 0.51 0.53 0.66 0.21 0.68 0.56
3 0.33 0.43 1.00 0.74 0.48 0.32 0.44 0.12 0.52 0.38
4 0.32 0.44 0.74 1.00 0.45 0.36 0.48 0.11 0.52 0.33
5 0.45 0.51 0.48 0.45 1.00 0.32 0.64 0.16 0.59 0.40
6 0.42 0.53 0.32 0.36 0.32 1.00 0.42 0.21 0.57 0.45
7 0.52 0.66 0.44 0.48 0.64 0.42 1.00 0.27 0.70 0.55
8 0.26 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.27 1.00 0.20 0.30
9 0.49 0.68 0.52 0.52 0.59 0.57 0.70 0.20 1.00 0.49
10 0.47 0.56 0.38 0.33 0.40 0.45 0.55 0.30 0.49 1.00
US
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
1’ 1.00 0.61 0.43 0.60 0.56 0.42 0.65 0.49 0.65 0.66
2’ 0.61 1.00 0.50 0.74 0.64 0.32 0.80 0.42 0.84 0.57
3’ 0.43 0.50 1.00 0.69 0.47 0.43 0.51 0.41 0.60 0.41
4’ 0.60 0.74 0.69 1.00 0.72 0.35 0.80 0.45 0.86 0.55
5’ 0.56 0.64 0.47 0.72 1.00 0.37 0.80 0.50 0.75 0.47
6’ 0.42 0.32 0.43 0.35 0.37 1.00 0.37 0.45 0.40 0.53
7’ 0.65 0.80 0.51 0.80 0.80 0.37 1.00 0.51 0.87 0.62
8’ 0.49 0.42 0.41 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.51 1.00 0.49 0.50
9’ 0.65 0.84 0.60 0.86 0.75 0.40 0.87 0.49 1.00 0.63
10’ 0.66 0.57 0.41 0.55 0.47 0.53 0.62 0.50 0.63 1.00
(AU,US)
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
1 0.31 0.49 0.28 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.51 0.20 0.51 0.26
2 0.26 0.63 0.34 0.39 0.39 0.33 0.57 0.14 0.62 0.27
3 0.18 0.40 0.63 0.60 0.30 0.24 0.36 0.10 0.40 0.15
4 0.26 0.55 0.55 0.71 0.43 0.38 0.57 0.12 0.58 0.27
5 0.36 0.52 0.40 0.50 0.54 0.32 0.70 0.17 0.52 0.29
6 0.25 0.40 0.28 0.24 0.23 0.38 0.36 0.22 0.41 0.31
7 0.35 0.59 0.40 0.48 0.51 0.37 0.70 0.20 0.63 0.34
8 0.24 0.32 0.24 0.25 0.18 0.34 0.44 0.21 0.29 0.24
9 0.33 0.58 0.41 0.52 0.43 0.37 0.66 0.15 0.64 0.28
10 0.17 0.50 0.26 0.26 0.33 0.36 0.46 0.23 0.46 0.32
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Table 5.6: Equilibrium result before imputation
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Risk-free
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Payoff 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 500
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Price 89.07 87.29 87.05 86.60 86.97 89.09 85.83 89.94 86.83 89.58 457.70
873.84 837.47 854.34 840.82 841.93 878.22 849.65 858.74 846.92 882.13
Return 12.28% 14.56% 14.88% 15.47% 14.98% 12.25% 16.51% 11.19% 15.16% 11.64% 9.24%
14.44% 19.41% 17.05% 18.93% 18.77% 13.87% 17.70% 16.45% 18.08% 13.36%
Allocation A 3.57 3.50 3.49 3.47 3.48 3.57 3.44 3.60 3.48 3.59 -78.18
(300,4) 35.00 33.54 34.22 33.68 33.72 35.17 34.03 34.39 33.92 35.33
Return: 18.39%, Std dev: 18.31%
Allocation B 4.53 4.44 4.43 4.40 4.42 4.53 4.37 4.57 4.42 4.56 119.79
(600,6) 44.44 42.59 43.45 42.76 42.82 44.66 43.21 43.67 43.07 44.86
Return: 15.05%, Std dev: 11.63%
Allocation C 35.67 34.96 34.86 34.69 34.83 35.68 34.38 36.02 34.78 35.88 -781.81
(3000,4) 349.99 335.42 342.18 336.76 337.21 351.74 340.30 343.94 339.21 353.31
Return: 18.39%, Std dev: 18.31%
Allocation D 45.30 44.39 44.27 44.04 44.23 45.31 43.65 45.74 44.16 45.56 1197.89
(6000,6) 444.41 425.92 434.50 427.62 428.18 446.64 432.11 436.73 430.72 448.63
Return: 15.05%, Std dev: 11.63%
Market 0.94% 0.92% 0.92% 0.92% 0.92% 0.94% 0.91% 0.95% 0.92% 0.95%
portfolio 9.25% 8.87% 9.05% 8.90% 8.92% 9.30% 9.00% 9.09% 8.97% 9.34%
Return: 16.50%, Std dev: 14.53%
This table shows the equilibrium for the calibrated two market model before imputation is introduced. Assets 1 to 10 belong to
the small (Australian) market, and have expected payoff of $100, and Assets 1’ to 10’ belong to the large (American) market,
with expected payoff of $1000. Investors A and B are from the small market, having initial wealth of $300 and $600, and
Investors C and D are from the large market and have initial wealth of $3000 and $6000. All investors have the same tangency
portfolio. Investors A and C have the same optimal portfolio, as they have the same risk aversion rate, and similarly for Investors
B and D. Returns for risky assets in the small market are relatively lower.
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5.2 Estimation error from using a segregated market portfolio
In practice, when estimating the expected return of risky assets using the Classic CAPM, it is common
to use a segregated market portfolio which consists only of risky assets in the relevant domestic market.
In this section, I use the calibrated two-market model to numerically analyze the estimation error that
arises from using a segregated market portfolio instead of the world market portfolio. I start with the
true Classic CAPM parameter values derived from a market portfolio that consists of all 20 risky assets.
I then compare the results with values derived from a market portfolio that consists of only the 10 risky
assets in one market.
5.2.1 True Classic CAPM parameter values
Using the equilibrium results in Table 5.6, we have the parameter values for the true Classic CAPM as
shown in Table 5.7. The Classic CAPM holds under this equilibrium.
5.2.2 CAPM parameter values using a segregated domestic market portfolio
I now recalculate the Classic CAPM parameter values by using segregated market portfolios.
There are two segregated market portfolios in this model. One involves risky assets in the small
market (Assets 1 to 10) and the Classic CAPM is used to estimate expected returns adopting that as
the market portfolio. The other segregated market portfolio includes assets in the large market (Assets
1’ to 10’) and the Classic CAPM is then used to estimate expected returns adopting that as the market
portfolio. The value of each term in the Classic CAPM using these two segregated market portfolios is
shown in Table 5.8.
For the small (Australian) market, the estimated betas of all risky assets are materially higher
when estimated against the segregated (Australian) market portfolio, because the variance of the
segregated market portfolio is much smaller than the world market portfolio. The estimate of the
expected return of the segregated market portfolio is also much lower than that computed using the
world market portfolio. As a result the Market Risk Premium is materially lower when estimated
relative to the Australian market portfolio than when computed using the world market portfolio. With
large estimation errors in betas and Market Risk Premium, the estimated returns of risky assets are
also materially different from the true values.
For the large (US) market, the betas of all risky assets when estimated against the US market
portfolio are slightly lower than the true values (estimated against the world market portfolio), due to
the larger standard deviation of the US market portfolio. The expected return of the segregated market
portfolio is slightly higher than the true market portfolio, which leads to a slightly higher MRP.
The relative position of the segregated market portfolios on the efficient frontier and CML is
shown in Figure 5.1. Neither the segregated market portfolio of the small market nor the large market
is efficient. However, the segregated market portfolio for the large market is closer to the efficient
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frontier, and thus the estimation errors are smaller for Asset 1’ to 10’ which are computed relative to
that portfolio.
Figure 5.1: Position of segregated market portfolio
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
Standard deviation
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 re
tu
rn
Efficient frontier
CML
Real market portfolio
Segregated small market
Segregated large market
104
C
H
A
PT
E
R
5.
T
W
O
-M
A
R
K
E
T
M
O
D
E
L
C
A
L
IB
R
A
T
E
D
W
IT
H
M
A
R
K
E
T
D
A
TA
Table 5.7: True Classic CAPM parameter value
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Beta 0.42 0.73 0.78 0.86 0.79 0.41 1.00 0.27 0.82 0.33
0.72 1.40 1.08 1.34 1.31 0.64 1.17 0.99 1.22 0.57
Return 12.28% 14.56% 14.88% 15.47% 14.98% 12.25% 16.51% 11.19% 15.16% 11.64%
14.44% 19.41% 17.05% 18.93% 18.77% 13.87% 17.70% 16.45% 18.08% 13.36%
Market portfolio Return: 16.50%, Std dev: 14.53%, MRP: 16.50% - 9.24% = 7.26%
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Table 5.8: Estimation error using segregated market portfolio
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Weight 10.14% 9.94% 9.91% 9.86% 9.90% 10.14% 9.77% 10.24% 9.89% 10.20%
Return: 13.86%, Std dev: 12.44%, MRP: 13.86% - 9.24% = 4.62%
Beta 0.85 1.00 1.23 1.21 1.36 0.66 1.35 0.53 1.16 0.69
Return 13.16% 13.89% 14.94% 14.83% 15.54% 12.27% 15.47% 11.69% 14.60% 12.45%
Error +0.89% -0.67% +0.06 -0.63% +0.56% +0.02% -1.04% +0.49% -0.56% +0.81%
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Weight 10.20% 9.78% 9.98% 9.82% 9.83% 10.25% 9.92% 10.03% 9.89% 10.30%
Return: 16.77%, Std dev: 15.09%, MRP: 16.77% - 9.24% = 7.53%
Beta 0.69 1.35 1.04 1.28 1.26 0.61 1.12 0.97 1.17 0.55
Return 14.45% 19.43% 17.05% 18.90% 18.72% 13.85% 17.67% 16.52% 18.08% 13.38%
Error +0.01% +0.02% -0.00% -0.03% -0.05% -0.02% -0.03% +0.07% 0.00% +0.02%
The estimated beta of risky assets in the small (Australian) market are materially higher when estimated relative
to the segregated Australian market portfolio. In addition, the estimated MRP is materially lower. The estimation
errors are material. For risky assets in the large (US) market, betas estimated against the US market portfolio
are slightly lower, the estimated MRP is slightly higher, and the estimation errors are relatively small.
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5.3 The effects of imputation credits on the market equilibrium
In this section, I introduce imputation credits into the calibrated model. Again, I analyze the effects
of imputation credits in three cases. Case One, all risky assets in both markets provide imputation
credits to their domestic investors. Case Two, all risky assets in the small (Australian) market provide
imputation credits to their domestic investors. Case Three, only some assets in the small (Australian)
market provide imputation credits.
As in the previous chapter, I assume that the imputation credits are non-stochastic. Risky assets
in the small market provide $1 imputation credits and risky assets in the large market provide $10
imputation credits, commensurate with their larger size. Investors A and B can only redeem credits
provided by the small market (Australian) assets and Investors C and D can only redeem credits
provided by large market (US) assets. If a short sale occurs for assets provide imputation credits,
investors are required to pay back the face amount of the credits when they close their position.
Consequently, the same numerical methods as in the previous chapter are used to calculate the market
equilibrium.
The remainder of this chapter sets out the numerical results of these three cases, and the findings
are similar to those in the previous chapter.
5.3.1 Case One: all risky assets provide imputation credits to domestic in-
vestors
In Case One, risky assets in the small (Australian) market provide $1 imputation credits to Investors A
and B, and risky assets in the large market provide $10 imputation credits to Investors C and D.
The equilibrium result is set out in Table 5.9 where figures in parentheses represent the difference
compared with the calibrated two-market equilibrium before imputation. The main changes to the
market equilibrium under imputation are:
• The risk-free rate increases by 1.00%. Again, this is because risky assets with imputation credits
become relatively more attractive to investors, resulting in less investment in the risk-free asset.
• The equilibrium prices of risky assets in the small market all decrease, while the equilibrium
prices of risky assets in the large market all increase. This is the combined effect of both markets’
introduction of imputation. The imputation credits provided by the large market induce the
’wealthy’ Investors C and D to withdraw capital from the (foreign) small market to their (large)
domestic market, while the imputation credits in the small market induces Investors A and B to
increase their investment in their domestic assets. As Investors A and B have a smaller amount
of wealth, the total investment in assets in the small market reduces. The opposite occurs for
assets in the large market.
• All investors increase their investment in their domestic market and decrease their investment
in their foreign market. Investors A and B hold zero percent in four of the foreign assets, and
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Investors C and D hold zero percent in five of the foreign assets. That is, a strong home bias
phenomena appears.
• Investors A and B have a smaller increase in portfolio return than Investors C and D. This is
because there is a decrease in foreign asset returns for A and B but an increase for C and D. For
the same reason, Investors A and B increase their investment in the risk-free asset, while C and
D decrease their investment in it. Therefore, A and B have a lower portfolio standard deviation.
Because there are zero-holding assets (i.e., the market equilibrium is a corner solution in which
investors hold a zero position in some assets), the standard CAPM equilibrium relationship does not
hold.
Once again, implementing the standard CAPM using returns that exclude imputation credits results
in estimation error, as shown in Table 5.11. This continues to be an important result as it is common in
practice to omit the value of imputation credits when measuring returns.
The change in the estimates of the cost of capital is shown in Table 5.12, which is in accordance
with the equilibrium price changes – assets in the small market have an increase in the cost of capital
while assets in the large market have a decrease in the cost of capital under Case One.
Home bias appears as investors benefit from imputation credits paid by their domestic assets. The
home bias level measured by EHB is shown in Table 5.13.
The value of imputation credits to investors, after factoring in the effects of changing the equilib-
rium, is shown in Table 5.14. For the less risk averse Investors A and C, the value of imputation is less
then the face value of the credits that are redeemed. This is because those investors are disadvantaged
by the increase in the risk-free rate because they are net borrowers. The reverse is true for the more
risk averse investors.
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Table 5.9: Equilibrium with imputation credits (Case One)
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Risk-free
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Payoff 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 500
AB 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Payoff 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 500
CD 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010
Price 88.36 86.83 86.37 86.07 86.30 88.55 85.33 89.21 86.22 88.86 453.53
874.64 838.76 855.34 842.05 843.15 879.06 850.80 859.66 848.05 882.87
Return 14.31% 16.32% 16.94% 17.35% 17.04% 14.06% 18.37% 13.22% 17.14% 13.67% 10.25%
AB 14.33% 19.22% 16.91% 18.76% 18.60% 13.76% 17.54% 16.32% 17.92% 13.27%
Return 13.18% 15.17% 15.78% 16.19% 15.88% 12.93% 17.20% 12.10% 15.98% 12.54% 10.25%
CD 15.48% 20.42% 18.08% 19.95% 19.79% 14.90% 18.71% 17.49% 19.10% 14.40%
Allocation A 4.68 38.12 18.03 37.79 7.08 38.87 37.46 38.97 37.85 12.57 -91.54
(300,4) 0.00 32.93 15.65 0.02 9.96 0.00 0.00 33.00 28.57 0.00
Return: 18.46%, Std dev: 17.15%
Allocation B 5.98 48.71 23.04 48.28 9.05 49.67 47.87 49.80 48.37 16.06 99.66
(600,6) 0.00 42.09 20.00 0.03 12.72 0.00 0.00 42.17 36.51 0.00
Return: 15.49%, Std dev: 10.96%
Allocation C 34.24 0.00 19.96 0.00 30.93 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 26.54 -769.90
(3000,4) 385.44 336.57 361.23 371.06 361.57 387.39 374.94 345.72 345.04 389.07
Return: 19.55%, Std dev: 18.58%
Allocation D 43.46 0.00 25.33 0.00 39.25 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 33.69 1215.31
(6000,6) 489.20 427.17 458.47 470.95 458.90 491.67 475.86 438.78 437.92 493.80
Return: 16.15%, Std dev: 11.79%
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Table 5.10: Equilibrium change after imputation (Case One)
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Risk-free
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Price -0.71 -0.46 -0.67 -0.54 -0.67 -0.54 -0.50 -0.73 -0.62 -0.72 -4.17
+0.80 +1.29 +1.00 +1.24 +1.22 +0.84 +1.15 +0.92 +1.13 +0.74
Return +2.03% +1.76% +2.06% +1.88% +2.06% +1.81% +1.86% +2.03% +1.98% +2.03% +1.00%
AB -0.10% -0.18% -0.14% -0.17% -0.17% -0.11% -0.16% -0.12% -0.16% -0.09%
Return +0.90% +0.61% +0.90% +0.72% +0.90% +0.68% +0.69% +0.90% +0.82% +0.90% +1.00%
CD +1.04% +1.01% +1.03% +1.01% +1.01% +1.03% +1.02% +1.04% +1.02% +1.04%
Allocation A +1.11 +34.62 +14.55 +34.32 +3.60 +35.31 +34.02 +35.37 +34.37 +8.98 -13.36
(300,4) -35.00 -0.61 -18.57 -33.66 -23.76 -35.17 -34.03 -1.40 -5.35 -35.33
Return: +0.07%, Std dev: -1.17%
Allocation B +1.45 +44.27 +18.62 +43.88 +4.62 +45.14 +43.50 +45.23 +43.95 +11.50 -20.13
(600,6) -44.44 -0.51 -23.45 -42.74 -30.10 -44.66 -43.21 -1.51 -6.56 -44.86
Return: +0.44%, Std dev: -0.67%
Allocation C -1.43 -34.96 -14.90 -34.69 -3.91 -35.68 -34.38 -35.83 -34.78 -9.33 +11.91
(3000,4) +35.45 +1.15 +19.05 +34.30 +24.36 +35.65 +34.64 +1.78 +5.84 +35.76
Return: +1.16%, Std dev: +0.27%
Allocation D -1.84 -44.39 -18.94 -44.04 -4.98 -45.31 -43.65 -45.50 -44.16 -11.87 +17.41
(6000,6) +44.78 +1.26 +23.97 +43.33 +30.71 +45.03 +43.75 +2.05 +7.20 +45.17
Return: +1.10%, Std dev: +0.16%
In Case One, assets provide $1 and $10 imputation credits respectively in the small market and the large market. Investors invest
more in their domestic assets, and hold zero of some foreign assets. Risky assets in the small market exhibit a decrease in price and
assets in the large market have an increase in price. The risk-free rate increases.
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Table 5.11: Estimation error for returns excluding imputation credits by the standard CAPM (Case One)
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Weight 0.94% 0.92% 0.91% 0.91% 0.91% 0.94% 0.90% 0.94% 0.91% 0.94%
9.26% 8.88% 9.05% 8.91% 8.93% 9.31% 9.01% 9.10% 8.98% 9.35%
Beta 0.42 0.74 0.78 0.86 0.80 0.42 1.01 0.27 0.82 0.33
0.72 1.40 1.08 1.33 1.31 0.64 1.16 0.99 1.22 0.57
CAPM implied 12.86% 14.82% 15.11% 15.60% 15.19% 12.83% 16.50% 11.93% 15.34% 12.31%
14.68% 18.92% 16.91% 18.52% 18.38% 14.20% 17.46% 16.40% 17.79% 13.76%
Actual 13.18% 15.17% 15.78% 16.19% 15.88% 12.93% 17.20% 12.10% 15.98% 12.54%
14.33% 19.22% 16.91% 18.76% 18.60% 13.76% 17.54% 16.32% 17.92% 13.27%
Difference -0.32% -0.35% -0.67% -0.58% -0.69% -0.10% -0.70% -0.17% -0.64% -0.23%
+0.35% -0.30% +0.00% -0.24% -0.22% +0.44% -0.07% +0.08% -0.13% +0.50%
r f = 10.25%, MRP = 6.20%
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Table 5.12: Cost of capital comparison (Case One)
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
With imputation 13.18% 15.17% 15.78% 16.19% 15.88% 12.93% 17.20% 12.10% 15.98% 12.54%
14.33% 19.22% 16.91% 18.76 % 18.60% 13.76% 17.54% 16.32% 17.92% 13.27%
Change +0.90% +0.60% +0.90% +0.72% +0.90% +0.68% +0.69% +0.90% +0.82% +0.90
-0.10 % -0.18% -0.14% -0.17% -0.17% -0.11% -0.16% -0.12% -0.16% -0.09%
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Table 5.13: EHB before and after imputation (Case One )
Before After
Small market 0 0.66
Large market 0 0.68
Table 5.14: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case one)
Investor Before After Difference Credits redeemed Percentage
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 339.63 341.61 1.98 3.12 0.64
B 670.89 675.62 4.73 3.98 1.19
C 3396.27 3428.30 32.03 42.65 0.75
D 6708.87 6771.56 62.68 54.13 1.16
5.3.2 Case Two: Risky assets in the small market provide imputation credits
In Case Two, risky assets in the small market provide $1 imputation credits and assets in the large
market do not provide imputation credits. Investors A and B are eligible to redeem credits but Investors
C and D are not. Note that for any short sales, the investor is required to pay back the full face amount
of any credits.
The equilibrium result and changes from the no-imputation equilibrium, are set out in Table 5.15
and Table 5.16. The risk-free rate increases by 0.02%, which less than the 1.00% in the previous
case, as it is impacted by imputation in only one (small) market. The equilibrium prices of assets that
provide imputation credits increase, and the price increases are small relative to the $1 imputation
credits. There is a decrease in the prices of assets in the large market (that do not provide imputation
credits).
Investors A and B increase their investment in domestic risky assets and decrease their investment
in the risk-free asset, while Investors C and D increase their investment in the risk-free asset and
their domestic risky assets. That is, the home bias phenomena appears under imputation. Moreover,
Investors C and D hold zero of Asset 6 in which case the standard CAPM equilibrium relationship
does not hold.
The estimation error from implementing the standard CAPM using returns that exclude imputation
credits is shown in Table 5.17.
As the equilibrium prices of assets that provide imputation credits increase, the cost of capital for
these assets decreases. On the contrary, the cost of capital for assets that do not provide imputation
credits increases. The change of cost of capital for Case Two is shown in Table 5.18.
The home bias level measured by EHB is shown in Table 5.19. Home bias is less severe than in
Case One, as only assets in the small market provide imputation credits in Case Two.
5.3. THE EFFECTS OF IMPUTATION CREDITS ON THE MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 113
The value of imputation credits to investors, after factoring in the effects of changing the equilib-
rium, is shown in Table 5.20. The actual value of imputation to Investors A and B is approximately
half of the face amount of credits that are redeemed, as the equilibrium prices of risky assets that
provide imputation credits increase. Moreover, Investor B has a slightly higher value percentage than
Investor A because he benefits from a long position in the risk-free asset, the return on which increases.
For investors that are not eligible to redeem imputation credits, Investor C suffers a small loss from the
equilibrium price changes, while Investor D benefits from the increase in risk-free rate.
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Table 5.15: Equilibrium with imputation credits (Case Two)
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Risk-free
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Payoff 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 500
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Payoff 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 500
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Price 89.14 87.36 87.12 86.68 87.05 89.23 85.91 90.01 86.91 89.65 457.61
873.74 837.43 854.27 840.77 841.89 878.10 849.59 858.66 846.86 882.01
Return 13.31% 15.61% 15.93% 16.52% 16.03% 13.19% 17.57% 12.21% 16.21% 12.66% 9.26%
AB 14.45% 19.41% 17.06% 18.94% 18.78% 13.88% 17.70% 16.46% 18.08% 13.38%
Return 12.18% 14.46% 14.78% 15.37% 14.88% 12.07% 16.40% 11.10% 15.06% 11.55% 9.26%
CD 14.45% 19.41% 17.06% 18.94% 18.78% 13.88% 17.70% 16.46% 18.08% 13.38%
Allocation A 8.52 36.98 6.25 34.20 5.14 39.49 14.74 33.35 18.83 25.62 -179.49
(300,4) 27.38 29.43 34.95 0.25 24.96 8.47 12.72 37.16 47.10 33.93
Return: 19.63%, Std dev: 19.89%
Allocation B 10.73 46.58 7.87 43.08 6.48 49.74 18.57 42.01 23.72 32.27 -3.94
(600,6) 34.49 37.07 44.02 0.31 31.43 10.67 16.02 46.81 59.32 42.74
Return: 15.79%, Std dev: 12.53%
Allocation C 30.78 1.68 32.15 4.14 33.22 0.00 23.17 6.45 19.54 13.98 -681.79
(3000,4) 357.59 339.56 341.49 370.08 345.98 378.34 361.55 341.22 326.14 354.72
Return: 18.34%, Std dev: 18.23%
Allocation D 39.11 2.13 40.84 5.26 42.20 0.00 29.43 8.20 24.82 17.77 1322.82
(6000,6) 454.27 431.36 433.81 470.13 439.52 480.62 459.30 433.47 414.31 450.62
Return: 15.03%, Std dev: 11.58%
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Table 5.16: Equilibrium change after imputation (Case Two)
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Risk-free
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Price +0.07 +0.08 +0.08 +0.08 +0.08 +0.14 +0.08 +0.07 +0.08 +0.07 -0.09
-0.10 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.11 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.12
Return +1.03% +1.05% +1.05% +1.05% +1.05% +0.94% +1.06% +1.02% +1.05% +1.03% +0.02%
AB +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.02%
Return -0.09% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.18% -0.11% -0.09% -0.10% -0.09% +0.02%
CD +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.02%
Allocation A +4.95 +33.48 +2.77 +30.73 +1.66 +35.92 +11.30 +29.75 +15.35 +22.04 -101.31
(300,4) -7.61 -4.11 +0.73 -33.43 -8.76 -26.70 -21.31 +2.77 +13.18 -1.40
Return: +1.24%, Std dev: +1.58%
Allocation B +6.20 +42.14 +3.45 +38.67 +2.05 +45.21 +14.20 +37.43 +19.30 +27.72 -123.73
(600,6) -9.95 -5.52 +0.57 -42.45 -11.39 -33.99 -27.19 +3.14 +16.25 -2.12
Return: +0.74%, Std dev: +0.90%
Allocation C -4.89 -33.28 -2.71 -30.55 -1.61 -35.68 -11.21 -29.57 -15.24 -21.89 +100.01
(3000,4) +7.60 +4.14 -0.69 +33.32 +8.77 +26.60 +21.25 -2.72 -13.07 +1.41
Return: -0.05%), Std dev: -0.09%
Allocation D -6.19 -42.26 -3.43 -38.79 -2.03 -45.31 -14.22 -37.54 -19.34 -27.79 +124.93
(6000,6) +9.85 +5.45 -0.68 +42.51 +11.33 +33.98 +27.19 -3.26 -16.41 +1.99
Return: -0.02%, Std dev: -0.05%
Risky assets in the small market that provide imputation credits have an increase in equilibrium price, while risky assets in the large
market that do not provide imputation credits have a decrease in equilibrium price. The change in equilibrium prices is relatively
small compared to the $1 imputation credits. The risk-free rate increases slightly. Investors invest more in their domestic assets and
less in foreign assets. Zero-holding assets still exist in this case.
116
C
H
A
PT
E
R
5.
T
W
O
-M
A
R
K
E
T
M
O
D
E
L
C
A
L
IB
R
A
T
E
D
W
IT
H
M
A
R
K
E
T
D
A
TA
Table 5.17: Estimation error for returns excluding imputation credits by the standard CAPM (Case Two)
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Weight 0.94% 0.93% 0.92% 0.92% 0.92% 0.94% 0.91% 0.95% 0.92% 0.95%
9.25% 8.87% 9.05% 8.90% 8.92% 9.30% 9.00% 9.09% 8.97% 9.34%
Beta 0.42 0.73 0.78 0.86 0.79 0.41 1.00 0.27 0.82 0.33
0.72 1.40 1.08 1.34 1.31 0.64 1.17 0.99 1.22 0.57
CAPM implied 12.29% 14.56% 14.88% 15.46% 14.98% 12.26% 16.50% 11.21% 15.16% 11.65%
14.44% 19.40% 17.05% 18.92% 18.77% 13.87% 17.69% 16.45% 18.07% 13.37%
Actual 12.18% 14.46% 14.78% 15.37% 14.88% 12.07% 16.40% 11.10% 15.06% 11.55%
14.45% 19.41% 17.06% 18.94% 18.78% 13.88% 17.70% 16.46% 18.08% 13.38%
Difference +0.10% +0.10% +0.10% +0.10% +0.10% +0.19% +0.10% +0.10% +0.10% +0.10%
-0.01% -0.02% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
r f = 9.26%, MRP = 7.23%
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Table 5.18: Cost of capital comparison (Case Two)
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
With imputation 12.18% 14.46% 14.78% 15.37% 14.88% 12.07% 16.40% 11.10% 15.06% 11.55%
14.45% 19.41% 17.06% 18.94% 18.78% 13.88% 17.70% 16.46% 18.08% 13.38%
Difference -0.09% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.18% -0.11% -0.09% -0.10% -0.09%
+0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.02%
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Table 5.19: EHB before and after imputation (Case Two )
Before After
Small market 0 0.41
Large market 0 0.52
Table 5.20: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case Two)
Investor Before After Difference Credits redeemed Percentage
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 339.63 340.99 1.36 2.53 0.54
B 670.89 672.63 1.75 3.19 0.55
C 3396.27 3396.19 -0.08 0 –
D 6708.87 6709.26 0.39 0 –
5.3.3 Case Three: only some assets in the small market provide imputation
credits
In Case Three, it is assumed that only Assets 1 to 8 in the small market provide imputation credits,
while Assets 9 and 10 and all risky assets in the large market do not provide imputation credits. The
choice of two assets in the small market that do not provide imputation credits is arbitrary, but nothing
turns on that assumption. The choice of Assets 9 and 10 is also arbitrary. However, the main findings
are unchanged regardless of how many and which assets are chosen to not provide imputation credits
in the small market.
The equilibrium result for Case Three, and changes resulting from the introduction of imputation, is
set out in Table 5.21 and Table 5.22. In this case, the risk-free rate again increases as imputation credits
attract more investment into risky assets such that there is relatively less demand for the risk-free asset.
The equilibrium prices of risky assets that provide imputation credits increase, and the prices of other
assets decrease. The increase in the equilibrium price is larger compared to Case Two, as Investors A
and B short sell Assets 9 and 10 and have more funds to invest in domestic assets that provide credits.
Investors C and D only hold foreign assets Assets 5, 9 and 10 for diversification benefits but zero in
other foreign assets.
The estimation error from implementing the standard CAPM using returns that exclude imputation
credits is shown in Table 5.23.
The change in the cost of capital is again in accordance with the equilibrium price movements, as
shown in Table 5.24.
The level of home-bias measured by EHB in Case Three is smaller than in Case Two, as shown in
Table 5.25. This is because fewer assets provide imputation credits in Case Three than in Case Two.
The value of imputation credits to investors, after factoring in the effects of changing the equilib-
rium, is shown in Table 5.26. Even though Investors C and D do not receive imputation credits directly,
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they benefit from the decrease in risky asset prices. For Investors A and B, as the increase in the price
of domestic assets that provide imputation credits are more than that in Case Two, the actual value of
imputation credits in less in proportion to the face amount of credits compared to Case Two.
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Table 5.21: Equilibrium with imputation credits (Case Three)
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Risk-free
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Payoff 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 100 100 500
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Payoff 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 500
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Price 89.19 87.75 87.18 86.80 87.04 89.63 86.22 90.08 86.81 89.55 457.54
873.62 837.33 854.16 840.67 841.78 877.98 849.48 858.55 846.75 881.89
Return 13.24% 15.10% 15.85% 16.36% 16.04% 12.68% 17.15% 12.12% 15.19% 11.67% 9.28%
AB 14.47% 19.43% 17.07% 18.95% 18.80% 13.90% 17.72% 16.48% 18.10% 13.39%
Return 12.12% 13.97% 14.71% 15.21% 14.89% 11.57% 15.99% 11.01% 15.19% 11.67% 9.28%
CD 14.47% 19.43% 17.07% 18.95% 18.80% 13.90% 17.72% 16.48% 18.10% 13.39%
Allocation A 39.47 38.83 38.58 38.41 25.98 39.66 38.15 39.86 -80.80 -79.13 -137.11
(300,4) 29.47 51.42 7.51 4.77 2.55 40.91 24.49 31.42 57.81 47.76
Return: 19.60%, Std dev: 19.84%
Allocation B 49.73 48.92 48.60 48.39 32.74 49.97 48.07 50.22 -101.80 -99.69 49.28
(600,6) 37.13 64.79 9.46 6.02 3.21 51.54 30.85 39.58 72.83 60.17
Return: 15.78%, Std dev: 12.50%
Allocation C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 118.67 118.21 -724.04
(3000,4) 355.47 317.63 368.76 365.54 368.24 346.01 349.80 346.90 315.43 340.91
Return: 18.37%, Std dev: 18.24%
Allocation D 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 150.75 150.16 1269.41
(6000,6) 451.55 403.49 468.43 464.34 467.78 439.53 444.34 440.66 400.68 433.05
Return: 15.05%, Std dev: 11.59%
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Table 5.22: Equilibrium change after imputation (Case Three)
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Risk-free
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Price +0.13 +0.46 +0.13 +0.20 +0.06 +0.55 +0.39 +0.14 -0.02 -0.03 -0.16
-0.22 -0.14 -0.18 -0.15 -0.15 -0.23 -0.17 -0.19 -0.16 -0.24
Return +0.96% +0.54% +0.97% +0.89% +1.06% +0.43% +0.64% +0.93% +0.03% +0.03% +0.04%
AB +0.03% +0.02% +0.02% +0.02% +0.02% +0.03% +0.02% +0.03% +0.02% +0.03%
Return -0.16% -0.60% -0.18% -0.26% -0.09% -0.68% -0.52% -0.18% +0.03% +0.03% +0.04%
CD +0.03% +0.02% +0.02% +0.02% +0.02% +0.03% +0.02% +0.03% +0.02% +0.03%
Allocation A +35.90 +35.33 +35.09 +34.94 +22.50 +36.09 +34.71 +36.26 -84.28 -82.71 -58.93
(300,4) -5.53 +17.88 -26.71 -28.90 -31.17 +5.73 -9.54 -2.98 +23.89 +12.43
Return: +1.21%, Std dev: +1.52%
Allocation B +45.20 +44.48 +44.18 +43.99 +28.32 +45.44 +43.70 +45.65 -106.22 -104.25 -70.51
(600,6) -7.31 +22.20 -33.98 -36.75 -39.61 +6.87 -12.36 -4.09 +29.76 +15.31
Return: +0.73%, Std dev: +0.87%
Allocation C -35.67 -34.96 -34.86 -34.69 -22.36 -35.68 -34.38 -36.02 +83.89 +82.33 +57.77
(3000,4) +5.48 -17.79 +26.58 +28.78 +31.04 -5.73 +9.50 +2.96 -23.78 -12.40
Return: -0.02%), Std dev: -0.07%
Allocation D -45.30 -44.39 -44.27 -44.04 -28.39 -45.31 -43.65 -45.74 +106.58 +104.60 +71.51
(6000,6) +97.14 -22.43 +33.93 +36.72 +39.59 -7.11 +12.23 +3.92 -30.04 -15.58
Return: -0.00%, Std dev: -0.04%
The equilibrium prices of risky assets that provide imputation credits increase more in this case than in Case Two, even though the
amount of imputation credits provided is $1 in both cases. The holding by domestic investors in assets that provide imputation
credits increases, while the holding by domestic investors in other assets can increase or decrease. Investors A and B short sell their
domestic assets that do not provide imputation credits, and Investors C and D hold zero in almost all foreign assets that provide
imputation credits.
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Table 5.23: Estimation error for returns excluding imputation credits by the standard CAPM (Case Three)
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Weight 0.94% 0.93% 0.92% 0.92% 0.92% 0.95% 0.91% 0.95% 0.92% 0.95%
9.25% 8.87% 9.05% 8.90% 8.91% 9.30% 9.00% 9.09% 8.97% 9.34%
Beta 0.42 0.73 0.78 0.86 0.79 0.41 1.00 0.27 0.82 0.33
0.72 1.40 1.08 1.34 1.31 0.64 1.17 0.99 1.22 0.57
CAPM implied 12.29% 14.54% 14.88% 15.46% 14.98% 12.25% 16.48% 11.22% 15.17% 11.66%
14.45% 19.39% 17.05% 18.92% 18.76% 13.88% 17.69% 16.45% 18.07% 13.38%
Actual 12.12% 13.97% 14.71% 15.21% 14.89% 11.57% 15.99% 11.01% 15.19% 11.67%
14.47% 19.43% 17.07% 18.95% 18.80% 13.90% 17.72% 16.48% 18.10% 13.39%
Difference +0.18% +0.58% +0.17% +0.25% +0.09% +0.69% +0.49% +0.20% -0.02% -0.01 %
-0.02% -0.04% -0.03% -0.03% -0.03% -0.02% -0.03% -0.03% -0.03% -0.01%
r f = 9.28%, MRP = 7.21%
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Table 5.24: Cost of capital comparison (Case Three)
GICS Hlth Fin Enrg Mtl Inf Util ConD Tel Ind ConS
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
With imputation 12.12% 13.97% 14.71% 15.21% 14.89% 11.57% 15.99% 11.01% 15.19% 11.67%
14.47% 19.43% 17.07% 18.95% 18.80% 13.90% 17.72% 16.48% 18.10% 13.39%
Difference -0.16% -0.60% -0.18% -0.26% -0.09% -0.68% -0.52% -0.18% +0.03% +0.03%
+0.03% +0.02% +0.02% +0.02% +0.02% +0.03% +0.02% +0.03% +0.02% +0.03%
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The home-bias level measured by EHB is shown in Table 5.25.
Table 5.25: EHB before and after imputation (Case Three )
Before After
Small market 0 0.25
Large market 0 0.28
Table 5.26: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case Three)
Investor Before After Difference Credits redeemed Percentage
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 339.63 340.99 1.36 3.40 0.40
B 670.89 672.68 1.79 4.28 0.42
C 3396.27 3396.79 0.51 0 –
D 6708.87 6710.37 1.49 0 –
5.3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I calibrate the two-market model using actual data from the Australian and US stock
markets. The analysis confirms the findings from the stylized model in the previous chapter. In
addition, this chapter establishes that:
• The numerical method is able to accommodate more complicated scenarios such as the inclusion
of more assets or more investors.
• The calibrated model enables us to study the estimation error that results from using a segregated
market portfolio instead of the world market portfolio in the Classic CAPM. The results show
that there are estimation errors in relation to asset betas, MRP, and expected returns. The
estimation errors are larger in the small market than in the large market.
• As zero-holding assets exist in the two-market calibrated model, the CAPM with imputation
credits does not hold. As a result, the better method to analyze the cost of capital under
imputation credits or the change of cost of capital is the numerical method provided in this
thesis.
• The introduction of imputation credits changes the nature of the equilibrium – all components of
the equilibrium change with the introduction of imputation. This effect has not been identified
in the previous literature. The effects of imputation credits depends on all components of the
market, such as the dividend tax policy of every market, the level of the risk-free rate, the wealth
and risk-aversion of individual investors, and whether or not there are short sale restrictions.
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• The actual value of imputation credits in proportion to the face amount of credits that redeemed
is different from investor to investor, depending on the investor’s wealth and risk-aversion.
Moreover, investors that are not eligible to redeem credits might benefit or suffer from imputation,
because the nature of equilibrium has changed and they tilt their portfolio holding from what is
otherwise optimal.

Chapter 6
Comparison of a few potential alternative
policies to imputation
Various countries have adopted dividend tax policies other than imputation. Ainsworth (2016) notes
that tax policies that are alternatives to dividend imputation include: 1) No imputation of corporate
taxes, but the application of a lower personal tax rate to dividend income (e.g., US, Norway), or
the taxation of only a portion of dividend income (e.g., Germany, Finland and France where 50%
of dividends are subject to tax); 2) No imputation of corporate taxes, but the application of a lower
corporate tax rate (e.g.,Ireland); 3) Maintaining a full dividend imputation system, but abolishing the
refunding of excess franking credits (e.g., the ALP policy taken to the 2019 federal election).
In this chapter, I examine these different policies in the context of the modelling framework
developed in previous chapters. I numerically compare the effects of these various policies on
government tax collections, investor utility and company metrics. I first introduce personal tax rates
into the model and calculate the equilibrium under personal taxes, then I introduce a full imputation
policy in the small (Australian) market, and finally impose alternative policies in the small market
to compare the market equilibrium against the equilibrium under the full imputation system. For the
large (American) market, I assume that there is no imputation and that all dividends are taxed in full at
the investor’s marginal tax rate.
I find that:
• Personal tax drives investors to invest more in the risk-free asset and less in risky assets.
• The effect of policy changes has two components; a direct effect caused by the policy, and
indirect effect caused by the consequential equilibrium movements. The latter effect has not
been identified in the previous literature, mainly due to the lack of a methodology to quantify it.
• The modelling framework developed in this thesis enables us to quantify both the direct and
indirect effects of different policy changes. It provides us detailed effects on each individual
investor and each individual asset.
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• Under full imputation, domestic investors benefit more than foreign investors. Moreover,
investors with lower personal tax rates benefit more from full imputation. Foreign investors
benefit from imputation mainly through a higher risk-free rate, thus foreign investors that have a
deep long position in the risk-free asset benefit, otherwise suffer a loss.
• Canceling cash refunds of excess imputation credits directly affects investors with low personal
tax rates, as they are the investors with excess imputation credits. Investors with higher personal
tax rates benefit slightly more from this policy than full imputation policy, as their holding
percentage of risky assets increases and are eligible to redeem more credits. That is, there
is less competition for credit-paying stocks. This policy results in a lower home bias than
full imputation because investors with low personal tax rates benefit less from tilting towards
domestic assets.
• A lower corporate tax benefits all investors and investors holding a higher percentage in risky
assets benefit more. That is, investors with a higher amount of initial wealth, lower personal
tax rate, or lower risk aversion benefit more. This policy creates no home-bias because both
domestic and foreign investors benefit equally from this policy.
• The partial taxation of dividends benefits domestic investors by increasing their after-tax returns,
and those with higher personal tax rate benefit more. Domestic investors with 0% personal tax
rate have no direct benefit from the policy. High personal tax rate investors short sell domestic
assets which have a relatively low return and less diversification benefits. Investors not subject to
the policy benefit mainly from the increase in the risk-free rate – thus a deep long position in the
risk-free asset makes them better off, and otherwise worse off. There is a small home bias under
this policy because both domestic and foreign assets are subject to partial taxation of dividends.
6.1 Equilibrium with personal taxes before imputation
I begin by introducing personal tax rates into the model. I assume there are 6 investors in each market,
and that the personal tax rate for each investor is [45%, 37%, 32.5%,19%, 15%, 0%] respectively. The
personal tax rate of 15% is included to reflect Australian superannuation funds. The other five tax rates
are in accordance with the Australian individual income tax brackets in financial year 2018-2019. I
impose the same personal tax brackets to investors in both markets.
Investors’ initial wealth, risk aversion rate and personal tax rates are summarized in Table 6.1.
Initial wealth for investors in the same market are set to be equal. Investors with higher personal tax
rates are assumed to have lower risk aversion rates.
Compared to the two-investors model, the six-investors model can be viewed as Investor A in the
two-investors model being evenly split into two investors and Investor B into four. Therefore, before
adding personal tax rates, the equilibrium outcomes of the six-investors model is the same as the
two-investors model, which is in Table 5.6.
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Table 6.1: Investor characteristics in the model with personal tax rate
Australian Investors A B C D E F
Initial wealth 150 150 150 150 150 150
Risk aversion rate 4 4 6 6 6 6
Personal tax rate 45% 37% 32.5% 19% 15% 0%
US Investors G H I J K L
Initial wealth 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500
risk aversion rate 4 4 6 6 6 6
Personal tax rate 45% 37% 32.5% 19% 15% 0%
To add personal tax rates into the model, the return received by investors after personal taxes is the
original return times (1− tp), where tp is the personal tax rate. This applies to both the risk-free asset
and risky assets. To take Investor A as an example, if the return from a risky asset is 10%, then after
personal tax at 45%, the return received by Investor A is 10%× (1−45%) = 5.5%. For the risk-free
asset, if Investor A takes a long position in the risk-free asset which has return rate r f , the return after
personal tax is r f (1− tp). If Investor A takes a short position in the risk-free asset, because interest is
tax deductible, the effective interest rate is also r f (1− tp). Therefore, the return from assets to each
investor is the original return times (1− tp). The equilibrium result with personal tax rates is shown in
Table 6.2.
Compared to the equilibrium price in Table 5.6, the risk-free rate decreases materially after
introducing personal taxes, which means that more is invested in the risk-free asset when investors
consider personal tax in their portfolio choices. Investors with lower personal tax rates invest more in
risky assets compared with investors that have higher personal tax rates. Moreover, investors with lower
risk aversion tend to invest more in risky assets. Investors that have the same level of risk aversion and
the same level of personal tax rates have the same optimal portfolio. For example, Investors A and G
both have risk-aversion rate 4 and personal tax rate 45%, they invest in the same optimal portfolio. All
investors have the same tangency portfolio, which is also the market portfolio.
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Table 6.2: Equilibrium result before imputation (with personal tax)
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Risk-free
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Payoff 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 500
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Price 90.22 87.76 87.42 86.81 87.32 90.25 85.73 91.43 87.13 90.93 468.29
878.89 828.38 851.81 833.02 834.57 884.96 845.29 857.91 841.50 890.40
Return 10.84% 13.95% 14.39% 15.20% 14.53% 10.80% 16.65% 9.37% 14.78% 9.97% 6.77%
13.78% 20.72% 17.40% 20.04% 19.82% 13.00% 18.30% 16.56% 18.84% 12.31%
Market 0.96% 0.93% 0.93% 0.92% 0.93% 0.96% 0.91% 0.97% 0.92% 0.96%
portfolio 9.32% 8.78% 9.03% 8.83% 8.85% 9.38% 8.96% 9.10% 8.92% 9.44%
Return: 16.63%, Std dev: 14.55%
Allocation A and G 0.73% 0.71% 0.71% 0.70% 0.71% 0.73% 0.69% 0.74% 0.71% 0.74% 23.56%
(4, 45%) 7.12% 6.71% 6.90% 6.75% 6.76% 7.17% 6.85% 6.95% 6.82% 7.22%
Return after personal tax: 7.87%, Std dev: 11.12%
Allocation B and H 0.89% 0.86% 0.86% 0.86% 0.86% 0.89% 0.84% 0.90% 0.86% 0.90% 7.08%
(4, 37%) 8.66% 8.16% 8.39% 8.21% 8.22% 8.72% 8.33% 8.45% 8.29% 8.77%
Return after personal tax: 10.04%, Std dev: 13.52%
Allocation C and I 0.64% 0.62% 0.62% 0.61% 0.62% 0.64% 0.61% 0.65% 0.62% 0.64% 33.39%
(6, 32.5%) 6.21% 5.85% 6.02% 5.88% 5.89% 6.25% 5.97% 6.06% 5.94% 6.29%
Return after personal tax: 9.00%, Std dev: 9.69%
Allocation D and J 0.88% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.88% 0.83% 0.89% 0.85% 0.89% 8.15%
(6, 19%) 8.56% 8.07% 8.30% 8.11% 8.13% 8.62% 8.23% 8.36% 8.20% 8.67%
Return after personal tax: 12.82%, Std dev: 13.36%
Allocation E and K 0.98% 0.95% 0.95% 0.94% 0.95% 0.98% 0.93% 0.99% 0.94% 0.99% -2.30%
(6, 15%) 9.53% 8.98% 9.24% 9.03% 9.05% 9.60% 9.17% 9.30% 9.13% 9.66%
Return after personal tax: 14.33%, Std dev: 14.88%
Allocation F and L 1.35% 1.32% 1.31% 1.30% 1.31% 1.35% 1.29% 1.37% 1.31% 1.36% -41.50%
(6, 0%) 13.19% 12.43% 12.78% 12.50% 12.52% 13.28% 12.68% 12.87% 12.62% 13.36%
Return after personal tax: 20.72%, Std dev: 20.58%
Compared to the equilibrium in Table 5.6, more is invested in the risk-free asset when investors consider personal taxes in their portfolio
choices. Investors with lower personal tax rates or lower risk aversion invest more in the risky assets. All investors choose the same
tangency portfolio.
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6.2 Equilibrium with full imputation under personal taxes
Now I introduce full imputation into the small (Australian) market. I assume there are $1 imputation
credits provided by each risky asset in the small (Australian) market, and only investors in the small
(Australian) market are eligible to redeem these imputation credits.
For a $1 imputation credit, the associated dividend is $2.33 1. Therefore, among the $100 expected
payoff of small market risky assets, $97.67 is the expected closing asset price and $2.33 is a cash
dividend which has an additional $1 credit attached to it. Similarly, for the large market, the $1000
expected payoff from risky assets, we assume $976.67 is expected asset price and $23.33 is dividend,
which has no imputation credits attached.
The equilibrium after introducing imputation credits is compared to the no-imputation equilibrium
in Table 6.3. As expected, the equilibrium prices for risky assets that provide imputation credits have
increased, and the equilibrium prices for assets that do not provide imputation credits have decreased.
The risk-free rate increases after introducing imputation credits. Investors in both markets increase
their investments in their domestic market, and decrease investment in the foreign market. Home
bias appears and the Equity Home Bias (EHB) value is shown in Table 6.4. In one market, investors
choose the same tangency portfolio, but with different weights in the risk-free asset. The weight in the
risk-free asset for each investor is shown in Table 6.5. Investors that are more risk averse or have a
higher personal tax rate invest more into the risk-free asset. Under full imputation, investors in the
small market all decrease their weight in the risk-free asset as risky assets provide higher returns with
imputation. Investors in the large market all increase their investment in the risk-free asset as the
risk-free rate is higher and they can not redeem imputation credits.
1$2.33 = $1× 1−TT , where T = 30% is the corporate rate.
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Table 6.3: Equilibrium under imputation (with personal tax)
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Risk-free
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Payoff 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 500
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Price 90.30 87.83 87.50 86.88 87.39 90.33 85.81 91.51 87.20 91.01 468.24
878.80 828.32 851.74 832.96 834.51 884.87 845.22 857.84 841.43 890.31
Price (+0.08 +0.08 +0.08 +0.08 +0.08 +0.08 +0.08 +0.08 +0.08 +0.08 -0.05)
changes (-0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09)
Return 11.85% 14.99% 15.44% 16.25% 15.57% 11.81% 17.71% 10.38% 15.82% 10.98% 6.78%
with credits 13.79% 20.73% 17.41% 20.05% 19.83% 13.01% 18.31% 16.57% 18.85% 12.32%
Change (+1.01% +1.04% +1.04% +1.05% +1.04% +1.01% +1.06% +1.00% +1.04% +1.01% +0.01%)
(+0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01%)
Return 10.74% 13.85% 14.29% 15.10% 14.42% 10.71% 16.54% 9.28% 14.67% 9.88% 6.78%
without credits 13.79% 20.73% 17.41% 20.05% 19.83% 13.01% 18.31% 16.57% 18.85% 12.32%
Change (-0.09% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.09% -0.11% -0.09% -0.10% -0.09% +0.01%)
(+0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01% +0.01%)
Tangency portfolio 1.42% 5.81% 1.29% 5.59% 1.08% 8.44% 2.78% 5.62% 2.67% 4.20%
small market 6.43% 6.79% 7.74% 1.82% 5.98% 3.34% 4.08% 7.78% 9.57% 7.57%
Change (+0.46% +4.88% +0.36% +4.67% +0.15% +7.48% +1.87% +4.65% +1.74% +3.23%)
(-2.89% -1.99% -1.29% -7.01% -2.87% -6.04% -4.88% -1.32% +0.65% -1.88%)
Tangency portfolio 0.90% 0.35% 0.88% 0.36% 0.91% 0.06% 0.69% 0.41% 0.72% 0.58%
large market 9.66% 9.02% 9.18% 9.67% 9.19% 10.11% 9.55% 9.25% 8.84% 9.66%
Change (-0.05% -0.58% -0.04% -0.56% -0.02% -0.90% -0.22% -0.56% -0.21% -0.39%)
(+0.35% +0.24% +0.15% +0.84% +0.34% +0.72% +0.58% +0.16% -0.08% +0.22%)
Risky assets in the small market that provide imputation credits have an increase in equilibrium price and risky assets in the large market
have a decrease in price. The risk-free rate increases. Home bias appears.
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Table 6.4: EHB before and after imputation with personal tax under full imputation
Before After
Small market 0 0.33
Large market 0 0.38
Table 6.5: Investors’ weight in the risk-free asset under imputation
Investor A B C D E F
Weight in risk-free 9.60% -10.04% 20.83% -10.95% -24.85% -56.89%
Change -13.96% -17.47% -12.56% -19.09% -22.56% -15.39%
Investor G H I J K L
Weight in risk-free 24.92% 8.75% 34.59% 9.85% -0.36% -39.28%
Change +1.37% +1.68% +1.20% +1.71% +1.94% +2.21%
The redemption of imputation credits for each small market investor (Investors A to F) is shown in
Table 6.6. Investor A has the same risk-aversion rate as Investor B, but has a higher personal tax rate,
in which case Investor A invests less in risky assets than Investor B. Thus his holding percentage in
risky assets is less than Investor B, and the credits he is eligible to redeem is less. Comparing Investors
B and C, even though B has a higher personal tax rate, he has a lower risk aversion rate so he will
still invest more in risky assets compared to Investor C, thus his holding percentage in risky assets
and credits to redeem are higher than for C. Other things being equal, lower risk aversion or a lower
personal tax rate means more investment in risky assets, and a higher holding percentage in risky assets
and a higher face amount of credits to redeem.
Table 6.6: Credits redemption of each Australian investor
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
A 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.59
B 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.72
C 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.52
D 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.16 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.73
E 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.18 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.82
F 0.04 0.16 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.22 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.11 1.03
Total 0.16 0.67 0.15 0.65 0.12 0.94 0.33 0.62 0.31 0.47 4.41
The value of imputation credits to each investor, in terms of the equivalent dollar value of expected
utility, is shown in Table 6.7. For those who can redeem credits, investors that have lower personal
tax rates benefit more from imputation credits, and they value credits more highly. Moreover, holding
personal tax rate constant, investors with lower risk aversion benefit more from imputation, and
they therefore hold a higher percentage in risky assets. For investors who can not redeem credits,
even though they are not influenced directly by imputation credits they are influenced through the
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equilibrium price movement and portfolio choice movement. Investors in the large market mainly
benefit from the increase in the risk-free rate, as their net benefit from imputation credits decreases
when their investment in the risk-free asset decreases. For Investor L, who is taking a deep short
position in the risk-free asset, suffers a loss from imputation.
Table 6.7: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (with personal tax)
Investor Before After Difference Credits redeemed Percentage
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 158.50 158.69 0.19 0.59 0.32
B 160.35 160.62 0.26 0.72 0.36
C 159.88 160.09 0.21 0.52 0.39
D 162.89 163.23 0.34 0.73 0.47
E 163.90 164.30 0.40 0.82 0.49
F 168.44 169.00 0.57 1.03 0.55
G 1585.03 1585.07 0.03 0 -
H 1603.55 1603.57 0.02 0 -
I 1598.82 1598.87 0.05 0 -
J 1628.87 1628.90 0.03 0 -
K 1638.97 1638.99 0.01 0 -
L 1684.35 1684.31 -0.04 0 -
Conclusions
• As in previous chapters, under imputation, equilibrium prices for risky assets that provide
imputation credits increase, and for other risky assets decrease. As imputation credits attract
more investment in the assets that provide credits. The risk-free rate increases for the same
reason. Investors build up their investments in domestic assets that provide imputation credits
and reduce their investments elsewhere, while foreign investors decrease their investments in
assets that provide imputation credits because of the higher equilibrium price of these assets. As
a result, home bias appears.
• Personal tax rates drive investors to invest more in the risk-free asset and less in the risky assets.
Investors with higher personal tax rates tend to invest more in the risk-free asset. Other things
being equal, investors with higher personal tax rate or higher risk averse rate hold less in the
risky assets, and thus are eligible to redeem fewer imputation credits, which leads to a lower
benefit from imputation credits.
• Investors who cannot redeem credits are influenced by imputation credits indirectly through
equilibrium price movements and portfolio choice movement. They mainly benefit from a
higher risk-free rate, and the more they invest in the risk-free asset, the more they benefit from
imputation. Investor L who takes a deep short position in the risk-free asset is the only one
suffers a loss from imputation credits in this case.
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6.3 Abolition of refunds of excess imputation credits
In this section, I consider the impact of the abolition of refunds of excess imputation credits. I note
that this affects only investors with low tax rates, as investors with high personal tax rates will have
personal tax payable in excess of imputation credits available to redeem.
I begin by noting that, under the equilibrium shown in Table 6.3, the net tax obligation for each
investor in the small market is set out in Table 6.8. I take Investor E as an example to illustrate how the
table is calculated. For Asset 1, Investor E’s personal tax liability for one unit is (101−90.30)∗0.15=
1.60, of which $1 has already been paid at the company level and is available to the investor as an
imputation credit. Thus, the net tax obligation is −0.60, which means that this investor is required to
pay an additional $0.60 tax for every unit of investment in Asset 1. Table 6.8 shows that the abolition
of cash refunds for excess franking credits would only directly affect Investor F in this case, whose
personal tax rate is 0% and who ends up with a positive tax flow due to him. After the abolition of
refunds, Investor F has no direct benefits from imputation credits, which means his situation is the
same as a foreign investor.
Table 6.8: Net tax obligation of each Australian investor under full imputation
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A -3.81 -4.92 -5.08 -5.35 -5.12 -3.80 -5.84 -3.27 -5.21 -3.50
B -2.96 -3.87 -4.00 -4.22 -4.03 -2.95 -4.62 -2.51 -4.10 -2.70
C -2.48 -3.28 -3.39 -3.59 -3.42 -2.47 -3.94 -2.09 -3.48 -2.25
D -1.03 -1.50 -1.57 -1.68 -1.59 -1.03 -1.89 -0.80 -1.62 -0.90
E -0.60 -0.97 -1.03 -1.12 -1.04 -0.60 -1.28 -0.42 -1.07 -0.50
F +1.00 +1.00 +1.00 +1.00 +1.00 +1.00 +1.00 +1.00 +1.00 +1.00
The abolition of cash refunds for excess franking credits would only directly affect
Investor F in this case, whose personal tax rate is 0% and who ends up with a positive tax
flow due to him.
In practice, superannuation funds that have tax rate of 15% may benefit from cash refunds for
excess imputation credits. This happens when the dividend yield is high enough to attach imputation
credits that exceed the investor’s total personal tax obligation. The divided yield applied in this case,
which is between 2.54% to 2.72%2, is not high enough to support cash refunds for investors that have
a 15% personal tax rate.
Besides the direct affect, the abolition of cash refunds of excess imputation credits has indirect
affects though the change of equilibrium to every investor in the market. The change in the equilibrium
is shown in Table 6.9. As Investor F does not receive cash refunds and there is no benefit of imputation
credits to him, he decreases his investment in his domestic assets and increases his investing in the
risk-free asset and foreign assets. His portfolio choice ends up being the same as Investor L in the
large market, who has the same risk aversion and personal tax rate. All other investors re-balance their
portfolios in the opposite direction to Investor F. As a result, the equilibrium prices of risky assets in
2For $1 imputation credits, the according fully franked dividend is $1× 70%30% = $2.33 at 30% corporate tax rate. $2.33
divided by the equilibrium price of each asset gives us the dividend yield.
136CHAPTER 6. COMPARISON OF A FEW POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE POLICIES TO IMPUTATION
the small (Australian) market fall slightly because one less investor benefits from imputation credits,
and the equilibrium prices of other risky assets and the risk-free asset increase or decrease based on
the net effect of investors’ re-balancing.
The home bias is less severe in this case than under full imputation, as shown by the EHB value in
Table 6.10. This is because Investor F (who invests the most in risky assets in the small market) now
invests more in foreign assets than in domestic assets, and because investors in the large market all
increase their investments in the foreign assets due to the decrease in asset prices.
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Table 6.9: Equilibrium under imputation without cash refund of excess imputation credits
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Risk-free
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Price 90.28 87.81 87.48 86.86 87.37 90.31 85.79 91.48 87.18 90.98 468.20
878.80 828.37 851.76 833.01 834.56 884.86 845.25 857.86 841.47 890.30
Price (-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03)
changes (-0.00 +0.05 +0.03 +0.05 +0.05 -0.01 +0.03 +0.02 +0.04 -0.01)
Tangency portfolio 1.43% 5.91% 1.30% 5.69% 1.08% 8.60% 2.82% 5.72% 2.70% 4.26%
A to E 6.37% 6.75% 7.72% 1.68% 5.92% 3.22% 3.98% 7.75% 9.58% 7.53%
Change (+0.01% +0.10% +0.01% +0.10% +0.00% +0.15% +0.04% +0.10% +0.04% +0.07%)
(-0.06% -0.04% -0.03% -0.15% -0.06% -0.13% -0.10% -0.03% +0.01% -0.04%)
Tangency portfolio 0.91% 0.48% 0.89% 0.49% 0.91% 0.27% 0.74% 0.54% 0.77% 0.67%
F 9.58% 8.96% 9.15% 9.47% 9.11% 9.93% 9.41% 9.22% 8.86% 9.61%
Change (-0.50% -5.32% -0.39% -5.10% -0.17% -8.17% -2.04% -5.07% -1.90% -3.53%)
(+3.15% +2.17% +1.40% +7.65% +3.13% +6.59% +5.33% +1.44% -0.71% +2.05%)
Tangency portfolio 0.91% 0.48% 0.89% 0.49% 0.91% 0.27% 0.74% 0.54% 0.77% 0.67%
G to L 9.58% 8.96% 9.15% 9.47% 9.11% 9.93% 9.41% 9.22% 8.86% 9.61%
Change (+0.01% +0.14% +0.01% +0.13% +0.00% +0.21% +0.05% +0.13% +0.05% +0.09%)
(-0.08% -0.06% -0.04% -0.20% -0.08% -0.17% -0.14% -0.04% +0.02% -0.05%)
The equilibrium price of risky assets in the small market is slightly lower. The equilibrium price for assets in the large market mostly
increase slightly. The risk-free rate increases. The portfolio movement of Investor F is the opposite to every other investor.
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Table 6.10: EHB before and after banning cash refund of excess imputation credits
Before After
Small market 0.33 0.26
Large market 0.38 0.29
Table 6.11: Investors’ weight in the risk-free asset under imputation without cash refund
Investor A B C D E F
Weight in risk-free 9.37% -10.69% 20.62% -11.25% -25.19% -39.80%
Change -0.23% -0.29% -0.21% -0.30% -0.34% +17.08%
Investor G H I J K L
Weight in risk-free 24.71% 8.50% 34.41% 9.65% -0.56% -39.80%
Change -0.22% -0.25% -0.18% -0.21% -0.20% -0.52%
Table 6.12 sets out the equivalent dollar value of expected utility of each investor after abolishing
cash refunds, and the differences relative to the previous case where cash refunds are allowed. After
banning cash refunds for excess imputation credits, Investor F suffers a material decline in utility
because he is no longer eligible to redeem credits and his short position in the risk-free asset is now
facing a higher borrowing rate. All other investors in the small (Australian) market benefit slightly,
because they hold a higher percentage of risky assets that provide imputation credits and are eligible to
redeem more credits. As a result, the reduction in aggregate credits redeemed by investors under the
new policy is lower than the face amount that Investor F is no longer able to to redeem. Investors in
the large market suffer from the re-balancing of their portfolio and benefit from the increase in the
risk-free rate. The combined effect is positive for investors who have a high proportion invested in the
risk-free asset, such as Investors G and I, but negative for investors who do not have a deep enough
long position in the risk-free asset.
Conclusions
The main findings in this section are that:
• The effects of abolishing cash refunds of excess imputation credits include direct effects (which
is the face amount of imputation credits that investors are no longer eligible to redeem) and
indirect effects (which is the equilibrium movement due to the new policy.) This has not been
identified in the previous literature.
• Investors that are directly affected by the policy (suffer a loss) are those with relatively low
personal tax rates, who end up with excess credits.
• Investors with higher personal tax rates, who are not directly affected by the policy, actually
benefit indirectly as their holding percentage of assets that provide credits are higher and they
are eligible to redeem more credits. That is, they face less competition for credit-paying stocks.
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Table 6.12: Dollar value of expected utility change by banning cash refund for excess imputation
credits
Investor Before banned After banned Difference Credits redeemed Change of
credits redeemed
A 158.69 158.70 +0.01 0.60 +0.01
B 160.62 160.63 +0.01 0.74 +0.02
C 160.09 160.10 +0.01 0.53 +0.01
D 163.23 163.24 +0.01 0.74 +0.01
E 164.30 164.31 +0.01 0.83 +0.01
F 169.00 168.42 -0.58 0 -1.03
G 1585.07 1585.07 +0.01 0 0
H 1603.57 1603.56 -0.01 0 0
I 1598.87 1598.89 +0.02 0 0
J 1628.90 1628.90 -0.01 0 0
K 1638.99 1638.97 -0.02 0 0
L 1684.31 1684.24 -0.07 0 0
• Foreign investors are also influenced by the policy indirectly from the change of equilibrium
prices and portfolio re-balancing. The effect can be positive or negative depending on their risk
aversion and portfolio position.
• The equilibrium prices of small (Australian) market assets decrease, as low-taxed investors
decrease their investment in these assets. Therefore, companies in the small market have a higher
cost of capital. The equilibrium price of assets in the large market can decrease or increase,
depending on the net effect of all investors’ re-balancing of their portfolios.
• The total amount of imputation credits redeemed by investors is smaller, but less than the total
amount that now-banned investors would otherwise have redeemed. This is because investors
that are not affected by the ban increase their holding in credit-paying assets.
• The home bias is less severe because low-taxed domestic investors, who invests the most in
risky assets in the small market, now invest more in foreign assets than in domestic assets,
and investors in the large market all increase their investments in the foreign assets due to the
decrease of asset prices.
6.4 Abolition of imputation and lowering of corporate tax rate
Another alternative to dividend imputation is to remove imputation and lower the corporate tax rate.
To simulate this situation, I assume the lower corporate tax rate is fully funded by the abolition of
redeemed imputation credits so that it remains budget neutral for government. As shown in Table 6.6,
the total credits redeemed in a full imputation system is $4.41, so I use this $4.41 to fund a lower
corporate tax rate. The result is that each of the ten risky assets in the small market has $0.44 additional
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after-tax profit, which is available to be distributed as dividends. Therefore, after removing imputation
and lowering the corporate tax rate, the expected payoff of risky assets in the small market is $100.44,
which is the same for resident and non-resident investors.
The equilibrium result is shown in Table 6.13. The effect of abolishing imputation on equilibrium
prices is the opposite to the effect of introducing imputation as shown in Table 6.3. That is, the price
of assets in the small market falls, the price of assets in the large market rises, and the risk-free rate
falls. Moreover, lowering the corporate tax rate, which is effectively increasing the payoff of risky
assets in the small market, attracts every investor in the market (not only domestic investors) to invest
more in assets in the small market. Therefore, lowering corporate taxes increases the equilibrium
price of assets in the small market even more than the introduction of imputation, and decreases the
prices of risky assets in the large market and the risk-free asset. As a result, the risk-free rate increases.
All investors now face the same return rate from risky assets and thus they share the same tangency
portfolio, in which case the home bias is removed. The weight of each investor in the risk-free asset is
shown in Table 6.14. Similar to the equilibrium before introducing imputation credits, investors that
have the same risk aversion rate and personal tax rate choose the same weight in the risk-free asset.
For example, Investors A and G both have risk aversion of 4 and personal tax rate 45%, and both invest
23.56% of their wealth in the risk-free asset.
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Table 6.13: Equilibrium remove imputation and lower corporate tax
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Risk-free
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Payoff 100.44 100.44 100.44 100.44 100.44 100.44 100.44 100.44 100.44 100.44 500
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Price 90.60 88.13 87.79 87.18 87.69 90.62 86.10 91.80 87.50 91.30 468.08
878.52 828.04 851.45 832.69 834.23 884.58 844.94 857.56 841.15 890.02
Price (+0.30 +0.30 +0.30 +0.30 +0.30 +0.30 +0.30 +0.30 +0.30 +0.30 -0.15)
changes (-0.29 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.29 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.29)
Return 10.86% 13.97% 14.41% 15.21% 14.54% 10.83% 16.65% 9.41% 14.79% 10.01% 6.82%
13.83% 20.77% 17.45% 20.09% 19.87% 13.05% 18.35% 16.61% 18.88% 12.36%
Tangency 0.96% 0.93% 0.93% 0.92% 0.93% 0.96% 0.91% 0.97% 0.93% 0.97%
portfolio 9.31% 8.78% 9.03% 8.83% 8.84% 9.38% 8.96% 9.09% 8.92% 9.44%
Return: 16.67%, Std dev: 14.54%
Portfolio change -0.46% -4.87% -0.36% -4.67% -0.15% -7.48% -1.87% -4.65% -1.74% -3.23%
small market +2.89% +1.98% +1.28% +7.00% +2.86% +6.03% +4.88% +1.31% -0.65% +1.87%
Portfolio change +0.06% +0.59% +0.05% +0.56% +0.02% +0.90% +0.23% +0.56% +0.21% +0.39%
large market -0.35% -0.24% -0.16% -0.84% -0.35% -0.73% -0.59% -0.16% +0.07% -0.23%
This table assumes that the lower corporate tax rate is fully funded by the reduction in redeemed imputation credits, which results in
$0.44 more after tax profit for each risky asset in the small market, which is distributed as dividends. Equilibrium prices for risky
assets in the small market increase even more than imputation because this policy attracts both domestic and foreign investors invest
more in assets in the small market. As a result, prices for assets in the large market decrease, and the risk-free rate increases. Every
investor faces the same return rate from risky assets thus home bias is removed.
142CHAPTER 6. COMPARISON OF A FEW POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE POLICIES TO IMPUTATION
Table 6.14: Investors’ weight in the risk-free asset remove imputation and lower corporate tax rate
Investor A B C D E F
Weight in risk-free 23.56% 7.08% 33.39% 8.16% -2.27% -41.56%
Investor G H I J K L
Weight in risk-free 23.56% 7.08% 33.39% 8.16% -2.27% -41.56%
The Equity Home Bias (EBS) calculated as Equation 4.1 before and after the new policy is shown
in Table 6.15. The lower corporate tax policy removes home bias because both domestic and foreign
investors have the same return rate from risky assets.
Table 6.15: EHB before and after remove imputation and lower corporate tax rate
Before After
Small market 0.33 0.00
Large market 0.38 0.00
The equivalent dollar value of expected utility of each investor is shown in Table 6.16. Compared
to the full imputation policy, a lower corporate tax rate results in investors in the small (Australian)
market suffering a loss from the policy change, and investors in the large (American) market benefit
from it. This is explained below.
This effect is actually a combination of two effects: removing imputation and lowering corporate
tax. First, the effect of removing imputation is the opposite to the effect of introducing imputation,
which is shown in Table 6.7. That is, for investors in the small market, the expected utility level falls
materially and for investors in the large market the change in expected utility is immaterial.
Second, the effect of lowering the corporate tax rate is quantified in Table 6.17. Here, both domestic
and foreign investors benefit from the higher expected payoff from risky assets in the small market.
Investors in the large market benefit more than investors in the small market as they have a higher
amount of total wealth thus hold a higher proportion of risky assets. Moreover, investors with lower
personal tax rates benefit more than investors with higher personal tax rate because they have a higher
proportion of wealth invested in risky assets.
Combining the two effects set out above, the net outcome of abolishing imputation and lowering
the corporate tax is to reduce the expected utility of investors in the small market and to increase the
expected utility of investors in the large market.
Conclusion
The effects of removing imputation credits and lowering the corporate tax rate in the small market
can be separated into two parts: removing imputation and lowering corporate tax rate. The combined
effects are:
• An increase in the equilibrium prices of risky assets in the small market, and a decrease the
equilibrium prices of risky assets in the large market. This occurs because lowering the corporate
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Table 6.16: Dollar value of expected utility change by removing imputation and lower corporate tax
Investor A B C D E F
Full imputation 158.69 160.62 160.09 163.23 164.30 169.00
Lower corporate tax rate 158.54 160.40 159.93 162.94 163.96 168.50
Change -0.15 -0.22 -0.16 -0.28 -0.34 -0.50
Investor G H I J K L
Full imputation 1585.07 1603.57 1598.87 1628.90 1638.99 1684.31
Lower corporate tax rate 1585.41 1603.98 1599.29 1629.43 1639.56 1685.03
Change +0.35 +0.41 +0.42 +0.53 +0.57 +0.72
Table 6.17: Dollar value of expected utility change by lower corporate tax compared to double taxation
Investor A B C D E F
Double taxation 158.50 160.35 159.88 162.89 163.90 168.44
Lower corporate tax rate 158.54 160.40 159.93 162.94 163.96 168.50
Change +0.04 +0.04 +0.05 +0.06 +0.06 +0.07
Investor G H I J K L
Double taxation 1585.03 1603.55 1598.82 1628.87 1638.97 1684.35
Lower corporate tax rate 1585.41 1603.98 1599.29 1629.43 1639.56 1685.03
Change +0.38 +0.43 +0.47 +0.56 +0.58 +0.68
tax rate increases the expected payoff of assets in the small market, which in turn attracts both
domestic investors and foreign investors to invest more in assets in the small market. For the
same reason, the risk-free rate increases as a result of this policy change.
• The new policy also removes the home bias phenomena and all investors have the same tangency
portfolio. This occurs because all investors in the market face the same rate of return from risky
assets after the policy change.
• Removing imputation results in a materially lower expected utility level for investors in the small
market and a slightly different expected utility level for investors in the large market, which is
the opposite to the effect of introducing imputation. Moreover, lowering the corporate tax rate
benefits every investors in the market. Investors holding a higher percentage of the risky assets
in the small market benefit more because these assets provide a higher expected payoff under
the new policy. That is, investors in the large market and investors with a lower personal tax rate
benefit more from lowering the corporate tax. The combined effect is that investors in the small
market suffer a loss while investors in the large market benefit from the policy change.
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6.5 Abolition of imputation and partial taxation of dividends
The final alternative to imputation that I consider is the removal of imputation and the partial taxation
of dividends. I assume that only 50% of each dividend (both from domestic assets and foreign assets)
is taxed at the personal tax rate. At this stage, I assume only Australian investors are subject to
the new policy, American investors still pay full personal tax for capital gains and dividends. As
explained above, there is $1 of imputation credits for risky assets in the small market in which case
the accompanying cash dividend (fully franked) is $2.33. Therefore, under this new policy, capital
gains and half of the dividend are subjected to personal tax, and the other half of the dividend $1.17 is
exempt from personal tax. Dividend received from foreign assets are also subject to the 50% partial
tax policy.
The equilibrium result is shown in Table 6.18 and the key features of that equilibrium are:
• The effect has two components: removing imputation and the partial taxation of dividends. The
effect of removing imputation is again the opposite to introducing it, as shown in Table 6.3.
• After introducing the partial taxation of dividends for investors in the small market, asset returns
increase for investors in the small market, the quantum of this benefit varies according to the
personal tax rates of investors, and from asset to asset. Specifically, the tax benefit of this policy
for investors in the small market is $1.17*tp for assets in the small market, and $11.67*tp for
assets in the large market, where tp is the personal tax rate. Therefore, the increase in asset
return is $1.17∗ tp/Pi for assets in the small market, and $11.67∗ tp/Pi for assets in the large
market, where Pi is the price of asset i.
• High-taxed investors in the small market enjoy a higher increase in asset returns under this
policy. Therefore, each of them re-balance their portfolio and have a different tangency portfolio.
Investors with a higher personal tax rate end up short selling some domestic assets that provide
a relatively lower return and lower diversification benefit. Investors in the large market also
re-balance their portfolios. Note that Investor F who has a 0% personal tax rate has no direct
benefit from the partial taxation of dividends, thus his tangency portfolio is the same as investors
in the large market that are not subject to this policy.
• After introducing partial taxation of dividends for investors in the small market, the net effect of
investors re-balancing their portfolio can result in an increase or decrease in equilibrium prices.
Combined with the effect of removing imputation, the equilibrium prices of assets in the small
market reduce and the equilibrium prices of assets in the large market end up increasing. Because
the benefit under imputation only makes domestic assets more attractive, but the partial taxation
of dividends makes all risky assets more attractive, the results is a re-balancing of portfolios
and a chance in equilibrium prices. For the same reason, this policy results in an increase in the
risk-free rate, as it becomes relatively less attractive for investors affected by the policy.
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• Table 6.19 shows the weight each investor places on the risk-free asset after the policy change.
Compared to Table 6.2, the effect of the partial taxation of dividends (not including the abolition
of imputation) is that investors in the small market decrease their investment in the risk-free
asset due to the higher return after-tax returns available from risky assets, and investors in the
large market increase their investment in the risk-free asset, attracted by the higher risk-free rate.
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Table 6.18: Equilibrium after removing imputation and partially taxing dividends
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Risk-free
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 10’
Price 90.22 87.75 87.42 86.81 87.32 90.25 85.73 91.42 87.13 90.92 468.06
878.87 828.45 851.84 833.09 834.64 884.93 845.33 857.93 841.55 890.36
Price (-0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.18)
changes (+0.06 +0.14 +0.10 +0.13 +0.13 +0.05 +0.11 +0.09 +0.12 +0.05)
Tangency 3.66% -0.40% 0.35% 3.22% 0.89% 5.54% -2.62% 3.20% -0.74% 6.86%
portfolio A 10.42% 5.78% 8.59% 2.39% 7.35% 6.70% 7.13% 5.79% 8.34% 17.53%
Tangency 3.02% -0.08% 0.49% 2.67% 0.90% 4.45% -1.78% 2.67% -0.34% 5.46%
portfolio B 10.15% 6.49% 8.70% 3.92% 7.71% 7.34% 7.56% 6.58% 8.48% 15.61%
Tangency 2.69% 0.08% 0.56% 2.39% 0.90% 3.89% -1.35% 2.40% -0.14% 4.74%
portfolio C 10.02% 6.86% 8.75% 4.71% 7.89% 7.67% 7.79% 6.98% 8.55% 14.62%
Tangency 1.81% 0.51% 0.74% 1.65% 0.92% 2.41% -0.21% 1.68% 0.40% 2.83%
portfolio D 9.67% 7.83% 8.89% 6.79% 8.38% 8.53% 8.38% 8.05% 8.74% 12.01%
Tangency 1.58% 0.62% 0.79% 1.45% 0.92% 2.02% 0.09% 1.49% 0.54% 2.33%
portfolio E 9.57% 8.09% 8.93% 7.34% 8.50% 8.76% 8.54% 8.33% 8.79% 11.32%
Tangency 0.81% 1.00% 0.96% 0.80% 0.93% 0.71% 1.10% 0.85% 1.01% 0.65%
portfolio F 9.26% 8.94% 9.05% 9.18% 8.93% 9.53% 9.06% 9.27% 8.95% 9.01%
Tangency 0.81% 1.00% 0.96% 0.80% 0.93% 0.71% 1.10% 0.85% 1.01% 0.65%
portfolio G to L 9.26% 8.94% 9.05% 9.18% 8.93% 9.53% 9.06% 9.27% 8.95% 9.01%
Equilibrium price for assets in the small market decrease and in the large market increase. Risk-free rate increase. Investors in
the small market have different tangency portfolio. Short sale occurs for small market investors that have higher personal tax
rate on domestic assets.
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Table 6.19: Investors’ weight in the risk-free asset after removing imputation and partially taxing
dividends
Investor A B C D E F
Weight in risk-free -6.13% -19.61% 18.03% -2.67% -11.46% -40.39%
Change -15.73% -9.22% -2.80% +8.27% +13.39% +16.50%
Investor G H I J K L
Weight in risk-free 24.78% 8.64% 34.52% 9.96% -0.09% -40.39%
Change -0.14% -0.11% -0.07% +0.11% +0.26% -1.10%
The equivalent dollar value of expected utility for each investor is shown in Table 6.20. The effect
has two components. First, the effect of removing imputation is the opposite to the effect of introducing
imputation, which is shown in Table 6.7. That is, for investors in the small market, the expected utility
level has fallen materially and for investors in the large market the change in utility is immaterial.
Second, the effect of the partial taxation of dividends is quantified in Table 6.21. Here, besides
Investor F who has a 0% personal tax rate, other investors in the small market benefit from receiving
more after-tax cash flow. Investors with higher personal tax rates benefit more because the amount of
tax saved is greater. Investor F suffers from a higher risk-free rate for his short position in the risk-free
asset. Investors in the large market also suffer a loss from the forced re-balancing of their portfolios.
They benefit from the increase in the risk-free rate if they have a long position in the risk-free asset and
suffer if they have a short position. Thus, investors with higher personal tax rates who have a higher
percentage in the risk-free asset benefit more from partial taxation of dividends.
Combining the two effects, there is a greater benefit for investors in the small market, and investors
with a higher personal tax rates. Investors in the large market benefit if they have a deep long position
in the risk-free asset, otherwise they suffer a loss.
Table 6.20: Dollar value of expected utility change remove imputation and partial taxation of dividends
Investor A B C D E F
Full imputation 158.69 160.62 160.09 163.23 164.30 169.00
Partially tax 159.35 161.17 160.39 163.27 164.23 168.40
Change +0.66 +0.55 +0.31 +0.05 -0.07 -0.61
Investor G H I J K L
Full imputation 1585.07 1603.57 1598.87 1628.90 1638.99 1684.31
Partially tax 1585.13 1603.56 1628.90 1638.93 1638.97 1683.96
Change +0.06 -0.00 +0.12 +0.00 -0.06 -0.35
The Equity Home Bias (EBS) calculated as Equation 4.1 before and after the new policy is shown
in Table 6.22. The partial taxation of dividends policy hardly creates home-bias because partial taxation
dividends is imposed to both domestic and foreign assets.
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Table 6.21: Dollar value of expected utility change by partial taxation of dividends compared to double
taxation
Investor A B C D E F
Double taxation 158.50 160.35 159.88 162.89 163.90 168.44
Partially tax 159.35 161.17 160.39 163.27 164.23 168.40
Change +0.85 +0.81 +0.51 +0.39 +0.33 -0.04
Investor G H I J K L
Double taxation 1585.03 1603.55 1598.82 1628.87 1638.97 1684.35
Partially tax 1585.13 1603.56 1628.90 1638.93 1638.97 1683.96
Change +0.09 +0.02 +0.17 +0.03 -0.04 -0.39
Table 6.22: EHB before and after remove imputation and partial taxation of dividends
Before After
Small market 0.33 0.05
Large market 0.38 0.06
Conclusion
The effects of removing imputation credits and partial taxation of dividends (50% of dividend dis-
tributed is taxed) for small market investors include:
• The equilibrium prices of risky assets in the small market fall, while the equilibrium prices of
risky assets in the large market increase. This occurs because the partial taxation of dividends
creates demand from investors in the small market for both domestic and foreign assets, while
imputation only makes domestic assets more attractive.
• The risk-free rate increases because risky assets become relatively more attractive and demand
for the risk-free asset falls.
• Investors in the small market benefit from receiving a higher after-tax cash flow, and investors
with higher personal tax rates benefit more. However Investors E and F (who have 15% and 0%
personal tax rates) suffer a loss from the policy change because the benefit of tax saving is lower
than the benefit of imputation to them.
• Investors in the large market benefit from the increase in the risk-free rate if they have a deep
long position in the risk-free asset, otherwise they suffer a loss from the forced re-balancing of
their portfolio.
• The new policy has an immaterial effect on home bias because both domestic and foreign assets
are subject to partial taxation of dividends.
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6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I introduce personal tax into the modelling framework developed in the previous chap-
ters, and I numerically compare the effects of various different dividend tax policies with imputation.
This chapter establishes that:
• The modelling framework is sufficiently powerful to handle more complex situations with more
investors with different personal tax rates.
• The modelling framework enables us to quantify the influence of different policy changes on
each individual investor and on each individual asset, which is impossible to do analytically.
• The effect of policy changes has two components: a direct effect caused by the introduction of
the new policy and an indirect effect caused by the consequential equilibrium movements. This
has not been identified in the previous literature, mainly due to the lack of a methodology to
quantify the indirect effect.
• Domestic investors with low personal tax rates benefit most from domestic imputation. However,
foreign investors also benefit from imputation mainly through a higher equilibrium risk-free rate
to the extent that they have a long position in the risk-free asset.
• The abolition of cash refunds for excess imputation credits directly affect investors with low
personal tax rates. Investors with higher personal tax rates benefit slightly more from this policy
than a full imputation policy, as their holding percentage of risky assets increases and they are
eligible to redeem more credits. This policy results in lower home bias than full imputation,
because investors with low personal tax rates benefit less from the policy and thus tilt less
towards domestic assets.
• A lower corporate tax benefits all investors, but particularly those that hold a higher percentage
in risky assets. That is, investors with a higher amount of initial wealth, lower personal tax rate,
or lower risk aversion benefit more. This policy creates no home bias because both domestic and
foreign investors benefit equally from this policy.
• The partial taxation of dividends benefits domestic investors by increasing their after-tax returns,
and those with higher personal tax rates benefit more. Domestic investors with a 0% personal
tax rate have no direct benefit from the policy. Short selling occurs for high personal tax rate
investors on domestic assets which have a relatively low return and less diversification benefits.
Investors not subject to the policy benefit mainly from an increase in the risk-free rate – thus
investors with a deep long position in the risk-free asset benefit most. There is negligible home
bias under this policy, because both domestic and foreign assets are subject to the partial taxation
of dividends.

Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis, I develop a numerical approach for deriving a market equilibrium. This allows me to
compare equilibrium outcomes before and after the introduction of dividend imputation.
I first study the effect of imputation in a single market model, then I extend the analysis to a
two-market scenario where a small market (Australia introduces imputation) and a large market (US)
does not. I then calibrate the two-market model to real market data and study the effects of imputation
credits based on stock market data from Australia and the US. Finally, I introduce personal taxes into
the model and analyse a range of alternative dividend tax policies.
The modelling framework developed in this thesis is sufficiently powerful to accommodate a broad
range of scenarios, including fully segmented markets, an integrated global market, and partially
segmented markets. It can also accommodate a large number of risky assets and investors.
The most important finding from this thesis is that the introduction of dividend imputation changes
the nature of the market equilibrium, including the equilibrium prices of assets, the risk-free rate,
investors’ portfolio choices, market portfolio weights, the beta of each asset, and so on. When analyzing
the effect of different dividend tax policies (e.g. full imputation, partial taxation on dividends, etc.)
it is important to consider the effect of this change in equilibrium outcomes – something that has
not been done in the extant literature. The extant literature such as Lally and van Zijl (2003) is
capable of identifying the component of total returns that is due to imputation credits within the
current equilibrium, but these models tell us nothing about the movement between one equilibrium
and another that results from the introduction of imputation. Moreover, in the two-market model under
imputation, because investors do not hold every asset in the market, the standard CAPM equilibrium
cannot be derived analytically so that only numerical solutions are available. The modelling framework
developed in this thesis provides a detailed description of equilibrium changes under a broad range of
scenarios, and it enables us to quantify the effect on each individual investor and on each individual
asset. We can obtain the information we need numerically, such as the change in the cost of capital,
the change in the risk-free rate, the change in investors’ expected utility levels and so on under various
scenarios.
Generally, the equilibrium prices of risky assets do not change materially when imputation is
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introduced because an increase in the risk-free rate offsets part of the incentive to tilt portfolios towards
credit-paying assets. In this situation, the benefits of imputation predominantly flow to investors
through higher expected returns. However, if we assume that the government fixes the risk-free rate
and varies the amount it borrows to clear the market, equilibrium prices increase more for assets that
provide imputation credits. In this situation, the benefit of imputation flows more to companies through
a lower cost of capital, and less to investors.
The introduction of imputation induces a home bias as investors tilt their portfolios towards
domestic assets to capture the benefit of credits. As noted above, the introduction of imputation tends
to increase the risk-free rate, which flows through to impact on foreign investors.
In practice, it is common to omit the value of imputation credits when measuring returns. I have
shown that use the standard CAPM based on returns that do not consider imputation credits leads to
material estimation error.
It is also common in practice to implement the CAPM with reference to a domestic market portfolio,
implicitly assuming segregated markets. This also produces material estimation error. My results show
that there is estimation error in relation to asset beta, market risk premium, and expected returns. The
estimation errors are larger in the small market than in the large market.
I also show that, in equilibrium, domestic investors find it attractive to short sell domestic assets
that do not pay imputation credits in order to increase investment in those assets that do distribute
credits. This is hedged by holding a long position in a positively correlated asset in the foreign market.
I also numerically test the effect of a short sale restriction on the market equilibrium. I show that
investors hold zero of the asset that would otherwise be shorted and the equilibrium price of that
asset increases, and equilibrium prices of other assets decrease. Investors are made worse off by the
restriction.
After introducing personal tax rates into the model it is able to analyze the effects of policy changes
relating to dividend tax policies. I show that there are two components to the effects of changes
in tax policy: the direct effect of the policy change itself and an indirect effect resulting from the
consequential change in the equilibrium. It is important to consider the indirect effect of equilibrium
movement when comparing different dividend tax policies. This is not something that has been done
in the extant literature.
The difficulty in implementing the framework that is developed in this thesis lies in numerically
solving for the market equilibrium. In this thesis, I creatively convert the problem of calculating the
market equilibrium into a root finding problem (i.e., find the root of g(P) = 0, where g(P) = f (P)−P,
is the difference between total investment f (P) in the assets as a function of asset prices P, and asset
prices P), and I then apply numerical methods to solve the problem.
In summary, the framework provided in this thesis is useful for analyzing the effects of imputation
credits on market equilibria and for analysing the effects of alternative dividend tax policies.
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Appendix A
Theories and derivations for calculating
market equilibrium
A.1 Derivation of the expected utility function
The power utility functions can be written as:
U(W ) =
W 1−ε
1− ε , ε > 0, ε 6= 1, (A.1)
where ε is the investor’s relative risk aversion rate and W is the wealth of an investor.
In a single-period portfolio choice problem, the end-of-period wealth is random since the return of
every portfolio is random (depending upon the random returns of the assets in the portfolio). Let rp be
the random rate of return of an individual’s portfolio, such that the individual’s end-of-period wealth is
given by:
W˜ =W0(1+ rp), (A.2)
where W0 is the wealth of the investor at the start of the period.
The random utility U(W˜ ) can then be expanded around the expected value of wealth, denoted as
E[W˜ ], using a Taylor series expansion. Let U ′(·), U ′′(·), and U (n)(·) denote the first, second, and nth
derivatives of the utility function. We have:
U(W˜ ) = U
(
E[W˜ ]
)
+
(
W˜ −E[W˜ ])U ′(E[W˜ ])
+
1
2
(
W˜ −E[W˜ ])2U ′′(E[W˜ ])+ ...
+
1
n!
(
W˜ −E[W˜ ])nU (n)(E[W˜ ])+ ... .
Thus the expected utility is given by:
E
[
U(W˜ )
]
= U
(
E[W˜ ]
)
+E
[(
W˜ −E[W˜ ])]U ′(E[W˜ ])
+
1
2
E
[(
W˜ −E[W˜ ])2]U ′′(E[W˜ ])+ ...
+
1
n!
E
[(
W˜ −E[W˜ ])n]U (n)(E[W˜ ])+ ...
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From the above function we note that the expected utility E
[
U(W˜ )
]
depends on the mean and
central moments of end-of-period wealth W˜ . For an expected-utility-maximising investor to have
mean-variance preferences, the expected utility must only depend on the mean and variance of the
portfolio return. Therefore, this either requires the utility function to be quadratic, or the portfolio
returns to have a normal (Gaussian) distribution. The utility function is assumed to be power utility
(since quadratic utility displays unattractive negative marginal utility for high levels of wealth), so
the asset returns are assumed to be multivariate normally distributed and the portfolio of assets has a
normally distributed return.
As the portfolio return is normally distributed, the end-of-period wealth W˜ is also normally
distributed. If V[W˜ ] is the variance of W˜ , the expected utility can be written as:
E
[
U(W˜ )
]
= U
(
E[W˜ ]
)
+0
+
1
2
V[W˜ ]U ′′
(
E[W˜ ]
)
+0
+
1
8
(
V[W˜ ]
)2U ′′′′(E[W˜ ])+0+ ...
+
1
(n/2)!
(1
2
V[W˜ ]
)(n/2)U (n)(E[W˜ ])+ ...
≈ U(E[W˜ ])+ 1
2
V[W˜ ]U ′′
(
E[W˜ ]
)
=
(
E[W˜ ]
)1−ε
1− ε −
1
2
V[W˜ ]
ε(
E[W˜ ]
)1+ε .
(A.3)
If we let µp and σp2 denote the mean and variance of the portfolio return rp, from Equation A.2,
the mean and variance of W˜ is:
E[W˜ ] =W0(1+µp),
V[W˜ ] =W 20 σp2.
(A.4)
Then substitute Equation A.4 into Equation A.3 to yield the following expression for expected
utility:
E
[
U(W˜ )
]
=
[
W0(1+µp)
]1−ε
1− ε −
1
2
W 20 σp
2 ε[
W0(1+µp])
]1+ε .
Every investor then maximizes expected utility, given their risk aversion.
A.2 Derivation for the solution of mean-variance efficient portfo-
lio and the Classic CAPM
The mean-variance efficient frontier is a set of portfolios that achieves the lowest level of portfolio
variance for each portfolio expected return. The construction of the mean-variance efficient portfolios
is derived below.
Let µ =
[
E[r1],E[r2], ...,E[rn]
]T
be an n× 1 vector of n risky assets’ expected returns. Let Σ
be an n× n covariance matrix of the returns on the n assets. Since Σ is a covariance matrix, it is
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symmetric and positive definite. Assume there is a risk-free asset with risk-free return rate r f . Let
ω = [ω1,ω2, ...,ωn] be a 1× n vector of portfolio proportions in risky assets, such that ωi is the
proportion of wealth invested in the ith risky asset. Thus (1−ω ·1) is the proportion invested in the
risk-free asset, where 1 is a n×1 vector of ones.
The portfolio optimization problem is to find the optimal portfolio weights ωˆ that minimize the
portfolio variance1 given a specific portfolio expected return:
ωˆ = argmin
ω
{1
2
ωΣωT
}
subject to
ω ·µ+ r f (1−ω ·1) = µˆp,
where µˆp is the target portfolio expected return rate.
This is a standard quadratic optimization problem, with solution given by:
ωˆT =
(µˆp− r f )Σ−1(µ− r f ·1)
(µ− r f ·1)TΣ−1(µ− r f ·1) . (A.5)
Moreover, the relation between the variance and the expected return of a mean-variance efficient
portfolio can be easily derived as:
σp2 = ωˆΣωˆT =
(µˆp− r f )2
(µ− r f ·1)TΣ−1(µ− r f ·1) . (A.6)
Taking the square root of Equation A.6 yields that the relation between an efficient portfolio’s
standard deviation σp and expected return µˆp is linear, as shown by the straight line in Figure A.1.
This straight line is usually referred to as the Capital Market Line (CML).
Figure A.1: Mean-variance efficient frontier
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The solid part of the hyperbola in Figure A.1 is the efficient frontier consisting of only risky
assets. Any portfolio on the CML can be replicated by two particular portfolios: one portfolio that
1Note that minimizing one-half of the portfolio variance is equivalent to minimizing the portfolio variance. This
simplifies the first-order condition and only changes the scale of the Lagrange multipliers.
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is located on the “risky-asset-only” frontier and tangent to the CML (the tangency portfolio); and
another portfolio that holds only the risk-free asset. This implies that, if all investors agree on the
distribution of asset returns (i.e., homogeneous expectations), then they all will choose to hold risky
assets in the same relative proportion given by the tangency portfolio. That is, all investors will invest
in the risk-free asset and the tangency portfolio in some proportion. The relative proportions invested
in each will vary according to each investor’s risk aversion. Therefore, in equilibrium, the aggregate
demand for risky assets will mirror the tangency portfolio as all investors demand risky assets in the
same proportion. Also, the aggregate demand must be a portfolio containing all risky assets. Thus, for
the market to clear, the tangency portfolio must be the portfolio of all assets, known as the ’market
portfolio.’
The weights for the market portfolio ωm can be calculated as:
ωm =
(
Σ−1(µ− r f ·1)
1TΣ−1(µ− r f ·1)
)T
. (A.7)
Furthermore, the expected rate of return µm and variance σm2 for market portfolio are:
µm = ωm ·µ, (A.8)
σm2 =
(µ− r f ·1)TΣ−1(µ− r f ·1)
[1TΣ−1(µ− r f ·1)]2
. (A.9)
The vector giving the relation between asset returns and the return on the market portfolio is easily
derived to be:
(µ− r f ·1) = (µm− r f )β , (A.10)
where:
β =
Σ ·ωTm
σm2
.
Hence, coordinate i of this vector, which gives the relation between asset i’s return and the market
portfolio’s return, is given by:
(E[ri]− r f ) = βi(E[rm]− r f ), for i = 1,2, ...n, (A.11)
where ri is the return of the ith asset, rm is the return of the market portfolio and βi is the ith element of
β , and
βi =
Cov(ri,rm)
σm2
.
Equation A.10 or Equation A.11 can be interpreted as an equilibrium relationship between the
excess expected return on any asset and the excess expected return on the market portfolio. This is
referred as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
Appendix B
Further results for the single market model
B.1 Numerical verification of the CAPM with imputation credits
(Case Two B)
The CAPM with imputation credits, Equation 3.13, is verified numerically in Case Two B, where all
risky assets provide imputation credits, but only Investor B is eligible to redeem credits. Therefore, the
utilization rate for Investor A is zero, UA = 0, while for Investor B is one, UB = 1. The risk-free rate
can be read from Table 3.28 as r f = 10.36%. The numerical value for each terms in Equation 3.13 are
shown in Table B.1.
Table B.1: Verification of the CAPM with imputation credits (Case Two B)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)= (2)(3)(4) ∑(1)(5)
Investor Ui pii 1λi ∑
pii
λi
xi U
A 0 0.3429 0.3234
0.2697
0.4112
0.5888
B 1 0.6571 0.2417 0.5888
(6) (7) (8) Left Right
Asset E[r·] IC·P·1 Cov(r·,rm) (6)+U(7)
(8)
(4) + r f
1 13.38% 1.13% 0.99% 14.05% 14.05%
2 17.58% 1.18% 2.13% 18.27% 18.27%
3 14.04% 1.14% 1.17% 14.70% 14.70%
Equation 3.13 provides a market wide expected return with imputation credits of each risky asset,
which is a weighted average of the expected return with imputation credits for Investor A and Investor
B, with weights xA = 0.4112 and xB = 0.5888.
Notice, in this case, the value of the redeem credits, U in Table B.1, is 0.5888. It is smaller than
the proportion of imputation credits that are redeemed by investors, as shown in Table 3.30, which is
$1.97/$3.00 = 0.6567.
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The weight of each risky asset in the market portfolio is in proportion to its total presence in the
market, which is wmj = [33.80%, 32.59%, 33.61%]. For the return of the market portfolio, we have:
E[rˆm] =∑wmj E[rˆ j] = 15.65%.
where E[rˆ j] = [14.05%, 18.27%, 14.70%] is the market wide expected return with imputation credits
of risky assets in Table B.1. Moreover, the numerical value of the right side of Equation 3.14 for the
market portfolio is:
15.65% =
V(rm)
∑ piiλi
+ r f =
1.42%
26.97%
+10.36%.
Again, the numerically derived equilibrium outcome for this case is consistent with the algebraically
derived outcome in (Lally and van Zijl, 2003).
B.2 Numerical verification of the CAPM with imputation credits
(Case Three 1)
In this case, similar to Case One, both investors receive the imputation credits, thus the utilization rate
for both Investor A and B are 1, UA =UB =U = 1. Moreover, Investor A and B have the same the
tangency portfolio, rKA = rKB = rm. The numerical value of each term in the CAPM with imputation
credits are shown in Table B.2. Recall r f = 10.45% from Table 3.37.
Table B.2: Verification of the CAPM with imputation credits (Case Three 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) Left Right
Asset E[r·] IC·P·1 Cov(r·,rm)
1
λ (1)+U(2)
(3)
(4) + r f
1 12.99% 1.13% 0.99%
26.97%
14.12% 14.12%
2 17.16% 1.17% 2.13% 18.33% 18.33%
3 14.82% 0.00% 1.18% 14.82% 14.82%
Also for the market portfolio:
E[rˆm] =∑wmj E[rˆ j] = 15.73%,
where wmj = [33.91%, 32.71%, 33.38%] as in Table B.2.
Or for the market portfolio as in Equation 3.16:
15.73% = 10.45%+
1.42%
26.97%
We can see, the numerically derived equilibrium outcome for this case is consistent with the
algebraically derived outcome in (Lally and van Zijl, 2003).
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B.3 Details of the results for Case Three 2
The equilibrium result is shown in Table B.3. The price of Asset 2, which does not provide credits,
drop $0.56, while the price of Asset 1 and Asset 3 both increase $0.31. The increase of the risk-free
rate is the same as in Case Three 1.
Table B.3: Equilibrium result with imputation (Case Three 2)
Asset 1 2 3 Risk-free
(Difference relative to no-imputation equilibrium)
Payoff 101 100 101 10
Price 88.50 84.45 88.00 9.05
(+0.31) (-0.56) (+0.31) (-0.06)
Return 14.12% 18.42% 14.78% 10.45%
(+0.73%) (+0.78%) (+0.73%) (+0.76%)
Allocation A 38.66 36.89 38.44 -23.98
(90,4) (+0.13) (-0.25) (+0.13) (+0.00)
Return: 17.14%(+0.73%), Std dev:15.12%(-0.00%)
Allocation B 49.84 47.56 49.56 33.04
(180,6) (+0.18) (-0.31) (+0.19) (-0.06)
Return: 14.76%(+0.75%), Std dev: 9.74%(+0.00%)
Market 33.91% 32.36% 33.72% –
portfolio (+0.11%) (-0.22%) (+0.11%) –
Return: 15.73%(+0.74%), Std dev: 11.94%(-0.00%)
The cost of capital changes are shown in Table B.4. In this case, it is Asset 2 that has an increase in
the cost of capital, but the increase is slightly larger than the increase of Asset 3 in Case Three 1. The
decrease of the cost of capital for Asset 1 is the same in Case Three 1 and Case Three 2.
Table B.4: Cost of capital comparison (Case Three 2)
Asset 1 2 3
No imputation 13.39% 17.64% 14.05%
With imputation 12.99% 0.1842 0.1364
Difference -0.40% +0.78% -0.41%
The holding percentage of investors are the same in this case and Case Three 1, but now is Asset 2
does not provide imputation credits, as shown in Table B.5.
The total value of imputation to investors are exactly the same in Case Three 1 and Case Three 2,
as shown in Table B.6.
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Table B.5: Redemption of imputation credits (Case Three 2)
Asset 1 2 3 Total
A’s asset holding 43.68% 43.68% 43.68%
Value of credits $0.44 $0 $0.44 $0.87
B’s asset holding 56.32% 56.32% 56.32%
Value of credits $0.56 $0 $0.56 $1.13
Table B.6: Dollar value of expected utility before and after imputation (Case Three 2)
Investor Before After Difference Credits redeemed Percentage
(1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) (4) (3)/(4)
A 101.45 102.13 0.68 0.87 0.78
B 201.01 202.37 1.36 1.13 1.12
